<?php
/**
* @file include/security.php
*
* @brief Some security related functions.
*/
use Zotlabs\Lib\Config;
/**
* @param array $user_record The account record
* @param array $channel
* @param bool $login_initial default false
* @param bool $interactive default false
* @param bool $return
* @param bool $update_lastlog
*/
function authenticate_success($user_record, $channel = null, $login_initial = false, $interactive = false, $return = false, $update_lastlog = false) {
$_SESSION['addr'] = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
$lastlog_updated = false;
$uid_to_load = null;
if (x($user_record, 'account_id')) {
App::$account = $user_record;
$_SESSION['account_id'] = $user_record['account_id'];
$_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1;
if ($channel)
$uid_to_load = $channel['channel_id'];
if (!$uid_to_load) {
$uid_to_load = (((x($_SESSION, 'uid')) && (intval($_SESSION['uid'])))
? intval($_SESSION['uid'])
: intval(App::$account['account_default_channel'])
);
}
if ($uid_to_load) {
change_channel($uid_to_load);
}
if ($login_initial || $update_lastlog) {
q("update account set account_lastlog = '%s' where account_id = %d",
dbesc(datetime_convert()),
intval($_SESSION['account_id'])
);
App::$account['account_lastlog'] = datetime_convert();
$lastlog_updated = true;
call_hooks('logged_in', App::$account);
}
}
if (($login_initial) && (!$lastlog_updated)) {
call_hooks('logged_in', $user_record);
// might want to log success here
}
if ($return || x($_SESSION, 'workflow')) {
unset($_SESSION['workflow']);
return;
}
if ((App::$module !== 'home') && x($_SESSION, 'login_return_url') && strlen($_SESSION['login_return_url'])) {
$return_url = $_SESSION['login_return_url'];
// don't let members get redirected to a raw ajax page update - this can happen
// if DHCP changes the IP address at an unfortunate time and paranoia is turned on
if (strstr($return_url, 'update_'))
$return_url = '';
unset($_SESSION['login_return_url']);
goaway(z_root() . '/' . $return_url);
}
/* This account has never created a channel. Send them to new_channel by default */
if (App::$module === 'login') {
$r = q("select count(channel_id) as total from channel where channel_account_id = %d and channel_removed = 0 ",
intval(App::$account['account_id'])
);
if (($r) && (!$r[0]['total']))
goaway(z_root() . '/new_channel');
}
/* else just return */
}
function atoken_login($atoken) {
if (! $atoken) {
return false;
}
if (App::$cmd === 'channel' && argv(1)) {
$channel = channelx_by_nick(argv(1));
if (perm_is_allowed($channel['channel_id'],$atoken['xchan_hash'],'delegate')) {
$_SESSION['delegate_channel'] = $channel['channel_id'];
$_SESSION['delegate'] = $atoken['xchan_hash'];
$_SESSION['account_id'] = intval($channel['channel_account_id']);
change_channel($channel['channel_id']);
return;
}
}
$_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1;
$_SESSION['visitor_id'] = $atoken['xchan_hash'];
$_SESSION['atoken'] = $atoken['atoken_id'];
App::set_observer($atoken);
return true;
}
/**
* @brief
*
* @param array $atoken
* @return array|null
*/
function atoken_xchan($atoken) {
$c = channelx_by_n($atoken['atoken_uid']);
if ($c) {
return [
'atoken_id' => $atoken['atoken_id'],
'xchan_hash' => substr($c['channel_hash'], 0, 16) . '.' . $atoken['atoken_guid'],
'xchan_name' => $atoken['atoken_name'],
'xchan_addr' => 'guest:' . $atoken['atoken_name'] . '@' . App::get_hostname(),
'xchan_network' => 'token',
'xchan_url' => z_root() . '/guest/' . substr($c['channel_hash'], 0, 16) . '.' . $atoken['atoken_guid'],
'xchan_hidden' => 1,
'xchan_photo_mimetype' => 'image/png',
'xchan_photo_l' => z_root() . '/' . get_default_profile_photo(300),
'xchan_photo_m' => z_root() . '/' . get_default_profile_photo(80),
'xchan_photo_s' => z_root() . '/' . get_default_profile_photo(48)
];
}
return null;
}
function atoken_delete($atoken_id) {
$r = q("select * from atoken where atoken_id = %d",
