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author | Harald Eilertsen <haraldei@anduin.net> | 2024-09-28 14:47:41 +0200 |
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committer | Harald Eilertsen <haraldei@anduin.net> | 2024-09-28 15:07:23 +0200 |
commit | 4dff1a1e5b6d1117cf3a8ad9924d38fb7d01b687 (patch) | |
tree | fad2b149f74383897841db0e8e749fd7ea9c95ba /vendor/chillerlan/php-qrcode/examples/html.php | |
parent | c12ef4fbf4b2046e0af68b11e8fe5af2d335f32e (diff) | |
download | volse-hubzilla-4dff1a1e5b6d1117cf3a8ad9924d38fb7d01b687.tar.gz volse-hubzilla-4dff1a1e5b6d1117cf3a8ad9924d38fb7d01b687.tar.bz2 volse-hubzilla-4dff1a1e5b6d1117cf3a8ad9924d38fb7d01b687.zip |
deps: Upgrade smarty/smarty to version 4.5.4
This eliminates a potential vulnerability where an template author could
inject arbitrary PHP files to be run via the 'extends' tag.
See:
- https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/security/advisories/GHSA-4rmg-292m-wg3w
- https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/commit/0be92bc8a6fb83e6e0d883946f7e7c09ba4e857a
Impact assessment:
In our case I would consider this a low severity issue as we don't
allow users to dynamically add or edit smarty templates. Templates has
to be updated via merge requests, or by installing a theme. In both
cases a malicious attacker already has easier ways to inject whatever
code they want.
Further, the extend tag is not in use in any of our core templates.
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/chillerlan/php-qrcode/examples/html.php')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions