diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'mod/post.php')
| -rw-r--r-- | mod/post.php | 761 |
1 files changed, 738 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/mod/post.php b/mod/post.php index 53180e1c1..05053e798 100644 --- a/mod/post.php +++ b/mod/post.php @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -<?php +<?php /** @file */ /** * Zot endpoint @@ -6,36 +6,519 @@ require_once('include/zot.php'); + + +function post_init(&$a) { + + // Most access to this endpoint is via the post method. + // Here we will pick out the magic auth params which arrive + // as a get request, and the only communications to arrive this way. + +/** + * Magic Auth + * ========== + * + * So-called "magic auth" takes place by a special exchange. On the site where the "channel to be authenticated" lives (e.g. $mysite), + * a redirection is made via $mysite/magic to the zot endpoint of the remote site ($remotesite) with special GET parameters. + * + * The endpoint is typically https://$remotesite/post - or whatever was specified as the callback url in prior communications + * (we will bootstrap an address and fetch a zot info packet if possible where no prior communications exist) + * + * Four GET parameters are supplied: + * + ** auth => the urlencoded webbie (channel@host.domain) of the channel requesting access + ** dest => the desired destination URL (urlencoded) + ** sec => a random string which is also stored on $mysite for use during the verification phase. + ** version => the zot revision + * + * When this packet is received, an "auth-check" zot message is sent to $mysite. + * (e.g. if $_GET['auth'] is foobar@podunk.edu, a zot packet is sent to the podunk.edu zot endpoint, which is typically /post) + * If no information has been recorded about the requesting identity a zot information packet will be retrieved before + * continuing. + * + * The sender of this packet is an arbitrary/random site channel. The recipients will be a single recipient corresponding + * to the guid and guid_sig we have associated with the requesting auth identity + * + * + * { + * "type":"auth_check", + * "sender":{ + * "guid":"kgVFf_...", + * "guid_sig":"PT9-TApz...", + * "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu", + * "url_sig":"T8Bp7j..." + * }, + * "recipients":{ + * { + * "guid":"ZHSqb...", + * "guid_sig":"JsAAXi..." + * } + * } + * "callback":"\/post", + * "version":1, + * "secret":"1eaa661", + * "secret_sig":"eKV968b1..." + * } + * + * + * auth_check messages MUST use encapsulated encryption. This message is sent to the origination site, which checks the 'secret' to see + * if it is the same as the 'sec' which it passed originally. It also checks the secret_sig which is the secret signed by the + * destination channel's private key and base64url encoded. If everything checks out, a json packet is returned: + * + * { + * "success":1, + * "confirm":"q0Ysovd1u..." + * "service_class":(optional) + * "level":(optional) + * } + * + * 'confirm' in this case is the base64url encoded RSA signature of the concatenation of 'secret' with the + * base64url encoded whirlpool hash of the requestor's guid and guid_sig; signed with the source channel private key. + * This prevents a man-in-the-middle from inserting a rogue success packet. Upon receipt and successful + * verification of this packet, the destination site will redirect to the original destination URL and indicate a successful remote login. + * Service_class can be used by cooperating sites to provide different access rights based on account rights and subscription plans. It is + * a string whose contents are not defined by protocol. Example: "basic" or "gold". + * + * + * + */ + + if(array_key_exists('auth',$_REQUEST)) { + + $ret = array('success' => false, 'message' => ''); + + logger('mod_zot: auth request received.'); + $address = $_REQUEST['auth']; + $desturl = $_REQUEST['dest']; + $sec = $_REQUEST['sec']; + $version = $_REQUEST['version']; + $test = ((x($_REQUEST,'test')) ? intval($_REQUEST['test']) : 0); + + // They are authenticating ultimately to the site and not to a particular channel. + // Any channel will do, providing it's currently active. We just need to have an + // identity to attach to the packet we send back. So find one. + + $c = q("select * from channel where not ( channel_pageflags & %d ) limit 1", + intval(PAGE_REMOVED) + ); + + if(! $c) { + // nobody here + logger('mod_zot: auth: unable to find a response channel'); + if($test) { + $ret['message'] .