| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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A HTTP feature policy is Yet Another HTTP header for instructing the
browser about which features the application intends to make use of and
to lock down access to others. This is a new security mechanism that
ensures that should an application become compromised or a third party
attempts an unexpected action, the browser will override it and maintain
the intended UX.
WICG specification: https://wicg.github.io/feature-policy/
The end result is a HTTP header that looks like the following:
```
Feature-Policy: geolocation 'none'; autoplay https://example.com
```
This will prevent the browser from using geolocation and only allow
autoplay on `https://example.com`. Full feature list can be found over
in the WICG repository[1].
As of today Chrome and Safari have public support[2] for this
functionality with Firefox working on support[3] and Edge still pending
acceptance of the suggestion[4].
#### Examples
Using an initializer
```rb
# config/initializers/feature_policy.rb
Rails.application.config.feature_policy do |f|
f.geolocation :none
f.camera :none
f.payment "https://secure.example.com"
f.fullscreen :self
end
```
In a controller
```rb
class SampleController < ApplicationController
def index
feature_policy do |f|
f.geolocation "https://example.com"
end
end
end
```
Some of you might realise that the HTTP feature policy looks pretty
close to that of a Content Security Policy; and you're right. So much so
that I used the Content Security Policy DSL from #31162 as the starting
point for this change.
This change *doesn't* introduce support for defining a feature policy on
an iframe and this has been intentionally done to split the HTTP header
and the HTML element (`iframe`) support. If this is successful, I'll
look to add that on it's own.
Full documentation on HTTP feature policies can be found at
https://wicg.github.io/feature-policy/. Google have also published[5] a
great in-depth write up of this functionality.
[1]: https://github.com/WICG/feature-policy/blob/master/features.md
[2]: https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5694225681219584
[3]: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1390801
[4]: https://wpdev.uservoice.com/forums/257854-microsoft-edge-developer/suggestions/33507907-support-feature-policy
[5]: https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2018/06/feature-policy
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We sometimes say "✂️ newline after `private`" in a code review (e.g.
https://github.com/rails/rails/pull/18546#discussion_r23188776,
https://github.com/rails/rails/pull/34832#discussion_r244847195).
Now `Layout/EmptyLinesAroundAccessModifier` cop have new enforced style
`EnforcedStyle: only_before` (https://github.com/rubocop-hq/rubocop/pull/7059).
That cop and enforced style will reduce the our code review cost.
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The ActionDispatch::HostAuthorization is a new middleware that prevent
against DNS rebinding and other Host header attacks. By default it is
included only in the development environment with the following
configuration:
Rails.application.config.hosts = [
IPAddr.new("0.0.0.0/0"), # All IPv4 addresses.
IPAddr.new("::/0"), # All IPv6 addresses.
"localhost" # The localhost reserved domain.
]
In other environments, `Rails.application.config.hosts` is empty and no
Host header checks will be done. If you want to guard against header
attacks on production, you have to manually permit the allowed hosts
with:
Rails.application.config.hosts << "product.com"
The host of a request is checked against the hosts entries with the case
operator (#===), which lets hosts support entries of type RegExp,
Proc and IPAddr to name a few. Here is an example with a regexp.
# Allow requests from subdomains like `www.product.com` and
# `beta1.product.com`.
Rails.application.config.hosts << /.*\.product\.com/
A special case is supported that allows you to permit all sub-domains:
# Allow requests from subdomains like `www.product.com` and
# `beta1.product.com`.
Rails.application.config.hosts << ".product.com"
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Rack::TemfileReaper in default middleware stack for API only apps
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https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy
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This reverts commit 3420a14590c0e6915d8b6c242887f74adb4120f9, reversing
changes made to afb66a5a598ce4ac74ad84b125a5abf046dcf5aa.
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We want the actual order to be very predictable, so it's rightly defined
in code -- not with an on-the-fly tsort.