intval($atoken_id)
);
if (!$r)
return;
$c = q("select channel_id, channel_hash from channel where channel_id = %d",
intval($r[0]['atoken_uid'])
);
if (!$c)
return;
$atoken_xchan = substr($c[0]['channel_hash'], 0, 16) . '.' . $r[0]['atoken_guid'];
q("delete from atoken where atoken_id = %d",
intval($atoken_id)
);
q("delete from abook where abook_channel = %d and abook_xchan = '%s'",
intval($c[0]['channel_id']),
dbesc($atoken_xchan)
);
q("delete from abconfig where chan = %d and xchan = '%s'",
intval($c[0]['channel_id']),
dbesc($atoken_xchan)
);
q("update xchan set xchan_deleted = 1 where xchan_hash = '%s'",
dbesc($atoken_xchan)
);
}
/**
* @brief
*
* In order for atoken logins to create content (such as posts) they need a stored xchan.
* we'll create one on the first atoken_login; it can't really ever go away but perhaps
* @fixme we should set xchan_deleted if it's expired or removed
*
* @param array $xchan
* @return void|boolean
*/
function atoken_create_xchan($xchan) {
$r = q("select xchan_hash from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s'",
dbesc($xchan['xchan_hash'])
);
if ($r)
return;
$xchan['xchan_guid'] = $xchan['xchan_hash'];
$store = [];
foreach ($xchan as $k => $v) {
if (strpos($k, 'xchan_') === 0) {
$store[$k] = $v;
}
}
xchan_store_lowlevel($store);
return true;
}
function atoken_abook($uid, $xchan_hash) {
if (substr($xchan_hash, 16, 1) != '.')
return false;
$r = q("select channel_hash from channel where channel_id = %d limit 1",
intval($uid)
);
if (!$r)
return false;
$x = q("select * from atoken where atoken_uid = %d and atoken_guid = '%s'",
intval($uid),
dbesc(substr($xchan_hash, 17))
);
if ($x) {
$xchan = atoken_xchan($x[0]);
$xchan['abook_blocked'] = 0;
$xchan['abook_ignored'] = 0;
$xchan['abook_pending'] = 0;
return $xchan;
}
return false;
}
/**
* @brief Change to another channel with current logged-in account.
*
* @param int $change_channel The channel_id of the channel you want to change to
*
* @return bool|array false or channel record of the new channel
*/
function change_channel($change_channel) {
$ret = false;
if ($change_channel) {
$r = q("select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and channel_account_id = %d and channel_removed = 0 limit 1",
intval($change_channel),
intval(get_account_id())
);
// It's not there. Is this an administrator, and is this the sys channel?
if (is_developer()) {
if (!$r) {
if (is_site_admin()) {
$r = q("select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and channel_system = 1 and channel_removed = 0 limit 1",
intval($change_channel)
);
}
}
}
if ($r) {
$hash = $r[0]['channel_hash'];
$_SESSION['uid'] = intval($r[0]['channel_id']);
App::set_channel($r[0]);
$_SESSION['theme'] = $r[0]['channel_theme'];
$_SESSION['mobile_theme'] = get_pconfig(local_channel(), 'system', 'mobile_theme');
$_SESSION['cloud_tiles'] = get_pconfig(local_channel(), 'system', 'cloud_tiles');
date_default_timezone_set($r[0]['channel_timezone']);
// Update the active timestamp at most once a day
if (substr($r[0]['channel_active'], 0, 10) !== substr(datetime_convert(), 0, 10)) {
q("UPDATE channel SET channel_active = '%s' WHERE channel_id = %d",
dbesc(datetime_convert()),
intval($r[0]['channel_id'])
);
}
$ret = $r[0];
}
$x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1",
dbesc($hash)
);
if ($x) {
$_SESSION['my_url'] = $x[0]['xchan_url'];
$_SESSION['my_address'] = channel_reddress($r[0]);
App::set_observer($x[0]);
App::set_perms(get_all_perms(local_channel(), $hash));
}
if (!is_dir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address']))
@os_mkdir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address'], STORAGE_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS, true);
$arr = ['channel_id' => $change_channel, 'chanx' => $ret];
call_hooks('change_channel', $arr);
}
return $ret;
}
/**
* @brief Creates an additional SQL where statement to check permissions.