= 'no local channels found.' . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + goaway($desturl); + } + + // Try and find a hubloc for the person attempting to auth + $x = q("select * from hubloc left join xchan on xchan_hash = hubloc_hash where hubloc_addr = '%s' order by hubloc_id desc limit 1", + dbesc($address) + ); + + if(! $x) { + // finger them if they can't be found. + $ret = zot_finger($address,null); + if($ret['success']) { + $j = json_decode($ret['body'],true); + if($j) + import_xchan($j); + $x = q("select * from hubloc left join xchan on xchan_hash = hubloc_hash where hubloc_addr = '%s' order by hubloc_id desc limit 1", + dbesc($address) + ); + } + } + if(! $x) { + logger('mod_zot: auth: unable to finger ' . $address); + + if($test) { + $ret['message'] .= 'no hubloc found for ' . $address . ' and probing failed.' . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + goaway($desturl); + } + + logger('mod_zot: auth request received from ' . $x[0]['hubloc_addr'] ); + + // check credentials and access + + // If they are already authenticated and haven't changed credentials, + // we can save an expensive network round trip and improve performance. + + $remote = remote_user(); + $result = null; + $remote_service_class = ''; + $remote_level = 0; + $remote_hub = $x[0]['hubloc_url']; + + // Also check that they are coming from the same site as they authenticated with originally. + + $already_authed = ((($remote) && ($x[0]['hubloc_hash'] == $remote) && ($x[0]['hubloc_url'] === $_SESSION['remote_hub'])) ? true : false); + + $j = array(); + + if(! $already_authed) { + + // Auth packets MUST use ultra top-secret hush-hush mode - e.g. the entire packet is encrypted using the site private key + // The actual channel sending the packet ($c[0]) is not important, but this provides a generic zot packet with a sender + // which can be verified + + $p = zot_build_packet($c[0],$type = 'auth_check', array(array('guid' => $x[0]['hubloc_guid'],'guid_sig' => $x[0]['hubloc_guid_sig'])), $x[0]['hubloc_sitekey'], $sec); + if($test) { + $ret['message'] .= 'auth check packet created using sitekey ' . $x[0]['hubloc_sitekey'] . EOL; + $ret['message'] .= 'packet contents: ' . $p . EOL; + } + + $result = zot_zot($x[0]['hubloc_callback'],$p); + + + if(! $result['success']) { + logger('mod_zot: auth_check callback failed.'); + if($test) { + $ret['message'] .= 'auth check request to your site returned .' . print_r($result, true) . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + goaway($desturl); + } + $j = json_decode($result['body'],true); + if(! $j) { + logger('mod_zot: auth_check json data malformed.'); + if($test) { + $ret['message'] .= 'json malformed: ' . $result['body'] . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + } + } + + if($test) { + $ret['message'] .= 'auth check request returned .' . print_r($j, true) . EOL; + } + + if($already_authed || $j['success']) { + if($j['success']) { + // legit response, but we do need to check that this wasn't answered by a man-in-middle + if(! rsa_verify($sec . $x[0]['xchan_hash'],base64url_decode($j['confirm']),$x[0]['xchan_pubkey'])) { + logger('mod_zot: auth: final confirmation failed.'); + if($test) { + $ret['message'] .= 'final confirmation failed. ' . $sec . print_r($j,true) . print_r($x[0],true); + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + goaway($desturl); + } + if(array_key_exists('service_class',$j)) + $remote_service_class = $j['service_class']; + if(array_key_exists('level',$j)) + $remote_level = $j['level']; + } + // everything is good... maybe + if(local_user()) { + + // tell them to logout if they're logged in locally as anything but the target remote account + // in which case just shut up because they don't need to be doing this at all. + + if($a->channel['channel_hash'] != $x[0]['xchan_hash']) { + logger('mod_zot: auth: already authenticated locally as somebody else.'); + notice( t('Remote authentication blocked. You are logged into this site locally. Please logout and retry.') . EOL); + if($test) { + $ret['message'] .= 'already logged in locally with a conflicting identity.' . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + } + goaway($desturl); + } + // log them in + + if($test) { + $ret['success'] = true; + $ret['message'] .