# frozen_string_literal: true
require "openssl"
require "base64"
require "active_support/core_ext/array/extract_options"
require "active_support/core_ext/module/attribute_accessors"
require "active_support/message_verifier"
require "active_support/messages/metadata"
module ActiveSupport
# MessageEncryptor is a simple way to encrypt values which get stored
# somewhere you don't trust.
#
# The cipher text and initialization vector are base64 encoded and returned
# to you.
#
# This can be used in situations similar to the <tt>MessageVerifier</tt>, but
# where you don't want users to be able to determine the value of the payload.
#
# len = ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor.key_len
# salt = SecureRandom.random_bytes(len)
# key = ActiveSupport::KeyGenerator.new('password').generate_key(salt, len) # => "\x89\xE0\x156\xAC..."
# crypt = ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor.new(key) # => #<ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor ...>
# encrypted_data = crypt.encrypt_and_sign('my secret data') # => "NlFBTTMwOUV5UlA1QlNEN2xkY2d6eThYWWh..."
# crypt.decrypt_and_verify(encrypted_data) # => "my secret data"
#
# === Confining messages to a specific purpose
#
# By default any message can be used throughout your app. But they can also be
# confined to a specific +:purpose+.
#
# token = crypt.encrypt_and_sign("this is the chair", purpose: :login)
#
# Then that same purpose must be passed when verifying to get the data back out:
#
# crypt.decrypt_and_verify(token, purpose: :login) # => "this is the chair"
# crypt.decrypt_and_verify(token, purpose: :shipping) # => nil
# crypt.decrypt_and_verify(token) # => nil
#
# Likewise, if a message has no purpose it won't be returned when verifying with
# a specific purpose.
#
# token = crypt.encrypt_and_sign("the conversation is lively")
# crypt.decrypt_and_verify(token, purpose: :scare_tactics) # => nil
# crypt.decrypt_and_verify(token) # => "the conversation is lively"
#
# === Making messages expire
#
# By default messages last forever and verifying one year from now will still
# return the original value. But messages can be set to expire at a given
# time with +:expires_in+ or +:expires_at+.
#
# crypt.encrypt_and_sign(parcel, expires_in: 1.month)
# crypt.encrypt_and_sign(doowad, expires_at: Time.now.end_of_year)
#
# Then the messages can be verified and returned upto the expire time.
# Thereafter, verifying returns +nil+.
#
# === Rotating keys
#
# MessageEncryptor also supports rotating out old configurations by falling
# back to a stack of encryptors. Call +rotate+ to build and add an encryptor
# so +decrypt_and_verify+ will also try the fallback.
#
# By default any rotated encryptors use the values of the primary
# encryptor unless specified otherwise.
#
# You'd give your encryptor the new defaults:
#
# crypt = ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor.new(@secret, cipher: "aes-256-gcm")
#
# Then gradually rotate the old values out by adding them as fallbacks. Any message
# generated with the old values will then work until the rotation is removed.
#
# crypt.rotate old_secret # Fallback to an old secret instead of @secret.
# crypt.rotate cipher: "aes-256-cbc" # Fallback to an old cipher instead of aes-256-gcm.
#
# Though if both the secret and the cipher was changed at the same time,
# the above should be combined into:
#
# crypt.rotate old_secret, cipher: "aes-256-cbc"
class MessageEncryptor
prepend Messages::Rotator::Encryptor
cattr_accessor :use_authenticated_message_encryption, instance_accessor: false, default: false
class << self
def default_cipher #:nodoc:
if use_authenticated_message_encryption
"aes-256-gcm"
else
"aes-256-cbc"
end
end
end
module NullSerializer #:nodoc:
def self.load(value)
value
end
def self.dump(value)
value
end
end
module NullVerifier #:nodoc:
def self.verify(value)
value
end
def self.generate(value)
