<?php /** @file */
/**
* Zot endpoint
*/
require_once('include/zot.php');
function post_init(&$a) {
// Most access to this endpoint is via the post method.
// Here we will pick out the magic auth params which arrive
// as a get request, and the only communications to arrive this way.
/**
* Magic Auth
* ==========
*
* So-called "magic auth" takes place by a special exchange. On the site where the "channel to be authenticated" lives (e.g. $mysite),
* a redirection is made via $mysite/magic to the zot endpoint of the remote site ($remotesite) with special GET parameters.
*
* The endpoint is typically https://$remotesite/post - or whatever was specified as the callback url in prior communications
* (we will bootstrap an address and fetch a zot info packet if possible where no prior communications exist)
*
* Four GET parameters are supplied:
*
** auth => the urlencoded webbie (channel@host.domain) of the channel requesting access
** dest => the desired destination URL (urlencoded)
** sec => a random string which is also stored on $mysite for use during the verification phase.
** version => the zot revision
*
* When this packet is received, an "auth-check" zot message is sent to $mysite.
* (e.g. if $_GET['auth'] is foobar@podunk.edu, a zot packet is sent to the podunk.edu zot endpoint, which is typically /post)
* If no information has been recorded about the requesting identity a zot information packet will be retrieved before
* continuing.
*
* The sender of this packet is an arbitrary/random site channel. The recipients will be a single recipient corresponding
* to the guid and guid_sig we have associated with the requesting auth identity
*
*
* {
* "type":"auth_check",
* "sender":{
* "guid":"kgVFf_...",
* "guid_sig":"PT9-TApz...",
* "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu",
* "url_sig":"T8Bp7j..."
* },
* "recipients":{
* {
* "guid":"ZHSqb...",
* "guid_sig":"JsAAXi..."
* }
* }
* "callback":"\/post",
* "version":1,
* "secret":"1eaa661",
* "secret_sig":"eKV968b1..."
* }
*
*
* auth_check messages MUST use encapsulated encryption. This message is sent to the origination site, which checks the 'secret' to see
* if it is the same as the 'sec' which it passed originally. It also checks the secret_sig which is the secret signed by the
* destination channel's private key and base64url encoded. If everything checks out, a json packet is returned:
*
* {
* "success":1,
* "confirm":"q0Ysovd1u..."
* "service_class":(optional)
* }
*
* 'confirm' in this case is the base64url encoded RSA signature of the concatenation of 'secret' with the
* base64url encoded whirlpool hash of the requestor's guid and guid_sig; signed with the source channel private key.
* This prevents a man-in-the-middle from inserting a rogue success packet. Upon receipt and successful
* verification of this packet, the destination site will redirect to the original destination URL and indicate a successful remote login.
* Service_class can be used by cooperating sites to provide different access rights based on account rights and subscription plans. It is
* a string whose contents are not defined by protocol. Example: "basic" or "gold".
*
*
*
*/
if(array_key_exists('auth',$_REQUEST)) {
$ret = array('success' => false, 'message' => '');
logger('mod_zot: auth request received.');
$address = $_REQUEST['auth'];
$desturl = $_REQUEST['dest'];
$sec = $_REQUEST['sec'];
$version = $_REQUEST['version'];
$test = ((x($_REQUEST,'test')) ? intval($_REQUEST['test']) : 0);
// They are authenticating ultimately to the site and not to a particular channel.
// Any channel will do, providing it's currently active. We just need to have an
// identity to attach to the packet we send back. So find one.
$c = q("select * from channel where not ( channel_pageflags & %d ) limit 1",
intval(PAGE_REMOVED)
);
if(! $c) {
// nobody here
logger('mod_zot: auth: unable to find a response channel');
if($test) {
$ret['message'] .= 'no local channels found.' . EOL;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
goaway($desturl);
}
// Try and find a hubloc for the person attempting to auth
$x = q("select * from hubloc left join xchan on xchan_hash = hubloc_hash where hubloc_addr = '%s' order by hubloc_id desc limit 1",
dbesc($address)
);
if(! $x) {
// finger them if they can't be found.
$ret = zot_finger($address,null);
if($ret['success']) {
$j = json_decode($ret['body'],true);
if($j)
import_xchan($j);
$x = q("select * from hubloc left join xchan on xchan_hash = hubloc_hash where hubloc_addr = '%s' order by hubloc_id desc limit 1",
dbesc($address)
);
}
}
if(! $x) {
logger('mod_zot: auth: unable to finger ' . $address);
if($test) {
$ret['message'] .= 'no hubloc found for ' . $address . ' and probing failed.' . EOL;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
goaway($desturl);
}
logger('mod_zot: auth request received from ' . $x[0]['hubloc_addr'] );
// check credentials and access
// If they are already authenticated and haven't changed credentials,
// we can save an expensive network round trip and improve performance.