= 'Authentication Success!' . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + + $_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1; + $_SESSION['visitor_id'] = $x[0]['xchan_hash']; + $_SESSION['my_url'] = $x[0]['xchan_url']; + $_SESSION['my_address'] = $address; + $_SESSION['remote_service_class'] = $remote_service_class; + $_SESSION['remote_level'] = $remote_level; + $_SESSION['remote_hub'] = $remote_hub; + + $arr = array('xchan' => $x[0], 'url' => $desturl, 'session' => $_SESSION); + call_hooks('magic_auth_success',$arr); + $a->set_observer($x[0]); + require_once('include/security.php'); + $a->set_groups(init_groups_visitor($_SESSION['visitor_id'])); + info(sprintf( t('Welcome %s. Remote authentication successful.'),$x[0]['xchan_name'])); + logger('mod_zot: auth success from ' . $x[0]['xchan_addr']); + q("update hubloc set hubloc_status = (hubloc_status | %d ) where hubloc_id = %d ", + intval(HUBLOC_WORKS), + intval($x[0]['hubloc_id']) + ); + + + } else { + if($test) { + $ret['message'] .= 'auth failure. ' . print_r($_REQUEST,true) . print_r($j,true) . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + logger('mod_zot: magic-auth failure - not authenticated: ' . $x[0]['xchan_addr']); + q("update hubloc set hubloc_status = (hubloc_status | %d ) where hubloc_id = %d ", + intval(HUBLOC_RECEIVE_ERROR), + intval($x[0]['hubloc_id']) + ); + } + + // FIXME - we really want to save the return_url in the session before we visit rmagic. + // This does however prevent a recursion if you visit rmagic directly, as it would otherwise send you back here again. + // But z_root() probably isn't where you really want to go. + + if($test) { + $ret['message'] .= 'auth failure fallthrough ' . print_r($_REQUEST,true) . print_r($j,true) . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + if(strstr($desturl,z_root() . '/rmagic')) + goaway(z_root()); + + goaway($desturl); + } + return; +} + + +/** + * @function post_post(&$a) + * zot communications and messaging + * + * Sender HTTP posts to this endpoint ($site/post typically) with 'data' parameter set to json zot message packet. + * This packet is optionally encrypted, which we will discover if the json has an 'iv' element. + * $contents => array( 'alg' => 'aes256cbc', 'iv' => initialisation vector, 'key' => decryption key, 'data' => encrypted data); + * $contents->iv and $contents->key are random strings encrypted with this site's RSA public key and then base64url encoded. + * Currently only 'aes256cbc' is used, but this is extensible should that algorithm prove inadequate. + * + * Once decrypted, one will find the normal json_encoded zot message packet. + * + * Defined packet types are: notify, purge, refresh, force_refresh, auth_check, ping, and pickup + * + * Standard packet: (used by notify, purge, refresh, force_refresh, and auth_check) + * + * { + * "type": "notify", + * "sender":{ + * "guid":"kgVFf_1...", + * "guid_sig":"PT9-TApzp...", + * "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu", + * "url_sig":"T8Bp7j5...", + * }, + * "recipients": { optional recipient array }, + * "callback":"\/post", + * "version":1, + * "secret":"1eaa...", + * "secret_sig": "df89025470fac8..." + * } + * + * Signature fields are all signed with the sender channel private key and base64url encoded. + * Recipients are arrays of guid and guid_sig, which were previously signed with the recipients private + * key and base64url encoded and later obtained via channel discovery. Absence of recipients indicates + * a public message or visible to all potential listeners on this site. + * + * "pickup" packet: + * The pickup packet is sent in response to a notify packet from another site + * + * { + * "type":"pickup", + * "url":"http:\/\/example.com", + * "callback":"http:\/\/example.com\/post", + * "callback_sig":"teE1_fLI...", + * "secret":"1eaa...", + * "secret_sig":"O7nB4_..." + * } + * + * In the pickup packet, the sig fields correspond to the respective data element signed with this site's system + * private key and then base64url encoded. + * The "secret" is the same as the original secret from the notify packet. + * + * If verification is successful, a json structure is returned + * containing a success indicator and an array of type 'pickup'. + * Each pickup element contains the original notify request and a message field whose contents are + * dependent on the message type + * + * This JSON array is AES encapsulated using the site public key of the site that sent the initial zot pickup packet. + * Using the above example, this would be example.com. + * + * + * { + * "success":1, + * "pickup":{ + * "notify":{ + * "type":"notify", + * "sender":{ + * "guid":"kgVFf_...", + * "guid_sig":"PT9-TApz...", + * "url":"http:\/\/z.podunk.edu", + * "url_sig":"T8Bp7j5D..." + * }, + * "callback":"\/post", + * "version":1, + * "secret":"1eaa661..." + * }, + * "message":{ + * "type":"activity", + * "message_id":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu", + * "message_top":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu", + * "message_parent":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu", + * "created":"2012-11-20 04:04:16", + * "edited":"2012-11-20 04:04:16", + * "title":"", + * "body":"Hi Nickordo", + * "app":"", + * "verb":"post", + * "object_type":"", + * "target_type":"", + * "permalink":"", + * "location":"", + * "longlat":"", + * "owner":{ + * "name":"Indigo", + * "address":"indigo@podunk.edu", + * "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu", + * "photo":{ + * "mimetype":"image\/jpeg", + * "src":"http:\/\/podunk.edu\/photo\/profile\/m\/5" + * }, + * "guid":"kgVFf_...", + * "guid_sig":"PT9-TAp...", + * }, + * "author":{ + * "name":"Indigo", + * "address":"indigo@podunk.edu", + * "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu", + * "photo":{ + * "mimetype":"image\/jpeg", + * "src":"http:\/\/podunk.edu\/photo\/profile\/m\/5" + * }, + * "guid":"kgVFf_...", + * "guid_sig":"PT9-TAp..." + * } + * } + * } + *} + * + * Currently defined message types are 'activity', 'mail', 'profile' and 'channel_sync', which each have + * different content schemas. + * + * Ping packet: + * A ping packet does not require any parameters except the type. It may or may not be encrypted. + * + * { + * "type": "ping" + * } + * + * On receipt of a ping packet a ping response will be returned: + * + * { + * "success" : 1, + * "site" { + * "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu", + * "url_sig":"T8Bp7j5...", + * "sitekey": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- + * MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQE..." + * } + * } + * + * The ping packet can be used to verify that a site has not been re-installed, and to + * initiate corrective action if it has. The url_sig is signed with the site private key + * and base64url encoded - and this should verify with the enclosed sitekey. Failure to + * verify indicates the site is corrupt or otherwise unable to communicate using zot. + * This return packet is not otherwise verified, so should be compared with other + * results obtained from this site which were verified prior to taking action. For instance + * if you have one verified result with this signature and key, and other records for this + * url which have different signatures and keys, it indicates that the site was re-installed + * and corrective action may commence (remove or mark invalid any entries with different + * signatures). + * If you have no records which match this url_sig and key - no corrective action should + * be taken as this packet may have been returned by an imposter. + * + */ + function post_post(&$a) { - logger('mod_zot: ' . print_r($_REQUEST,true), LOGGER_DEBUG); - $ret = array('result' => false); + $encrypted_packet = false; + $ret = array('success' => false); $data = json_decode($_REQUEST['data'],true); - logger('mod_zot: data: ' . print_r($data,true), LOGGER_DATA); + + /** + * Many message packets will arrive encrypted. The existence of an 'iv' element + * tells us we need to unencapsulate the AES-256-CBC content using the site private key + */ if(array_key_exists('iv',$data)) { - $data = aes_unencapsulate($data,get_config('system','prvkey')); - logger('mod_zot: decrypt1: ' . $data); + $encrypted_packet = true; + $data = crypto_unencapsulate($data,get_config('system','prvkey')); + logger('mod_zot: decrypt1: ' . $data, LOGGER_DATA); $data = json_decode($data,true); } - logger('mod_zot: decoded data: ' . print_r($data,true), LOGGER_DATA); + if(! $data) { + + // possible Bleichenbacher's attack, just treat it as a + // message we have no handler for. It should fail a bit + // further along with "no hub". Our public key is public + // knowledge. There's no reason why anybody should get the + // encryption wrong