value
end
end
class InvalidMessage < StandardError; end
OpenSSLCipherError = OpenSSL::Cipher::CipherError
# Initialize a new MessageEncryptor. +secret+ must be at least as long as
# the cipher key size. For the default 'aes-256-gcm' cipher, this is 256
# bits. If you are using a user-entered secret, you can generate a suitable
# key by using <tt>ActiveSupport::KeyGenerator</tt> or a similar key
# derivation function.
#
# First additional parameter is used as the signature key for +MessageVerifier+.
# This allows you to specify keys to encrypt and sign data.
#
# ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor.new('secret', 'signature_secret')
#
# Options:
# * <tt>:cipher</tt> - Cipher to use. Can be any cipher returned by
# <tt>OpenSSL::Cipher.ciphers</tt>. Default is 'aes-256-gcm'.
# * <tt>:digest</tt> - String of digest to use for signing. Default is
# +SHA1+. Ignored when using an AEAD cipher like 'aes-256-gcm'.
# * <tt>:serializer</tt> - Object serializer to use. Default is +Marshal+.
def initialize(secret, *signature_key_or_options)
options = signature_key_or_options.extract_options!
sign_secret = signature_key_or_options.first
@secret = secret
@sign_secret = sign_secret
@cipher = options[:cipher] || self.class.default_cipher
@digest = options[:digest] || "SHA1" unless aead_mode?
@verifier = resolve_verifier
@serializer = options[:serializer] || Marshal
end
# Encrypt and sign a message. We need to sign the message in order to avoid
# padding attacks. Reference: https://www.limited-entropy.com/padding-oracle-attacks/.
def encrypt_and_sign(value, expires_at: nil, expires_in: nil, purpose: nil)
verifier.generate(_encrypt(value, expires_at: expires_at, expires_in: expires_in, purpose: purpose))
end
# Decrypt and verify a message. We need to verify the message in order to
# avoid padding attacks. Reference: https://www.limited-entropy.com/padding-oracle-attacks/.
def decrypt_and_verify(data, purpose: nil, **)
_decrypt(verifier.verify(data), purpose)
end
# Given a cipher, returns the key length of the cipher to help generate the key of desired size
def self.key_len(cipher = default_cipher)
OpenSSL::Cipher.new(cipher).key_len
end
private
def _encrypt(value, **metadata_options)
cipher = new_cipher
cipher.encrypt
cipher.key = @secret
# Rely on OpenSSL for the initialization vector
iv = cipher.random_iv
cipher.auth_data = "" if aead_mode?
encrypted_data = cipher.update(Messages::Metadata.wrap(@serializer.dump(value), metadata_options))
encrypted_data << cipher.final
blob = "#{::Base64.strict_encode64 encrypted_data}--#{::Base64.strict_encode64 iv}"
blob = "#{blob}--#{::Base64.strict_encode64 cipher.auth_tag}" if aead_mode?
blob
end
def _decrypt(encrypted_message, purpose)
cipher = new_cipher
encrypted_data, iv, auth_tag = encrypted_message.split("--".freeze).map { |v| ::Base64.strict_decode64(v) }
# Currently the OpenSSL bindings do not raise an error if auth_tag is
# truncated, which would allow an attacker to easily forge it. See
# https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/63
raise InvalidMessage if aead_mode? && (auth_tag.nil? || auth_tag.bytes.length != 16)
cipher.decrypt
cipher.key = @secret
cipher.iv = iv
if aead_mode?
cipher.auth_tag = auth_tag
cipher.auth_data = ""
end
decrypted_data = cipher.update(encrypted_data)
decrypted_data << cipher.final
message = Messages::Metadata.verify(decrypted_data, purpose)
@serializer.load(message) if message
rescue OpenSSLCipherError, TypeError, ArgumentError
raise InvalidMessage
end
def new_cipher
OpenSSL::Cipher.new(@cipher)
end
attr_reader :verifier
def aead_mode?
@aead_mode ||= new_cipher.authenticated?
end
def resolve_verifier
if aead_mode?
NullVerifier
else
MessageVerifier.new(@sign_secret || @secret, digest: @digest, serializer: NullSerializer)
end
end
end
end