But we can do the tsort here, and then verify that it matches the
implemented ordering. This way we don't leave future readers guessing
which parts of the ordering are deliberate and which are arbitrary.
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The current code base is not uniform. After some discussion,
we have chosen to go with double quotes by default.
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These should allow external code to run blocks of user code to do
"work", at a similar unit size to a web request, without needing to get
intimate with ActionDipatch.
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Also call it `public_server.index_name` so it'll make more sense.
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As discussed in https://github.com/rails/rails/pull/19135#issuecomment-153385986.
Replaces `serve_static_files` to unify the static options under the `public_file_server` wing.
Deprecates `serve_static_files` accessors, but make them use the newer config internally.
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Add basic support for access control headers to ActionDispatch::Static
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Now ActionDispatch::Static can accept HTTP headers so that developers
will have control of returning arbitrary headers like
'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' when a response is delivered. They can
be configured through `#config.public_file_server.headers`:
config.public_file_server.headers = {
"Cache-Control" => "public, max-age=60",
"Access-Control-Allow-Origin" => "http://rubyonrails.org"
}
Also deprecate `config.static_cache_control` in favor of
`config.public_file_server.headers`.
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This reverts commit 37423e4ff883ad5584bab983aceb4b2b759a1fd8.
Jeremy is right that we shouldn't remove this. The fact is that many
engines are depending on this middleware to be in the default stack.
This ties our hands and forces us to keep the middleware in the stack so
that engines will work. To be extremely clear, I think this is another
smell of "the rack stack" that we have in place. When manipulating
middleware, we should have meaningful names for places in the req / res
lifecycle **not** have engines depend on a particular constant be in a
particular place in the stack. This is a weakness of the API that we
have to figure out a way to address before removing the constant.
As far as timing attacks are concerned, we can reduce the granularity
such that it isn't useful information for hackers, but is still useful
for developers.
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The runtime header is a potential target for timing attacks since it
returns the amount of time spent on the server (eliminating network
speed). Total time is also not accurate for streaming responses.
The middleware can be added back via:
```ruby
config.middleware.ues ::Rack::Runtime
```
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This can still be added to the middleware stack, but is really not
necessary. I'll follow up with a commit that deprecates the constant
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We don't need to fully disable concurrent requests: just ensure that
loads are performed in isolation.
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when true
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Set `config.static_index` to serve a static directory index file not
named `index`. For example, to serve `main.html` instead of `index.html`
for directory requests, set `config.static_index` to `"main"`.
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Allow static asset serving from env variable (enhanced!)
Conflicts:
railties/CHANGELOG.md
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If code is not eager loaded constants are loaded on demand. Constant
autoloading is not thread-safe, so if eager loading is not enabled
multi-threading should not be allowed.
This showed up in certain Capybara scenarios: Most Capybara drivers
other than Rack::Test need a web server. In particular, drivers for
JavaScript support. Capybara launches WEBrick in its own thread for
those but that per se is fine, because the spec thread and the server
thread are coordinated.
Problem comes if the page being served in the spec makes Ajax calls.
Those may hit WEBrick in parallel, and since WEBrick is multi-threaded
and allow_concurrency? returns true in the test environment before
this patch, threads are spawned to serve those parallel requests. On
the other hand, since eager_load is false by default in the test
environment, constants are not preloaded.
So the suite is autoloading constants in a multi-threaded set. That's
a receipt for paracetamol. The symptom is random obscure errors whose
messages point somehow to constant autoloading.
As a consequence of this fix for allow_concurrency? WEBrick in
Capybara scenarios no longer runs in multi-threaded mode.
Fixes #15089.
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This reverts commit 19ac034bdc9be175eff7cf54208ba14b43d97681.
And allows webservers to configure X-Sendfile-Type.
Closes #11440 thanks to [@MSch]
Conflicts:
railties/lib/rails/application.rb
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A lot of logic for building the default middleware stack is currently
kept in Application class, but this can be encapsulated and made more
modular by being moved to its own class. Also refactored a couple of the
helper methods.
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