unless they're fishing or hacking. If + // they're developing and made a goof, this can be discovered + // in the logs of the destination site. If they're fishing or + // hacking, the bottom line is we can't verify their hub. + // That's all we're going to tell them. + + $data = array('type' => 'bogus'); + } + $msgtype = ((array_key_exists('type',$data)) ? $data['type'] : ''); + if($msgtype === 'ping') { + + // Useful to get a health check on a remote site. + // This will let us know if any important communication details + // that we may have stored are no longer valid, regardless of xchan details. + logger('POST: got ping send pong now back: ' . z_root() , LOGGER_DEBUG ); + + $ret['success'] = true; + $ret['site'] = array(); + $ret['site']['url'] = z_root(); + $ret['site']['url_sig'] = base64url_encode(rsa_sign(z_root(),get_config('system','prvkey'))); + $ret['site']['sitekey'] = get_config('system','pubkey'); + json_return_and_die($ret); + } if($msgtype === 'pickup') { + /** + * The 'pickup' message arrives with a tracking ID which is associated with a particular outq_hash + * First verify that that the returned signatures verify, then check that we have an outbound queue item + * with the correct hash. + * If everything verifies, find any/all outbound messages in the queue for this hubloc and send them back + * + */ + if((! $data['secret']) || (! $data['secret_sig'])) { $ret['message'] = 'no verification signature'; - logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']); + logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message'], LOGGER_DEBUG); json_return_and_die($ret); } - $r = q("select hubloc_sitekey from hubloc where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_callback = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '' limit 1", + $r = q("select distinct hubloc_sitekey from hubloc where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_callback = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '' group by hubloc_sitekey ", dbesc($data['url']), dbesc($data['callback']) ); @@ -44,23 +527,47 @@ function post_post(&$a) { logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']); json_return_and_die($ret); } - // verify the url_sig - $sitekey = $r[0]['hubloc_sitekey']; - logger('sitekey: ' . $sitekey); - if(! rsa_verify($data['callback'],base64url_decode($data['callback_sig']),$sitekey)) { + foreach ($r as $hubsite) { + + // verify the url_sig + // If the server was re-installed at some point, there could be multiple hubs with the same url and callback. + // Only one will have a valid key. + + $forgery = true; + $secret_fail = true; + + $sitekey = $hubsite['hubloc_sitekey']; + + logger('mod_zot: Checking sitekey: ' . $sitekey, LOGGER_DATA); + + if(rsa_verify($data['callback'],base64url_decode($data['callback_sig']),$sitekey)) { + $forgery = false; + } + if(rsa_verify($data['secret'],base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$sitekey)) { + $secret_fail = false; + } + if((! $forgery) && (! $secret_fail)) + break; + } + + if($forgery) { $ret['message'] = 'possible site forgery'; logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']); json_return_and_die($ret); } - if(! rsa_verify($data['secret'],base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$sitekey)) { + if($secret_fail) { $ret['message'] = 'secret validation failed'; logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']); json_return_and_die($ret); } - // If we made it to here, we've got a valid pickup. Grab everything for this host and send it. + /** + * If we made it to here, the signatures verify, but we still don't know if the tracking ID is valid. + * It wouldn't be an error if the tracking ID isn't found, because we may have sent this particular + * queue item with another pickup (after the tracking ID for the other pickup was verified). + */ $r = q("select outq_posturl from outq where outq_hash = '%s' and outq_posturl = '%s' limit 1", dbesc($data['secret']), @@ -72,10 +579,17 @@ function post_post(&$a) { json_return_and_die($ret); } + /** + * Everything is good if we made it here, so find all messages that are going to this location + * and send them all. + */ + $r = q("select * from outq where outq_posturl = '%s'", dbesc($data['callback']) ); if($r) { + logger('mod_zot: succesful pickup message received from ' . $data['callback'] . ' ' . count($r) . ' message(s) picked