*
* @param int $owner_id
* @param bool $remote_observer (optional) use current observer if unset
* @param $table (optional)
* @param $token (optional)
*
* @return string additional SQL where statement
*/
function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '', $token = EMPTY_STR) {
$local_channel = local_channel();
$observer = $remote_observer ?? get_observer_hash();
/**
* Construct permissions
*
* default permissions - anonymous user
*/
if ($table)
$table .= '.';
$sql = " AND {$table}allow_cid = ''
AND {$table}allow_gid = ''
AND {$table}deny_cid = ''
AND {$table}deny_gid = ''
";
/**
* Profile owner - everything is visible
*/
if (($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) {
return EMPTY_STR;
}
else {
/*
* OCAP token access
*/
if ($token) {
$sql = " AND ( {$table}allow_cid like '" . protect_sprintf('%<token:' . $token . '>%') .
"' OR ( {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '' AND {$table}deny_cid = '' AND {$table}deny_gid = '' ) )";
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor.
*/
elseif ($observer) {
$sec = get_security_ids($owner_id, $observer);
// always allow the channel owner, even if authenticated as a visitor
if ($sec['channel_id']) {
foreach ($sec['channel_id'] as $ch) {
if ($observer === $ch) {
return EMPTY_STR;
}
}
}
if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) {
$ca = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) {
$ca[] = '<' . $c . '>';
}
$cs = implode('|', $ca);
}
else {
$cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) {
$ga = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) {
$ga[] = '<' . $g . '>';
}
$gs = implode('|', $ga);
}
else {
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
" AND ( NOT ({$table}deny_cid $regexop '%s' OR {$table}deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( {$table}allow_cid $regexop '%s' OR {$table}allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '') )
)
",
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
}
return $sql;
}
/**
* @brief Creates an additional SQL where statement to check permissions for an item.
*
* @param int $owner_id
* @param bool $remote_observer (optional) use current observer if unset
*
* @return string additional SQL where statement
*/
function item_permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null) {
$local_channel = local_channel();
/**
* Construct permissions
*
* default permissions - anonymous user
*/
$sql = " AND item_private = 0 ";
/**
* Profile owner - everything is visible
*/
if (($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) {
$sql = '';
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor.
*/
else {
$observer = (($remote_observer) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash());
if ($observer) {
$scope = scopes_sql($owner_id, $observer);
$sec = get_security_ids($owner_id, $observer);
// always allow the channel owner, even if authenticated as a visitor
if ($sec['channel_id']) {
foreach ($sec['channel_id'] as $ch) {
if ($observer === $ch) {
return EMPTY_STR;
}
}
}
if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) {
$ca = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) {
$ca[] = '<' . $c . '>';
}
$cs = implode('|', $ca);
}
else {
$cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) {
$ga = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) {
$ga[] = '<' . $g . '>';
}
$gs = implode('|', $ga);
}
else {
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
// This function is often called without an $owner_id in places where this could not be
// determined in advance. The ACL fields will usually not contain the original author or owner
// so we will also check for author_xchan and owner_xchan to account for this ACL deficiency.