$remote = remote_user();
$result = null;
$remote_service_class = '';
$remote_hub = $x[0]['hubloc_url'];
// Also check that they are coming from the same site as they authenticated with originally.
$already_authed = ((($remote) && ($x[0]['hubloc_hash'] == $remote) && ($x[0]['hubloc_url'] === $_SESSION['remote_hub'])) ? true : false);
$j = array();
if(! $already_authed) {
// Auth packets MUST use ultra top-secret hush-hush mode - e.g. the entire packet is encrypted using the site private key
// The actual channel sending the packet ($c[0]) is not important, but this provides a generic zot packet with a sender
// which can be verified
$p = zot_build_packet($c[0],$type = 'auth_check', array(array('guid' => $x[0]['hubloc_guid'],'guid_sig' => $x[0]['hubloc_guid_sig'])), $x[0]['hubloc_sitekey'], $sec);
if($test) {
$ret['message'] .= 'auth check packet created using sitekey ' . $x[0]['hubloc_sitekey'] . EOL;
$ret['message'] .= 'packet contents: ' . $p . EOL;
}
$result = zot_zot($x[0]['hubloc_callback'],$p);
if(! $result['success']) {
logger('mod_zot: auth_check callback failed.');
if($test) {
$ret['message'] .= 'auth check request to your site returned .' . print_r($result, true) . EOL;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
goaway($desturl);
}
$j = json_decode($result['body'],true);
if(! $j) {
logger('mod_zot: auth_check json data malformed.');
if($test) {
$ret['message'] .= 'json malformed: ' . $result['body'] . EOL;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
}
}
if($test) {
$ret['message'] .= 'auth check request returned .' . print_r($j, true) . EOL;
}
if($already_authed || $j['success']) {
if($j['success']) {
// legit response, but we do need to check that this wasn't answered by a man-in-middle
if(! rsa_verify($sec . $x[0]['xchan_hash'],base64url_decode($j['confirm']),$x[0]['xchan_pubkey'])) {
logger('mod_zot: auth: final confirmation failed.');
if($test) {
$ret['message'] .= 'final confirmation failed. ' . $sec . print_r($j,true) . print_r($x[0],true);
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
goaway($desturl);
}
if(array_key_exists('service_class',$j))
$remote_service_class = $j['service_class'];
}
// everything is good... maybe
if(local_user()) {
// tell them to logout if they're logged in locally as anything but the target remote account
// in which case just shut up because they don't need to be doing this at all.
if($a->channel['channel_hash'] != $x[0]['xchan_hash']) {
logger('mod_zot: auth: already authenticated locally as somebody else.');
notice( t('Remote authentication blocked. You are logged into this site locally. Please logout and retry.') . EOL);
if($test) {
$ret['message'] .= 'already logged in locally with a conflicting identity.' . EOL;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
}
goaway($desturl);
}
// log them in
if($test) {
$ret['success'] = true;
$ret['message'] .= 'Authentication Success!' . EOL;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
$_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1;
$_SESSION['visitor_id'] = $x[0]['xchan_hash'];
$_SESSION['my_address'] = $address;
$_SESSION['remote_service_class'] = $remote_service_class;
$_SESSION['remote_hub'] = $remote_hub;
$arr = array('xchan' => $x[0], 'url' => $desturl, 'session' => $_SESSION);
call_hooks('magic_auth_success',$arr);
$a->set_observer($x[0]);
require_once('include/security.php');
$a->set_groups(init_groups_visitor($_SESSION['visitor_id']));
info(sprintf( t('Welcome %s. Remote authentication successful.'),$x[0]['xchan_name']));
logger('mod_zot: auth success from ' . $x[0]['xchan_addr']);
} else {
if($test) {
$ret['message'] .= 'auth failure. ' . print_r($_REQUEST,true) . print_r($j,true) . EOL;
json_return_and_dir($ret);
}
logger('mod_zot: magic-auth failure - not authenticated: ' . $x[0]['xchan_addr']);
q("update hubloc set hubloc_status = (hubloc_status | %d ) where hubloc_id = %d ",
intval(HUBLOC_RECEIVE_ERROR),
intval($x[0]['hubloc_id'])
);
}
// FIXME - we really want to save the return_url in the session before we visit rmagic.