up', LOGGER_DEBUG); + $ret['success'] = true; $ret['pickup'] = array(); foreach($r as $rr) { @@ -86,34 +600,231 @@ function post_post(&$a) { ); } } - $encrypted = aes_encapsulate(json_encode($ret),$sitekey); + + $encrypted = crypto_encapsulate(json_encode($ret),$sitekey); json_return_and_die($encrypted); + + /** pickup: end */ } + + + + /** + * All other message types require us to verify the sender. This is a generic check, so we + * will do it once here and bail if anything goes wrong. + */ + if(array_key_exists('sender',$data)) { $sender = $data['sender']; } + /** Check if the sender is already verified here */ + $hub = zot_gethub($sender); + if(! $hub) { + + /** Have never seen this guid or this guid coming from this location. Check it and register it. */ + // (!!) this will validate the sender $result = zot_register_hub($sender); - if((! $result['success']) || (! zot_gethub($sender))) { + + if((! $result['success']) || (! ($hub = zot_gethub($sender)))) { $ret['message'] = 'Hub not available.'; logger('mod_zot: no hub'); json_return_and_die($ret); } } + + // Update our DB to show when we last communicated successfully with this hub + // This will allow us to prune dead hubs from using up resources + + $r = q("update hubloc set hubloc_connected = '%s' where hubloc_id = %d limit 1", + dbesc(datetime_convert()), + intval($hub['hubloc_id']) + ); + + // a dead hub came back to life - reset any tombstones we might have + + if($hub['hubloc_status'] & HUBLOC_OFFLINE) { + q("update hubloc set hubloc_status = (hubloc_status ^ %d) where hubloc_id = %d limit 1", + intval(HUBLOC_OFFLINE), + intval($hub['hubloc_id']) + ); + if($r[0]['hubloc_flags'] & HUBLOC_FLAGS_ORPHANCHECK) { + q("update hubloc set hubloc_flags = (hubloc_flags ^ %d) where hubloc_id = %d limit 1", + intval(HUBLOC_FLAGS_ORPHANCHECK), + intval($hub['hubloc_id']) + ); + } + q("update xchan set xchan_flags = (xchan_flags ^ %d) where (xchan_flags & %d) and xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1", + intval(XCHAN_FLAGS_ORPHAN), + intval(XCHAN_FLAGS_ORPHAN), + dbesc($hub['hubloc_hash']) + ); + } + + + + /** + * This hub has now been proven to be valid. + * Any hub with the same URL and a different sitekey cannot be valid. + * Get rid of them (mark them deleted). There's a good chance they were re-installs. + * + */ + + q("update hubloc set hubloc_flags = ( hubloc_flags | %d ) where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '%s' ", + intval(HUBLOC_FLAGS_DELETED), + dbesc($hub['hubloc_url']), + dbesc($hub['hubloc_sitekey']) + ); + // TODO: check which hub is primary and take action if mismatched if(array_key_exists('recipients',$data)) $recipients = $data['recipients']; - if($msgtype === 'refresh') { + + if($msgtype === 'auth_check') { + + /** + * Requestor visits /magic/?dest=somewhere on their own site with a browser + * magic redirects them to $destsite/post [with auth args....] + * $destsite sends an auth_check packet to originator site + * The auth_check packet is handled here by the originator's site + * - the browser session is still waiting + * inside $destsite/post for everything to verify + * If everything checks out we'll return a token to $destsite + * and then $destsite will verify the token, authenticate the browser + * session and then redirect to the original destination. + * If authentication fails, the redirection to the original destination + * will still take place but without authentication. + */ + logger('mod_zot: auth_check', LOGGER_DEBUG); + + if(! $encrypted_packet) { + logger('mod_zot: auth_check packet was not encrypted.'); + $ret['message'] .= 'no packet encryption' . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + $arr = $data['sender']; + $sender_hash = base64url_encode(hash('whirlpool',$arr['guid'] . $arr['guid_sig'], true)); + + // garbage collect any old unused notifications + q("delete from verify where type = 'auth' and created < UTC_TIMESTAMP() - INTERVAL 10 MINUTE"); + + $y = q("select xchan_pubkey from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1", + dbesc($sender_hash) + ); + + // We created a unique hash in mod/magic.php when we invoked remote auth, and stored it in + // the verify table. It is now coming back to us as 'secret' and is signed by a channel at the other end. + // First verify their signature. We will have obtained a zot-info packet from them as part of the sender + // verification. + + if((! $y) || (! rsa_verify($data['secret'],base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$y[0]['xchan_pubkey']))) { + logger('mod_zot: auth_check: sender not found or secret_sig invalid.'); + $ret['message'] .