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
" AND ( author_xchan = '%s' OR owner_xchan = '%s' OR
(( NOT (deny_cid $regexop '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( allow_cid $regexop '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0 ))
)) OR ( item_private = 1 $scope ))
",
dbesc($observer),
dbesc($observer),
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
}
return $sql;
}
/**
* Remote visitors also need to be checked against the public_scope parameter if item_private is set.
* This function checks the various permutations of that field for any which apply to this observer.
*
*/
function scopes_sql($uid, $observer) {
$str = " and ( public_policy = 'authenticated' ";
if (!is_foreigner($observer))
$str .= " or public_policy = 'network: red' ";
if (local_channel())
$str .= " or public_policy = 'site: " . App::get_hostname() . "' ";
$ab = q("select * from abook where abook_xchan = '%s' and abook_channel = %d limit 1",
dbesc($observer),
intval($uid)
);
if (!$ab)
return $str . " ) ";
if ($ab[0]['abook_pending'])
$str .= " or public_policy = 'any connections' ";
$str .= " or public_policy = 'contacts' ) ";
return $str;
}
/**
* @param string $observer_hash
*
* @return string additional SQL where statement
*/
function public_permissions_sql($observer_hash) {
$owner_id = 0;
if ($observer_hash) {
$sec = get_security_ids($owner_id, $observer_hash);
if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) {
$ca = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) {
$ca[] = '<' . $c . '>';
}
$cs = implode('|', $ca);
}
else {
$cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) {
$ga = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) {
$ga[] = '<' . $g . '>';
}
$gs = implode('|', $ga);
}
else {
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
" AND ( NOT (deny_cid $regexop '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( allow_cid $regexop '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0) )
)
",
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
else {
$sql = EMPTY_STR;
}
return $sql;
}
/*
* Functions used to protect against Cross-Site Request Forgery
* The security token has to base on at least one value that an attacker can't know - here it's the session ID and the private key.
* In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes;
* or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours).
* The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case:
* A security token is used to protect a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link).
* If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer.
* Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are,
* so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types).
*/
function get_form_security_token($typename = '') {
$timestamp = time();
$guid = App::$observer['xchan_guid'] ?? '';
$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $guid . ((local_channel()) ? App::$channel['channel_prvkey'] : '') . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename);
return $timestamp . '.' . $sec_hash;
}
function check_form_security_token($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!x($_REQUEST, $formname)) return false;
$hash = $_REQUEST[$formname];
$max_livetime = 10800; // 3 hours
$x = explode('.', $hash);
if (time() > (IntVal($x[0]) + $max_livetime))
return false;
$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', App::$observer['xchan_guid'] . ((local_channel()) ? App::$channel['channel_prvkey'] : '') . session_id() . $x[0] . $typename);
return ($sec_hash == $x[1]);
}
function check_form_security_std_err_msg() {
/** @noinspection PhpToStringImplementationInspection */
return t('The form security token was not correct. This probably happened because the form has been opened for too long (>3 hours) before submitting it.') . EOL;
}
function check_form_security_token_redirectOnErr($err_redirect, $typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) {
logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . App::$observer['xchan_name'] . ' - form element ' . $typename);
logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA);
notice(check_form_security_std_err_msg());
goaway(z_root() . $err_redirect);
}
}
function check_form_security_token_ForbiddenOnErr($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) {
logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . App::$observer['xchan_name'] . ' - form element ' . $typename);
logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA);
header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
killme();
}
}
// Returns an array of group hash id's on this entire site (across all channels) that this connection is a member of.