// This does however prevent a recursion if you visit rmagic directly, as it would otherwise send you back here again.
// But z_root() probably isn't where you really want to go.
if($test) {
$ret['message'] .= 'auth failure fallthrough ' . print_r($_REQUEST,true) . print_r($j,true) . EOL;
json_return_and_dir($ret);
}
if(strstr($desturl,z_root() . '/rmagic'))
goaway(z_root());
goaway($desturl);
}
return;
}
/**
* @function post_post(&$a)
* zot communications and messaging
*
* Sender HTTP posts to this endpoint ($site/post typically) with 'data' parameter set to json zot message packet.
* This packet is optionally encrypted, which we will discover if the json has an 'iv' element.
* $contents => array( 'alg' => 'aes256cbc', 'iv' => initialisation vector, 'key' => decryption key, 'data' => encrypted data);
* $contents->iv and $contents->key are random strings encrypted with this site's RSA public key and then base64url encoded.
* Currently only 'aes256cbc' is used, but this is extensible should that algorithm prove inadequate.
*
* Once decrypted, one will find the normal json_encoded zot message packet.
*
* Defined packet types are: notify, purge, refresh, auth_check, ping, and pickup
*
* Standard packet: (used by notify, purge, refresh, and auth_check)
*
* {
* "type": "notify",
* "sender":{
* "guid":"kgVFf_1...",
* "guid_sig":"PT9-TApzp...",
* "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu",
* "url_sig":"T8Bp7j5...",
* },
* "recipients": { optional recipient array },
* "callback":"\/post",
* "version":1,
* "secret":"1eaa...",
* "secret_sig": "df89025470fac8..."
* }
*
* Signature fields are all signed with the sender channel private key and base64url encoded.
* Recipients are arrays of guid and guid_sig, which were previously signed with the recipients private
* key and base64url encoded and later obtained via channel discovery. Absence of recipients indicates
* a public message or visible to all potential listeners on this site.
*
* "pickup" packet:
* The pickup packet is sent in response to a notify packet from another site
*
* {
* "type":"pickup",
* "url":"http:\/\/example.com",
* "callback":"http:\/\/example.com\/post",
* "callback_sig":"teE1_fLI...",
* "secret":"1eaa...",
* "secret_sig":"O7nB4_..."
* }
*
* In the pickup packet, the sig fields correspond to the respective data element signed with this site's system
* private key and then base64url encoded.
* The "secret" is the same as the original secret from the notify packet.
*
* If verification is successful, a json structure is returned
* containing a success indicator and an array of type 'pickup'.
* Each pickup element contains the original notify request and a message field whose contents are
* dependent on the message type
*
* This JSON array is AES encapsulated using the site public key of the site that sent the initial zot pickup packet.
* Using the above example, this would be example.com.
*
*
* {
* "success":1,
* "pickup":{
* "notify":{
* "type":"notify",
* "sender":{
* "guid":"kgVFf_...",
* "guid_sig":"PT9-TApz...",
* "url":"http:\/\/z.podunk.edu",
* "url_sig":"T8Bp7j5D..."
* },
* "callback":"\/post",
* "version":1,
* "secret":"1eaa661..."
* },
* "message":{
* "type":"activity",
* "message_id":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu",
* "message_top":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu",
* "message_parent":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu",
* "created":"2012-11-20 04:04:16",
* "edited":"2012-11-20 04:04:16",
* "title":"",
* "body":"Hi Nickordo",
* "app":"",
* "verb":"post",
* "object_type":"",
* "target_type":"",
* "permalink":"",
* "location":"",
* "longlat":"",
* "owner":{
* "name":"Indigo",
* "address":"indigo@podunk.edu",
* "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu",
* "photo":{
* "mimetype":"image\/jpeg",
* "src":"http:\/\/podunk.edu\/photo\/profile\/m\/5"
* },
* "guid":"kgVFf_...",
* "guid_sig":"PT9-TAp...",
* },
* "author":{
* "name":"Indigo",
* "address":"indigo@podunk.edu",
* "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu",
* "photo":{
* "mimetype":"image\/jpeg",
* "src":"http:\/\/podunk.edu\/photo\/profile\/m\/5"
* },
* "guid":"kgVFf_...",
* "guid_sig":"PT9-TAp..."
* }
* }
* }
*}
*
* Currently defined message types are 'activity', 'mail', 'profile' and 'channel_sync', which each have
* different content schemas.
