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+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require "ipaddr"
+
+module ActionDispatch
+ # This middleware calculates the IP address of the remote client that is
+ # making the request. It does this by checking various headers that could
+ # contain the address, and then picking the last-set address that is not
+ # on the list of trusted IPs. This follows the precedent set by e.g.
+ # {the Tomcat server}[https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=50453],
+ # with {reasoning explained at length}[http://blog.gingerlime.com/2012/rails-ip-spoofing-vulnerabilities-and-protection]
+ # by @gingerlime. A more detailed explanation of the algorithm is given
+ # at GetIp#calculate_ip.
+ #
+ # Some Rack servers concatenate repeated headers, like {HTTP RFC 2616}[https://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec4.html#sec4.2]
+ # requires. Some Rack servers simply drop preceding headers, and only report
+ # the value that was {given in the last header}[http://andre.arko.net/2011/12/26/repeated-headers-and-ruby-web-servers].
+ # If you are behind multiple proxy servers (like NGINX to HAProxy to Unicorn)
+ # then you should test your Rack server to make sure your data is good.
+ #
+ # IF YOU DON'T USE A PROXY, THIS MAKES YOU VULNERABLE TO IP SPOOFING.
+ # This middleware assumes that there is at least one proxy sitting around
+ # and setting headers with the client's remote IP address. If you don't use
+ # a proxy, because you are hosted on e.g. Heroku without SSL, any client can
+ # claim to have any IP address by setting the X-Forwarded-For header. If you
+ # care about that, then you need to explicitly drop or ignore those headers
+ # sometime before this middleware runs.
+ class RemoteIp
+ class IpSpoofAttackError < StandardError; end
+
+ # The default trusted IPs list simply includes IP addresses that are
+ # guaranteed by the IP specification to be private addresses. Those will
+ # not be the ultimate client IP in production, and so are discarded. See
+ # https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network for details.
+ TRUSTED_PROXIES = [
+ "127.0.0.1", # localhost IPv4
+ "::1", # localhost IPv6
+ "fc00::/7", # private IPv6 range fc00::/7
+ "10.0.0.0/8", # private IPv4 range 10.x.x.x
+ "172.16.0.0/12", # private IPv4 range 172.16.0.0 .. 172.31.255.255
+ "192.168.0.0/16", # private IPv4 range 192.168.x.x
+ ].map { |proxy| IPAddr.new(proxy) }
+
+ attr_reader :check_ip, :proxies
+
+ # Create a new +RemoteIp+ middleware instance.
+ #
+ # The +ip_spoofing_check+ option is on by default. When on, an exception
+ # is raised if it looks like the client is trying to lie about its own IP
+ # address. It makes sense to turn off this check on sites aimed at non-IP
+ # clients (like WAP devices), or behind proxies that set headers in an
+ # incorrect or confusing way (like AWS ELB).
+ #
+ # The +custom_proxies+ argument can take an Array of string, IPAddr, or
+ # Regexp objects which will be used instead of +TRUSTED_PROXIES+. If a
+ # single string, IPAddr, or Regexp object is provided, it will be used in
+ # addition to +TRUSTED_PROXIES+. Any proxy setup will put the value you
+ # want in the middle (or at the beginning) of the X-Forwarded-For list,
+ # with your proxy servers after it. If your proxies aren't removed, pass
+ # them in via the +custom_proxies+ parameter. That way, the middleware will
+ # ignore those IP addresses, and return the one that you want.
+ def initialize(app, ip_spoofing_check = true, custom_proxies = nil)
+ @app = app
+ @check_ip = ip_spoofing_check
+ @proxies = if custom_proxies.blank?
+ TRUSTED_PROXIES
+ elsif custom_proxies.respond_to?(:any?)
+ custom_proxies
+ else
+ Array(custom_proxies) + TRUSTED_PROXIES
+ end
+ end
+
+ # Since the IP address may not be needed, we store the object here
+ # without calculating the IP to keep from slowing down the majority of
+ # requests. For those requests that do need to know the IP, the
+ # GetIp#calculate_ip method will calculate the memoized client IP address.
