aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/include/security.php
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'include/security.php')
-rwxr-xr-xinclude/security.php348
1 files changed, 348 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/security.php b/include/security.php
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..af201d2af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/security.php
@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
+<?php
+
+function authenticate_success($user_record, $login_initial = false, $interactive = false) {
+
+ $a = get_app();
+
+ $_SESSION['uid'] = $user_record['uid'];
+ $_SESSION['theme'] = $user_record['theme'];
+ $_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1;
+ $_SESSION['page_flags'] = $user_record['page-flags'];
+ $_SESSION['my_url'] = $a->get_baseurl() . '/profile/' . $user_record['nickname'];
+ $_SESSION['my_address'] = $user_record['nickname'] . '@' . substr($a->get_baseurl(),strpos($a->get_baseurl(),'://')+3);
+ $_SESSION['addr'] = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
+
+ $a->user = $user_record;
+
+ if($interactive) {
+ if($a->user['login_date'] === '0000-00-00 00:00:00') {
+ $_SESSION['return_url'] = 'profile_photo/new';
+ $a->module = 'profile_photo';
+ info( t("Welcome ") . $a->user['username'] . EOL);
+ info( t('Please upload a profile photo.') . EOL);
+ }
+ else
+ info( t("Welcome back ") . $a->user['username'] . EOL);
+ }
+
+ $member_since = strtotime($a->user['register_date']);
+ if(time() < ($member_since + ( 60 * 60 * 24 * 14)))
+ $_SESSION['new_member'] = true;
+ else
+ $_SESSION['new_member'] = false;
+ if(strlen($a->user['timezone'])) {
+ date_default_timezone_set($a->user['timezone']);
+ $a->timezone = $a->user['timezone'];
+ }
+
+ $master_record = $a->user;
+
+ if((x($_SESSION,'submanage')) && intval($_SESSION['submanage'])) {
+ $r = q("select * from user where uid = %d limit 1",
+ intval($_SESSION['submanage'])
+ );
+ if(count($r))
+ $master_record = $r[0];
+ }
+
+ $r = q("SELECT `uid`,`username`,`nickname` FROM `user` WHERE `password` = '%s' AND `email` = '%s'",
+ dbesc($master_record['password']),
+ dbesc($master_record['email'])
+ );
+ if($r && count($r))
+ $a->identities = $r;
+ else
+ $a->identities = array();
+
+ $r = q("select `user`.`uid`, `user`.`username`, `user`.`nickname`
+ from manage left join user on manage.mid = user.uid
+ where `manage`.`uid` = %d",
+ intval($master_record['uid'])
+ );
+ if($r && count($r))
+ $a->identities = array_merge($a->identities,$r);
+
+ if($login_initial)
+ logger('auth_identities: ' . print_r($a->identities,true), LOGGER_DEBUG);
+
+ $r = q("SELECT * FROM `contact` WHERE `uid` = %d AND `self` = 1 LIMIT 1",
+ intval($_SESSION['uid']));
+ if(count($r)) {
+ $a->contact = $r[0];
+ $a->cid = $r[0]['id'];
+ $_SESSION['cid'] = $a->cid;
+ }
+
+ header('X-Account-Management-Status: active; name="' . $a->user['username'] . '"; id="' . $a->user['nickname'] .'"');
+
+ if($login_initial) {
+ $l = get_browser_language();
+
+ q("UPDATE `user` SET `login_date` = '%s', `language` = '%s' WHERE `uid` = %d LIMIT 1",
+ dbesc(datetime_convert()),
+ dbesc($l),
+ intval($_SESSION['uid'])
+ );
+
+ call_hooks('logged_in', $a->user);
+
+ if(($a->module !== 'home') && isset($_SESSION['return_url']))
+ goaway($a->get_baseurl() . '/' . $_SESSION['return_url']);
+ }
+
+}
+
+
+
+function can_write_wall(&$a,$owner) {
+
+ static $verified = 0;
+
+ if((! (local_user())) && (! (remote_user())))
+ return false;
+
+ $uid = local_user();
+
+ if(($uid) && ($uid == $owner)) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if(remote_user()) {
+
+ // use remembered decision and avoid a DB lookup for each and every display item
+ // DO NOT use this function if there are going to be multiple owners
+
+ // We have a contact-id for an authenticated remote user, this block determines if the contact
+ // belongs to this page owner, and has the necessary permissions to post content
+
+ if($verified === 2)
+ return true;
+ elseif($verified === 1)
+ return false;
+ else {
+
+ $r = q("SELECT `contact`.*, `user`.`page-flags` FROM `contact` LEFT JOIN `user` on `user`.`uid` = `contact`.`uid`
+ WHERE `contact`.`uid` = %d AND `contact`.`id` = %d AND `contact`.`blocked` = 0 AND `contact`.`pending` = 0
+ AND `user`.`blockwall` = 0 AND `readonly` = 0 AND ( `contact`.`rel` IN ( %d , %d ) OR `user`.`page-flags` = %d ) LIMIT 1",
+ intval($owner),
+ intval(remote_user()),
+ intval(CONTACT_IS_SHARING),
+ intval(CONTACT_IS_FRIEND),
+ intval(PAGE_COMMUNITY)
+ );
+
+ if(count($r)) {
+ $verified = 2;
+ return true;
+ }
+ else {
+ $verified = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+
+function permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) {
+
+ $local_user = local_user();
+ $remote_user = remote_user();
+
+ /**
+ * Construct permissions
+ *
+ * default permissions - anonymous user
+ */
+
+ $sql = " AND allow_cid = ''
+ AND allow_gid = ''
+ AND deny_cid = ''
+ AND deny_gid = ''
+ ";
+
+ /**
+ * Profile owner - everything is visible
+ */
+
+ if(($local_user) && ($local_user == $owner_id)) {
+ $sql = '';
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
+ * check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
+ * and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
+ * If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
+ * done this and passed the groups into this function.