= 'sender not found or sig invalid ' . print_r($y,true) . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + // There should be exactly one recipient, the original auth requestor + + $ret['message'] .= 'recipients ' . print_r($recipients,true) . EOL; + + if($data['recipients']) { + + $arr = $data['recipients'][0]; + $recip_hash = base64url_encode(hash('whirlpool',$arr['guid'] . $arr['guid_sig'], true)); + $c = q("select channel_id, channel_account_id, channel_prvkey from channel where channel_hash = '%s' limit 1", + dbesc($recip_hash) + ); + if(! $c) { + logger('mod_zot: auth_check: recipient channel not found.'); + $ret['message'] .= 'recipient not found.' . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + $confirm = base64url_encode(rsa_sign($data['secret'] . $recip_hash,$c[0]['channel_prvkey'])); + + // This additionally checks for forged sites since we already stored the expected result in meta + // and we've already verified that this is them via zot_gethub() and that their key signed our token + + $z = q("select id from verify where channel = %d and type = 'auth' and token = '%s' and meta = '%s' limit 1", + intval($c[0]['channel_id']), + dbesc($data['secret']), + dbesc($data['sender']['url']) + ); + if(! $z) { + logger('mod_zot: auth_check: verification key not found.'); + $ret['message'] .= 'verification key not found' . EOL; + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + $r = q("delete from verify where id = %d limit 1", + intval($z[0]['id']) + ); + + $u = q("select account_service_class from account where account_id = %d limit 1", + intval($c[0]['channel_account_id']) + ); + + logger('mod_zot: auth_check: success', LOGGER_DEBUG); + $ret['success'] = true; + $ret['confirm'] = $confirm; + if($u && $u[0]['account_service_class']) + $ret['service_class'] = $u[0]['account_service_class']; + json_return_and_die($ret); + + } + json_return_and_die($ret); + } + + + if($msgtype === 'purge') { + if($recipients) { + // basically this means "unfriend" + foreach($recipients as $recip) { + $r = q("select channel.*,xchan.* from channel + left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash + where channel_guid = '%s' and channel_guid_sig = '%s' limit 1", + dbesc($recip['guid']), + dbesc($recip['guid_sig']) + ); + if($r) { + $r = q("select abook_id from abook where uid = %d and abook_xchan = '%s' limit 1", + intval($r[0]['channel_id']), + dbesc(base64url_encode(hash('whirlpool',$sender['guid'] . $sender['guid_sig'], true))) + ); + if($r) { + contact_remove($r[0]['channel_id'],$r[0]['abook_id']); + } + } + } + } + else { + // Unfriend everybody - basically this means the channel has committed suicide + $arr = $data['sender']; + $sender_hash = base64url_encode(hash('whirlpool',$arr['guid'] . $arr['guid_sig'], true)); + + require_once('include/Contact.php'); + remove_all_xchan_resources($sender_hash); + + $ret['success'] = true; + json_return_and_die($ret); + + } + } + + if(($msgtype === 'refresh') || ($msgtype === 'force_refresh')) { // remote channel info (such as permissions or photo or something) // has been updated. Grab a fresh copy and sync it. + // The difference between refresh and force_refresh is that + // force_refresh unconditionally creates a directory update record, + // even if no changes were detected upon processing. if($recipients) { @@ -131,7 +842,7 @@ function post_post(&$a) { 'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'], 'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'], 'hubloc_url' => $sender['url'] - ),$r[0]); + ),$r[0], (($msgtype === 'force_refresh') ? true : false)); } } else { @@ -142,9 +853,9 @@ function post_post(&$a) { 'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'], 'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'], 'hubloc_url' => $sender['url'] - ),null); + ),null,(($msgtype === 'force_refresh') ? true : false)); } - $ret['result'] = true; + $ret['success'] = true; json_return_and_die($ret); } @@ -160,11 +871,15 @@ function post_post(&$a) { $ret['delivery_report'] = $x; } - $ret['result'] = true; + $ret['success'] = true; json_return_and_die($ret); } -} + // catchall + json_return_and_die($ret); + + +} |