+ def call(env)
+ req = ActionDispatch::Request.new env
+ req.remote_ip = GetIp.new(req, check_ip, proxies)
+ @app.call(req.env)
+ end
+
+ # The GetIp class exists as a way to defer processing of the request data
+ # into an actual IP address. If the ActionDispatch::Request#remote_ip method
+ # is called, this class will calculate the value and then memoize it.
+ class GetIp
+ def initialize(req, check_ip, proxies)
+ @req = req
+ @check_ip = check_ip
+ @proxies = proxies
+ end
+
+ # Sort through the various IP address headers, looking for the IP most
+ # likely to be the address of the actual remote client making this
+ # request.
+ #
+ # REMOTE_ADDR will be correct if the request is made directly against the
+ # Ruby process, on e.g. Heroku. When the request is proxied by another
+ # server like HAProxy or NGINX, the IP address that made the original
+ # request will be put in an X-Forwarded-For header. If there are multiple
+ # proxies, that header may contain a list of IPs. Other proxy services
+ # set the Client-Ip header instead, so we check that too.
+ #
+ # As discussed in {this post about Rails IP Spoofing}[http://blog.gingerlime.com/2012/rails-ip-spoofing-vulnerabilities-and-protection/],
+ # while the first IP in the list is likely to be the "originating" IP,
+ # it could also have been set by the client maliciously.
+ #
+ # In order to find the first address that is (probably) accurate, we
+ # take the list of IPs, remove known and trusted proxies, and then take
+ # the last address left, which was presumably set by one of those proxies.
+ def calculate_ip
+ # Set by the Rack web server, this is a single value.
+ remote_addr = ips_from(@req.remote_addr).last
+
+ # Could be a CSV list and/or repeated headers that were concatenated.
+ client_ips = ips_from(@req.client_ip).reverse
+ forwarded_ips = ips_from(@req.x_forwarded_for).reverse
+
+ # +Client-Ip+ and +X-Forwarded-For+ should not, generally, both be set.
+ # If they are both set, it means that either:
+ #
+ # 1) This request passed through two proxies with incompatible IP header
+ # conventions.
+ # 2) The client passed one of +Client-Ip+ or +X-Forwarded-For+
+ # (whichever the proxy servers weren't using) themselves.
+ #
+ # Either way, there is no way for us to determine which header is the
+ # right one after the fact. Since we have no idea, if we are concerned
+ # about IP spoofing we need to give up and explode. (If you're not
+ # concerned about IP spoofing you can turn the +ip_spoofing_check+
+ # option off.)
+ should_check_ip = @check_ip && client_ips.last && forwarded_ips.last
+ if should_check_ip && !forwarded_ips.include?(client_ips.last)
+ # We don't know which came from the proxy, and which from the user
+ raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?! " \
+ "HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{@req.client_ip.inspect} " \
+ "HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{@req.x_forwarded_for.inspect}"
+ end
+
+ # We assume these things about the IP headers:
+ #
+ # - X-Forwarded-For will be a list of IPs, one per proxy, or blank
+ # - Client-Ip is propagated from the outermost proxy, or is blank
+ # - REMOTE_ADDR will be the IP that made the request to Rack
+ ips = [forwarded_ips, client_ips, remote_addr].flatten.compact
+
+ # If every single IP option is in the trusted list, just return REMOTE_ADDR
+ filter_proxies(ips).first || remote_addr
+ end
+
+ # Memoizes the value returned by #calculate_ip and returns it for
+ # ActionDispatch::Request to use.
+ def to_s
+ @ip ||= calculate_ip
+ end
+
+ private
+
+ def ips_from(header) # :doc:
+ return [] unless header
+ # Split the comma-separated list into an array of strings.
+ ips = header.strip.split(/[,\s]+/)
+ ips.select do |ip|
+ begin
+ # Only return IPs that are valid according to the IPAddr#new method.
+ range = IPAddr.new(ip).to_range
+ # We want to make sure nobody is sneaking a netmask in.
+ range.begin == range.end
+ rescue ArgumentError
+ nil
+ end
+ end
+ end
+
+ def filter_proxies(ips) # :doc:
+ ips.reject do |ip|
+ @proxies.any? { |proxy| proxy === ip }
+ end
+ end
+ end
+ end
+end