// var $contact_id = xchan_hash of connection
function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) {
$groups = [];
$x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s'",
dbesc($contact_id)
);
if (!$x) {
return $groups;
}
// include xchans for all zot-like networks
$xchans = q("select xchan_hash from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' OR ( xchan_guid = '%s' AND xchan_pubkey = '%s' ) ",
dbesc($contact_id),
dbesc($x[0]['xchan_guid']),
dbesc($x[0]['xchan_pubkey'])
);
if ($xchans) {
$hashes = ids_to_querystr($xchans, 'xchan_hash', true);
}
// private profiles are treated as a virtual group
$r = q("SELECT abook_profile from abook where abook_xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) and abook_profile != '' ");
if ($r) {
foreach ($r as $rv) {
$groups[] = 'vp.' . $rv['abook_profile'];
}
}
// physical groups this identity is a member of
$r = q("SELECT hash FROM pgrp left join pgrp_member on pgrp.id = pgrp_member.gid WHERE xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) ");
if ($r) {
foreach ($r as $rr)
$groups[] = $rr['hash'];
}
return $groups;
}
function get_security_ids($channel_id, $ob_hash) {
$ret = [
'channel_id' => [],
'allow_cid' => [],
'allow_gid' => []
];
$x = q("select xchan_hash from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s'",
dbesc($ob_hash)
);
if (!$x) {
return $ret;
}
$ret['allow_cid'][] = $x[0]['xchan_hash'];
if (!$channel_id) {
return $ret;
}
$ch = q("select channel_hash from channel where channel_id = %d",
intval($channel_id)
);
if ($ch) {
$ret['channel_id'][] = $ch[0]['channel_hash'];
}
$groups = [];
// private profiles are treated as a virtual group
$r = q("SELECT abook_profile from abook where abook_channel = %d and abook_xchan = '%s' and abook_profile != ''",
intval($channel_id),
dbesc(protect_sprintf($x[0]['xchan_hash']))
);
if ($r) {
foreach ($r as $rv) {
if (!in_array('vp.' . $rv['abook_profile'], $groups)) {
$groups[] = 'vp.' . $rv['abook_profile'];
}
}
}
// physical groups this identity is a member of
$r = q("SELECT hash FROM pgrp left join pgrp_member on pgrp.id = pgrp_member.gid WHERE pgrp.uid = %d and pgrp_member.xchan = '%s'",
intval($channel_id),
dbesc(protect_sprintf($x[0]['xchan_hash']))
);
if ($r) {
foreach ($r as $rv) {
if (!in_array($rv['hash'], $groups)) {
$groups[] = $rv['hash'];
}
}
}
$ret['allow_gid'] = $groups;
return $ret;
}
// This is used to determine which uid have posts which are visible to the logged in user (from the API) for the
// public_timeline, and we can use this in a community page by making
// $perms = (PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) unless logged in.
// Collect uids of everybody on this site who has opened their posts to everybody on this site (or greater visibility)
// We always include yourself if logged in because you can always see your own posts
// resolving granular permissions for the observer against every person and every post on the site
// will likely be too expensive.
// Returns a string list of comma separated channel_ids suitable for direct inclusion in a SQL query
function stream_perms_api_uids($perms = NULL, $limit = 0, $rand = 0) {
$perms = is_null($perms) ? (PERMS_SITE | PERMS_NETWORK | PERMS_PUBLIC) : $perms;
$ret = array();
$limit_sql = (($limit) ? " LIMIT " . intval($limit) . " " : '');
$random_sql = (($rand) ? " ORDER BY " . db_getfunc('RAND') . " " : '');
if (local_channel())
$ret[] = local_channel();
$x = q("select uid, v from pconfig where cat = 'perm_limits' and k = 'view_stream' ");
if ($x) {
$y = [];
foreach ($x as $xv) {
if (intval($xv['v']) & $perms) {
$y[] = $xv;
}
}
if ($y) {
$ids = ids_to_querystr($y, 'uid');
