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-rw-r--r--guides/source/security.md10
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/guides/source/security.md b/guides/source/security.md
index 2d1bc3b5b3..a81a782cf2 100644
--- a/guides/source/security.md
+++ b/guides/source/security.md
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ It works like this:
* The user takes the cookie from the first step (which they previously copied) and replaces the current cookie in the browser.
* The user has their original credit back.
-Including a nonce (a random value) in the session solves replay attacks. A nonce is valid only once, and the server has to keep track of all the valid nonces. It gets even more complicated if you have several application servers (mongrels). Storing nonces in a database table would defeat the entire purpose of CookieStore (avoiding accessing the database).
+Including a nonce (a random value) in the session solves replay attacks. A nonce is valid only once, and the server has to keep track of all the valid nonces. It gets even more complicated if you have several application servers. Storing nonces in a database table would defeat the entire purpose of CookieStore (avoiding accessing the database).
The best _solution against it is not to store this kind of data in a session, but in the database_. In this case store the credit in the database and the logged_in_user_id in the session.
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ Another class of security vulnerabilities surrounds the use of redirection and f
WARNING: _Redirection in a web application is an underestimated cracker tool: Not only can the attacker forward the user to a trap web site, they may also create a self-contained attack._
-Whenever the user is allowed to pass (parts of) the URL for redirection, it is possibly vulnerable. The most obvious attack would be to redirect users to a fake web application which looks and feels exactly as the original one. This so-called phishing attack works by sending an unsuspicious link in an email to the users, injecting the link by XSS in the web application or putting the link into an external site. It is unsuspicious, because the link starts with the URL to the web application and the URL to the malicious site is hidden in the redirection parameter: http://www.example.com/site/redirect?to= www.attacker.com. Here is an example of a legacy action:
+Whenever the user is allowed to pass (parts of) the URL for redirection, it is possibly vulnerable. The most obvious attack would be to redirect users to a fake web application which looks and feels exactly as the original one. This so-called phishing attack works by sending an unsuspicious link in an email to the users, injecting the link by XSS in the web application or putting the link into an external site. It is unsuspicious, because the link starts with the URL to the web application and the URL to the malicious site is hidden in the redirection parameter: http://www.example.com/site/redirect?to=www.attacker.com. Here is an example of a legacy action:
```ruby
def legacy
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ In 2007 there was the first tailor-made trojan which stole information from an I
Having one single place in the admin interface or Intranet, where the input has not been sanitized, makes the entire application vulnerable. Possible exploits include stealing the privileged administrator's cookie, injecting an iframe to steal the administrator's password or installing malicious software through browser security holes to take over the administrator's computer.
-Refer to the Injection section for countermeasures against XSS. It is _recommended to use the SafeErb plugin_ also in an Intranet or administration interface.
+Refer to the Injection section for countermeasures against XSS.
**CSRF** Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), also known as Cross-Site Reference Forgery (XSRF), is a gigantic attack method, it allows the attacker to do everything the administrator or Intranet user may do. As you have already seen above how CSRF works, here are a few examples of what attackers can do in the Intranet or admin interface.
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ s = sanitize(user_input, tags: tags, attributes: %w(href title))
This allows only the given tags and does a good job, even against all kinds of tricks and malformed tags.
-As a second step, _it is good practice to escape all output of the application_, especially when re-displaying user input, which hasn't been input-filtered (as in the search form example earlier on). _Use `escapeHTML()` (or its alias `h()`) method_ to replace the HTML input characters &, ", <, and > by their uninterpreted representations in HTML (`&`, `"`, `<`, and `>`). However, it can easily happen that the programmer forgets to use it, so _it is recommended to use the SafeErb gem. SafeErb reminds you to escape strings from external sources.
+As a second step, _it is good practice to escape all output of the application_, especially when re-displaying user input, which hasn't been input-filtered (as in the search form example earlier on). _Use `escapeHTML()` (or its alias `h()`) method_ to replace the HTML input characters &, ", <, and > by their uninterpreted representations in HTML (`&`, `"`, `<`, and `>`).
##### Obfuscation and Encoding Injection
@@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ When `params[:token]` is one of: `[nil]`, `[nil, nil, ...]` or
`['foo', nil]` it will bypass the test for `nil`, but `IS NULL` or
`IN ('foo', NULL)` where clauses still will be added to the SQL query.
-To keep rails secure by default, `deep_munge` replaces some of the values with
+To keep Rails secure by default, `deep_munge` replaces some of the values with
`nil`. Below table shows what the parameters look like based on `JSON` sent in
request: