# frozen_string_literal: true
require "ipaddr"
module ActionDispatch
# This middleware calculates the IP address of the remote client that is
# making the request. It does this by checking various headers that could
# contain the address, and then picking the last-set address that is not
# on the list of trusted IPs. This follows the precedent set by e.g.
# {the Tomcat server}[https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=50453],
# with {reasoning explained at length}[http://blog.gingerlime.com/2012/rails-ip-spoofing-vulnerabilities-and-protection]
# by @gingerlime. A more detailed explanation of the algorithm is given
# at GetIp#calculate_ip.
#
# Some Rack servers concatenate repeated headers, like {HTTP RFC 2616}[https://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec4.html#sec4.2]
# requires. Some Rack servers simply drop preceding headers, and only report
# the value that was {given in the last header}[http://andre.arko.net/2011/12/26/repeated-headers-and-ruby-web-servers].
# If you are behind multiple proxy servers (like NGINX to HAProxy to Unicorn)
# then you should test your Rack server to make sure your data is good.
#
# IF YOU DON'T USE A PROXY, THIS MAKES YOU VULNERABLE TO IP SPOOFING.
# This middleware assumes that there is at least one proxy sitting around
# and setting headers with the client's remote IP address. If you don't use
# a proxy, because you are hosted on e.g. Heroku without SSL, any client can
# claim to have any IP address by setting the X-Forwarded-For header. If you
# care about that, then you need to explicitly drop or ignore those headers
# sometime before this middleware runs.
class RemoteIp
class IpSpoofAttackError < StandardError; end
# The default trusted IPs list simply includes IP addresses that are
# guaranteed by the IP specification to be private addresses. Those will
# not be the ultimate client IP in production, and so are discarded. See
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network for details.
TRUSTED_PROXIES = [
"127.0.0.1", # localhost IPv4
"::1", # localhost IPv6
"fc00::/7", # private IPv6 range fc00::/7
"10.0.0.0/8", # private IPv4 range 10.x.x.x
"172.16.0.0/12", # private IPv4 range 172.16.0.0 .. 172.31.255.255
"192.168.0.0/16", # private IPv4 range 192.168.x.x
].map { |proxy| IPAddr.new(proxy) }
attr_reader :check_ip, :proxies
# Create a new +RemoteIp+ middleware instance.
#
# The +ip_spoofing_check+ option is on by default. When on, an exception
# is raised if it looks like the client is trying to lie about its own IP
# address. It makes sense to turn off this check on sites aimed at non-IP
# clients (like WAP devices), or behind proxies that set headers in an
# incorrect or confusing way (like AWS ELB).
#
# The +custom_proxies+ argument can take an Array of string, IPAddr, or
# Regexp objects which will be used instead of +TRUSTED_PROXIES+. If a
# single string, IPAddr, or Regexp object is provided, it will be used in
# addition to +TRUSTED_PROXIES+. Any proxy setup will put the value you
# want in the middle (or at the beginning) of the X-Forwarded-For list,
# with your proxy servers after it. If your proxies aren't removed, pass
# them in via the +custom_proxies+ parameter. That way, the middleware will
# ignore those IP addresses, and return the one that you want.
def initialize(app, ip_spoofing_check = true, custom_proxies = nil)
@app = app
@check_ip = ip_spoofing_check
@proxies = if custom_proxies.blank?
TRUSTED_PROXIES
elsif custom_proxies.respond_to?(:any?)
custom_proxies
else
Array(custom_proxies) + TRUSTED_PROXIES
end
end
# Since the IP address may not be needed, we store the object here
# without calculating the IP to keep from slowing down the majority of
# requests. For those requests that do need to know the IP, the
# GetIp#calculate_ip method will calculate the memoized client IP address.
def call(env)
req = ActionDispatch::Request.new env
req.remote_ip = GetIp.new(req, check_ip, proxies)
@app.call(req.env)
end
# The GetIp class exists as a way to defer processing of the request data
# into an actual IP address. If the ActionDispatch::Request#remote_ip method
# is called, this class will calculate the value and then memoize it.
class GetIp
def initialize(req, check_ip, proxies)
@req = req
@check_ip = check_ip
@proxies = proxies
end
# Sort through the various IP address headers, looking for the IP most
# likely to be the address of the actual remote client making this
# request.
#
# REMOTE_ADDR will be correct if the request is made directly against the
# Ruby process, on e.g. Heroku. When the request is proxied by another
# server like HAProxy or NGINX, the IP address that made the original
# request will be put in an X-Forwarded-For header. If there are multiple
# proxies, that header may contain a list of IPs. Other proxy services
# set the Client-Ip header instead, so we check that too.
#
# As discussed in {this post about Rails IP Spoofing}[http://blog.gingerlime.com/2012/rails-ip-spoofing-vulnerabilities-and-protection/],
# while the first IP in the list is likely to be the "originating" IP,
# it could also have been set by the client maliciously.
#
# In order to find the first address that is (probably) accurate, we
# take the list of IPs, remove known and trusted proxies, and then take
# the last address left, which was presumably set by one of those proxies.
def calculate_ip
# Set by the Rack web server, this is a single value.
remote_addr = ips_from(@req.remote_addr).last
# Could be a CSV list and/or repeated headers that were concatenated.
client_ips = ips_from(@req.client_ip).reverse
forwarded_ips = ips_from(@req.x_forwarded_for).reverse
# +Client-Ip+ and +X-Forwarded-For+ should not, generally, both be set.
# If they are both set, it means that either:
#
# 1) This request passed through two proxies with incompatible IP header
# conventions.
# 2) The client passed one of +Client-Ip+ or +X-Forwarded-For+
# (whichever the proxy servers weren't using) themselves.
#
# Either way, there is no way for us to determine which header is the
# right one after the fact. Since we have no idea, if we are concerned
# about IP spoofing we need to give up and explode. (If you're not
# concerned about IP spoofing you can turn the +ip_spoofing_check+
# option off.)
should_check_ip = @check_ip && client_ips.last && forwarded_ips.last
if should_check_ip && !forwarded_ips.include?(client_ips.last)
# We don't know which came from the proxy, and which from the user
raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?! " \
"HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{@req.client_ip.inspect} " \
"HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{@req.x_forwarded_for.inspect}"
end
# We assume these things about the IP headers:
#
# - X-Forwarded-For will be a list of IPs, one per proxy, or blank
# - Client-Ip is propagated from the outermost proxy, or is blank
# - REMOTE_ADDR will be the IP that made the request to Rack
ips = [forwarded_ips, client_ips, remote_addr].flatten.compact
# If every single IP option is in the trusted list, just return REMOTE_ADDR
filter_proxies(ips).first || remote_addr
end
# Memoizes the value returned by #calculate_ip and returns it for
# ActionDispatch::Request to use.
def to_s
@ip ||= calculate_ip
end
private
def ips_from(header) # :doc:
return [] unless header
# Split the comma-separated list into an array of strings.
ips = header.strip.split(/[,\s]+/)
ips.select do |ip|
# Only return IPs that are valid according to the IPAddr#new method.
range = IPAddr.new(ip).to_range
# We want to make sure nobody is sneaking a netmask in.
range.begin == range.end
rescue ArgumentError
nil
end
end
def filter_proxies(ips) # :doc:
ips.reject do |ip|
@proxies.any? { |proxy| proxy === ip }
end
end
end
end
end
