| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
This reverts commit 3420a14590c0e6915d8b6c242887f74adb4120f9, reversing
changes made to afb66a5a598ce4ac74ad84b125a5abf046dcf5aa.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
WebSocket always defers the decision to the server, because it didn't
have to deal with legacy compatibility... but the same-origin policy is
still a reasonable default.
Origin checks do not protect against a directly connecting attacker --
they can lie about their host, but can also lie about their origin.
Origin checks protect against a connection from 3rd-party controlled
script in a context where a victim browser's cookies will be passed
along. And if an attacker has breached that protection, they've already
compromised the HTTP session, so treating the WebSocket connection in
the same way seems reasonable.
In case this logic proves incorrect (or anyone just wants to be more
paranoid), we retain a config option to disable it.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
When the `allow_same_origin_as_host` is set to `true`, the request
forgery protection permits `HTTP_ORIGIN` values starting with the
corresponding `proto://` prefix followed by `HTTP_HOST`. This way
it is not required to specify the list of allowed URLs.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
The current code base is not uniform. After some discussion,
we have chosen to go with double quotes by default.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
This reverts commit d0393fccffc118a5de37654aa222774b66123393, reversing
changes made to 3b7ccadfc1c8dfec61af898167e1300b17f5cf25.
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
| |
Warnings coming from code and test are removed
|
| |
|
