diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'include/security.php')
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | include/security.php | 141 |
1 files changed, 139 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/include/security.php b/include/security.php index bc2c9f0bf..66622fd33 100755..100644 --- a/include/security.php +++ b/include/security.php @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ function authenticate_success($user_record, $login_initial = false, $interactive $_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1; $_SESSION['page_flags'] = $user_record['page-flags']; $_SESSION['my_url'] = $a->get_baseurl() . '/profile/' . $user_record['nickname']; + $_SESSION['my_address'] = $user_record['nickname'] . '@' . substr($a->get_baseurl(),strpos($a->get_baseurl(),'://')+3); $_SESSION['addr'] = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']; $a->user = $user_record; @@ -108,14 +109,18 @@ function can_write_wall(&$a,$owner) { if(remote_user()) { - // user remembered decision and avoid a DB lookup for each and every display item + // use remembered decision and avoid a DB lookup for each and every display item // DO NOT use this function if there are going to be multiple owners + // We have a contact-id for an authenticated remote user, this block determines if the contact + // belongs to this page owner, and has the necessary permissions to post content + if($verified === 2) return true; elseif($verified === 1) return false; else { + $r = q("SELECT `contact`.*, `user`.`page-flags` FROM `contact` LEFT JOIN `user` on `user`.`uid` = `contact`.`uid` WHERE `contact`.`uid` = %d AND `contact`.`id` = %d AND `contact`.`blocked` = 0 AND `contact`.`pending` = 0 AND `user`.`blockwall` = 0 AND `readonly` = 0 AND ( `contact`.`rel` IN ( %d , %d ) OR `user`.`page-flags` = %d ) LIMIT 1", @@ -125,6 +130,7 @@ function can_write_wall(&$a,$owner) { intval(CONTACT_IS_FRIEND), intval(PAGE_COMMUNITY) ); + if(count($r)) { $verified = 2; return true; @@ -197,7 +203,7 @@ function permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) { " AND ( allow_cid = '' OR allow_cid REGEXP '<%d>' ) AND ( deny_cid = '' OR NOT deny_cid REGEXP '<%d>' ) AND ( allow_gid = '' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' ) - AND ( deny_gid = '' OR NOT deny_gid REGEXP '%s') + AND ( deny_gid = '' OR NOT deny_gid REGEXP '%s') ", intval($remote_user), intval($remote_user), @@ -207,4 +213,135 @@ function permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) { } } return $sql; +} + + +function item_permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) { + + $local_user = local_user(); + $remote_user = remote_user(); + + /** + * Construct permissions + * + * default permissions - anonymous user + */ + + $sql = " AND allow_cid = '' + AND allow_gid = '' + AND deny_cid = '' + AND deny_gid = '' + AND private = 0 + "; + + /** + * Profile owner - everything is visible + */ + + if(($local_user) && ($local_user == $owner_id)) { + $sql = ''; + } + + /** + * Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified, + * check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id + * and load the groups the visitor belongs to. + * If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already + * done this and passed the groups into this function. + */ + + elseif($remote_user) { + + if(! $remote_verified) { + $r = q("SELECT id FROM contact WHERE id = %d AND uid = %d AND blocked = 0 LIMIT 1", + intval($remote_user), + intval($owner_id) + ); + if(count($r)) { + $remote_verified = true; + $groups = init_groups_visitor($remote_user); + } + } + if($remote_verified) { + + $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match + + if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) { + foreach($groups as $g) + $gs .= '|<' . intval($g) . '>'; + } + + $sql = sprintf( + " AND ( private = 0 OR ( private = 1 AND wall = 1 AND ( allow_cid = '' OR allow_cid REGEXP '<%d>' ) + AND ( deny_cid = '' OR NOT deny_cid REGEXP '<%d>' ) + AND ( allow_gid = '' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' ) + AND ( deny_gid = '' OR NOT deny_gid REGEXP '%s'))) + ", + intval($remote_user), + intval($remote_user), + dbesc($gs), + dbesc($gs) + ); + } + } + + return $sql; +} + + +/* + * Functions used to protect against Cross-Site Request Forgery + * The security token has to base on at least one value that an attacker can't know - here it's the session ID and the private key. + * In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes; + * or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours). + * The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case: + * A security token is used to protekt a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link). + * If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer. + * Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are, + * so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types). + */ +function get_form_security_token($typename = '') { + $a = get_app(); + + $timestamp = time(); + $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename); + + return $timestamp . '.' . $sec_hash; +} + +function check_form_security_token($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { + if (!x($_REQUEST, $formname)) return false; + $hash = $_REQUEST[$formname]; + + $max_livetime = 10800; // 3 hours + + $a = get_app(); + + $x = explode('.', $hash); + if (time() > (IntVal($x[0]) + $max_livetime)) return false; + + $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $x[0] . $typename); + + return ($sec_hash == $x[1]); +} + +function check_form_security_std_err_msg() { + return t('The form security token was not correct. This probably happened because the form has been opened for too long (>3 hours) before subitting it.') . EOL; +} +function check_form_security_token_redirectOnErr($err_redirect, $typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { + if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) { + $a = get_app(); + logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . $a->user['guid'] . ' - form element ' . $typename); + logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA); + notice( check_form_security_std_err_msg() ); + goaway($a->get_baseurl() . $err_redirect ); + } +} +function check_form_security_token_ForbiddenOnErr($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { + if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) { + logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . $a->user['guid'] . ' - form element ' . $typename); + logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA); + header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden'); + killme(); + } }
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