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authorfriendica <info@friendica.com>2012-03-13 14:36:52 -0700
committerfriendica <info@friendica.com>2012-03-13 14:36:52 -0700
commitacc4bbeb6ebc832da2a8b5a37b764a6a53dd1214 (patch)
tree018927c54c16f68aeae7153c81c404d3e9cbbc7d /include/security.php
parent5a4167646553e589cf9647c0e0d0446e3f5fd672 (diff)
parent59766b944c9ea3a45b1d7e8593f7bb5d4a0b8445 (diff)
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Merge pull request #129 from CatoTH/master
CSRF-Protection and minor changes
Diffstat (limited to 'include/security.php')
-rwxr-xr-xinclude/security.php46
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/security.php b/include/security.php
index 8c536b656..6ea515bff 100755
--- a/include/security.php
+++ b/include/security.php
@@ -288,3 +288,49 @@ function item_permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null)
}
+/*
+ * Functions used to protect against Cross-Site Request Forgery
+ * The security token has to base on at least one value that an attacker can't know - here it's the session ID and the private key.
+ * In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes;
+ * or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours).
+ * The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case:
+ * A security token is used to protekt a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link).
+ * If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer.
+ * Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are,
+ * so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types).
+ */
+function get_form_security_token($typename = "") {
+ $a = get_app();
+
+ $timestamp = time();
+ $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user["guid"] . $a->user["prvkey"] . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename);
+
+ return $timestamp . "." . $sec_hash;
+}
+
+function check_form_security_token($typename = "", $formname = 'form_security_token') {
+ if (!x($_REQUEST, $formname)) return false;
+ $hash = $_REQUEST[$formname];
+
+ $max_livetime = 10800; // 3 hours
+
+ $a = get_app();
+
+ $x = explode(".", $hash);
+ if (time() > (IntVal($x[0]) + $max_livetime)) return false;
+
+ $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user["guid"] . $a->user["prvkey"] . session_id() . $x[0] . $typename);
+
+ return ($sec_hash == $x[1]);
+}
+
+function check_form_security_std_err_msg() {
+ return t('The form security token was not correct. This probably happened because the form has been opened for too long (>3 hours) before subitting it.') . EOL;
+}
+function check_form_security_token_redirectOnErr($err_redirect, $typename = "", $formname = 'form_security_token') {
+ if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) {
+ $a = get_app();
+ notice( check_form_security_std_err_msg() );
+ goaway($a->get_baseurl() . $err_redirect );
+ }
+}