$r = q("select channel_id from channel where channel_id in ( $ids ) and ( channel_pageflags & %d ) = 0 and channel_system = 0 and channel_removed = 0 $random_sql $limit_sql ",
intval(PAGE_ADULT | PAGE_CENSORED)
);
if ($r) {
foreach ($r as $rr)
if (!in_array($rr['channel_id'], $ret))
$ret[] = $rr['channel_id'];
}
}
}
$str = '';
if ($ret) {
foreach ($ret as $rr) {
if ($str)
$str .= ',';
$str .= intval($rr);
}
}
else
$str = "''";
logger('stream_perms_api_uids: ' . $str, LOGGER_DEBUG);
return $str;
}
function stream_perms_xchans($perms = NULL) {
$perms = is_null($perms) ? (PERMS_SITE | PERMS_NETWORK | PERMS_PUBLIC) : $perms;
$ret = array();
if (local_channel())
$ret[] = get_observer_hash();
$x = q("select uid, v from pconfig where cat = 'perm_limits' and k = 'view_stream' ");
if ($x) {
$y = [];
foreach ($x as $xv) {
if (intval($xv['v']) & $perms) {
$y[] = $xv;
}
}
if ($y) {
$ids = ids_to_querystr($y, 'uid');
$r = q("select channel_hash from channel where channel_id in ( $ids ) and ( channel_pageflags & %d ) = 0 and channel_system = 0 and channel_removed = 0 ",
intval(PAGE_ADULT | PAGE_CENSORED)
);
if ($r) {
foreach ($r as $rr)
if (!in_array($rr['channel_hash'], $ret))
$ret[] = $rr['channel_hash'];
}
}
}
$str = '';
if ($ret) {
foreach ($ret as $rr) {
if ($str)
$str .= ',';
$str .= "'" . dbesc($rr) . "'";
}
}
else
$str = "''";
logger('stream_perms_xchans: ' . $str, LOGGER_DEBUG);
return $str;
}
/**
* Duty day / time checks for account register
* @author hilmar runge
* @since 2020.02.10
* @param $op what to test: isOpen, nextOpen
* @param $wd weekday according ISO-8601 (1 monday, 7 sunday)
* @param $hhmm a 24h clock value hours and minutes
* if no params are given, the values are taken from the current time
* return is bool(false) if register_duty is not available
*/
function zarIsDuty($wd=NULL, $hhmm=NULL, $op='isOpen') {
$isduty = Config::Get('system', 'register_duty_jso');
if (!$isduty)
return (bool)false;
is_null($wd) ? $wd = date('N') : '';
is_null($hhmm) ? $hhmm = date('Hi') : '';
if (!intval($wd . $hhmm)) return (bool)false;
// be sure to have a valid weekday as index
$wd = (7 + $wd) % 7;
$wd === 0 ? $wd = 7 : '';
$duty = json_decode($isduty, true);
if (!$duty)
return (bool)false;
switch ($op) {
case 'isOpen':
/**
* Check if registration is open
* @return int(0) for not close (open) or int(1) for closed.
* return is bool(false) if register_duty is not available
*/
if (!$duty[$wd]) return (bool)false;
$dutyis = 0;
foreach ($duty[$wd] as $o => $tf) {
if ($o > $hhmm) {
$dutyis = $tf;
break;
}
}
return $dutyis;
case 'nextOpen':
/**
* Look for next period opens
* @return "=>N =>Hi" date value of the next period register is open for requests
* where N is a weekday (1=monday ... 7=sunday) according ISO-8601
* where Hi is a 24h clock value hhmm by hours and minutes.
* If no next period open is available, return results to false.
*/
$myd = $wd;
$myh = $hhmm;
$is1 = false;
// $myd = "5"; // testcase only
// $myh = "1110"; // testcase only
// a 1st match may be applied below my time and is to see as a cycle to the next week
// but looking is also for a open time after my time is available this week
foreach ($duty as $dd => $dhs) {
if ($is1 && $dd < $myd)
continue;
foreach ($dhs as $dh => $tf) {
if ($tf) continue; // close
// a weeks 1st open
if (!$is1) $is1 = array($dd, $dh);
// but is a match after now?
//if ($dd == $myd && $myh >= $dh && $myh <= $dh) continue;
// if the day is not (more) today start find early morning
if ($dd > $myd) $myh = "0000";
// a next period after now in the remainder of the week
if ($dd >= $myd && $dh >= $myh && !$tf)
return array($dd, $dh);
else
continue;
}
}
return $is1; // false or array
default:
//
break;
}
}