[ci skip] Fix grammar

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/guides/source/security.md b/guides/source/security.md
index 96b9f4bcce..b30bed3767 100644
--- a/guides/source/security.md
+++ b/guides/source/security.md
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ The following is an excerpt from the [Js.Yamanner@m](http://www.symantec.com/sec
   var IDList = '';   var CRumb = '';   function makeRequest(url, Func, Method,Param) { ...
 ```
 
-The worms exploits a hole in Yahoo's HTML/JavaScript filter, which usually filters all target and onload attributes from tags (because there can be JavaScript). The filter is applied only once, however, so the onload attribute with the worm code stays in place. This is a good example why blacklist filters are never complete and why it is hard to allow HTML/JavaScript in a web application.
+The worms exploit a hole in Yahoo's HTML/JavaScript filter, which usually filters all targets and onload attributes from tags (because there can be JavaScript). The filter is applied only once, however, so the onload attribute with the worm code stays in place. This is a good example why blacklist filters are never complete and why it is hard to allow HTML/JavaScript in a web application.
 
 Another proof-of-concept webmail worm is Nduja, a cross-domain worm for four Italian webmail services. Find more details on [Rosario Valotta's paper](http://www.xssed.com/news/37/Nduja_Connection_A_cross_webmail_worm_XWW/). Both webmail worms have the goal to harvest email addresses, something a criminal hacker could make money with.