+ */
+
+ elseif($remote_user) {
+
+ if(! $remote_verified) {
+ $r = q("SELECT id FROM contact WHERE id = %d AND uid = %d AND blocked = 0 LIMIT 1",
+ intval($remote_user),
+ intval($owner_id)
+ );
+ if(count($r)) {
+ $remote_verified = true;
+ $groups = init_groups_visitor($remote_user);
+ }
+ }
+ if($remote_verified) {
+
+ $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
+
+ if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
+ foreach($groups as $g)
+ $gs .= '|<' . intval($g) . '>';
+ }
+
+ $sql = sprintf(
+ " AND ( allow_cid = '' OR allow_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
+ AND ( deny_cid = '' OR NOT deny_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
+ AND ( allow_gid = '' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' )
+ AND ( deny_gid = '' OR NOT deny_gid REGEXP '%s')
+ ",
+ intval($remote_user),
+ intval($remote_user),
+ dbesc($gs),
+ dbesc($gs)
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ return $sql;
+}
+
+
+function item_permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) {
+
+ $local_user = local_user();
+ $remote_user = remote_user();
+
+ /**
+ * Construct permissions
+ *
+ * default permissions - anonymous user
+ */
+
+ $sql = " AND allow_cid = ''
+ AND allow_gid = ''
+ AND deny_cid = ''
+ AND deny_gid = ''
+ AND private = 0
+ ";
+
+ /**
+ * Profile owner - everything is visible
+ */
+
+ if(($local_user) && ($local_user == $owner_id)) {
+ $sql = '';
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
+ * check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
+ * and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
+ * If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
+ * done this and passed the groups into this function.
+ */
+
+ elseif($remote_user) {
+
+ if(! $remote_verified) {
+ $r = q("SELECT id FROM contact WHERE id = %d AND uid = %d AND blocked = 0 LIMIT 1",
+ intval($remote_user),
+ intval($owner_id)
+ );
+ if(count($r)) {
+ $remote_verified = true;
+ $groups = init_groups_visitor($remote_user);
+ }
+ }
+ if($remote_verified) {
+
+ $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
+
+ if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
+ foreach($groups as $g)
+ $gs .= '|<' . intval($g) . '>';
+ }
+
+ $sql = sprintf(
+ " AND ( private = 0 OR ( private = 1 AND wall = 1 AND ( allow_cid = '' OR allow_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
+ AND ( deny_cid = '' OR NOT deny_cid REGEXP '<%d>' )
+ AND ( allow_gid = '' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' )
+ AND ( deny_gid = '' OR NOT deny_gid REGEXP '%s')))
+ ",
+ intval($remote_user),
+ intval($remote_user),
+ dbesc($gs),
+ dbesc($gs)
+ );
+ }
+ }
+
+ return $sql;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Functions used to protect against Cross-Site Request Forgery
+ * The security token has to base on at least one value that an attacker can't know - here it's the session ID and the private key.
+ * In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes;
+ * or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours).
+ * The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case:
+ * A security token is used to protekt a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link).
+ * If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer.
+ * Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are,
+ * so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types).
+ */
+function get_form_security_token($typename = '') {
+ $a = get_app();
+
+ $timestamp = time();
+ $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename);
+
+ return $timestamp . '.' . $sec_hash;
+}
+
+function check_form_security_token($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
+ if (!x($_REQUEST, $formname)) return false;
+ $hash = $_REQUEST[$formname];
+
+ $max_livetime = 10800; // 3 hours
+
+ $a = get_app();
+
+ $x = explode('.', $hash);
+ if (time() > (IntVal($x[0]) + $max_livetime)) return false;
+
+ $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $x[0] . $typename);
+
+ return ($sec_hash == $x[1]);
+}
+
+function check_form_security_std_err_msg() {
+ return t('The form security token was not correct. This probably happened because the form has been opened for too long (>3 hours) before submitting it.') . EOL;
+}
+function check_form_security_token_redirectOnErr($err_redirect, $typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
+ if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) {
+ $a = get_app();
+ logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . $a->user['guid'] . ' - form element ' . $typename);
+ logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA);
+ notice( check_form_security_std_err_msg() );
+ goaway($a->get_baseurl() . $err_redirect );
+ }
+}
+function check_form_security_token_ForbiddenOnErr($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
+ if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) {
+ $a = get_app();
+ logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . $a->user['guid'] . ' - form element ' . $typename);
+ logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA);
+ header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
+ killme();
+ }
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-01-17 09:20:32 +0000