*
* Ping packet:
* A ping packet does not require any parameters except the type. It may or may not be encrypted.
*
* {
* "type": "ping"
* }
*
* On receipt of a ping packet a ping response will be returned:
*
* {
* "success" : 1,
* "site" {
* "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu",
* "url_sig":"T8Bp7j5...",
* "sitekey": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
* MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQE..."
* }
* }
*
* The ping packet can be used to verify that a site has not been re-installed, and to
* initiate corrective action if it has. The url_sig is signed with the site private key
* and base64url encoded - and this should verify with the enclosed sitekey. Failure to
* verify indicates the site is corrupt or otherwise unable to communicate using zot.
* This return packet is not otherwise verified, so should be compared with other
* results obtained from this site which were verified prior to taking action. For instance
* if you have one verified result with this signature and key, and other records for this
* url which have different signatures and keys, it indicates that the site was re-installed
* and corrective action may commence (remove or mark invalid any entries with different
* signatures).
* If you have no records which match this url_sig and key - no corrective action should
* be taken as this packet may have been returned by an imposter.
*
*/
function post_post(&$a) {
logger('mod_zot: ' . print_r($_REQUEST,true), LOGGER_DEBUG);
$encrypted_packet = false;
$ret = array('success' => false);
$data = json_decode($_REQUEST['data'],true);
logger('mod_zot: data: ' . print_r($data,true), LOGGER_DATA);
/**
* Many message packets will arrive encrypted. The existence of an 'iv' element
* tells us we need to unencapsulate the AES-256-CBC content using the site private key
*/
if(array_key_exists('iv',$data)) {
$encrypted_packet = true;
$data = crypto_unencapsulate($data,get_config('system','prvkey'));
logger('mod_zot: decrypt1: ' . $data, LOGGER_DATA);
$data = json_decode($data,true);
}
if(! $data) {
// possible Bleichenbacher's attack, just treat it as a
// message we have no handler for. It should fail a bit
// further along with "no hub". Our public key is public
// knowledge. There's no reason why anybody should get the
// encryption wrong unless they're fishing or hacking. If
// they're developing and made a goof, this can be discovered
// in the logs of the destination site. If they're fishing or
// hacking, the bottom line is we can't verify their hub.
// That's all we're going to tell them.
$data = array('type' => 'bogus');
}
logger('mod_zot: decoded data: ' . print_r($data,true), LOGGER_DATA);
$msgtype = ((array_key_exists('type',$data)) ? $data['type'] : '');
if($msgtype === 'ping') {
// Useful to get a health check on a remote site.
// This will let us know if any important communication details
// that we may have stored are no longer valid, regardless of xchan details.
$ret['success'] = true;
$ret['site'] = array();
$ret['site']['url'] = z_root();
$ret['site']['url_sig'] = base64url_encode(rsa_sign(z_root(),get_config('system','prvkey')));
$ret['site']['sitekey'] = get_config('system','pubkey');
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
if($msgtype === 'pickup') {
/**
* The 'pickup' message arrives with a tracking ID which is associated with a particular outq_hash
* First verify that that the returned signatures verify, then check that we have an outbound queue item
* with the correct hash.
* If everything verifies, find any/all outbound messages in the queue for this hubloc and send them back
*
*/
if((! $data['secret']) || (! $data['secret_sig'])) {
$ret['message'] = 'no verification signature';
logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message'], LOGGER_DEBUG);
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
$r = q("select distinct hubloc_sitekey from hubloc where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_callback = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '' group by hubloc_sitekey ",
dbesc($data['url']),
dbesc($data['callback'])
);
if(! $r) {
$ret['message'] = 'site not found';
logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
foreach ($r as $hubsite) {
// verify the url_sig
// If the server was re-installed at some point, there could be multiple hubs with the same url and callback.
// Only one will have a valid key.
$forgery = true;
$secret_fail = true;
$sitekey = $hubsite['hubloc_sitekey'];
logger('mod_zot: Checking sitekey: ' . $sitekey);
if(rsa_verify($data['callback'],base64url_decode($data['callback_sig']),$sitekey)) {
$forgery = false;
}
if(rsa_verify($data['secret'],base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$sitekey)) {
$secret_fail = false;
}
if((! $forgery) && (! $secret_fail))
break;
}
if($forgery) {
$ret['message'] = 'possible site forgery';
logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
if($secret_fail) {
$ret['message'] = 'secret validation failed';
logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
/**
* If we made it to here, the signatures verify, but we still don't know if the tracking ID is valid.
* It wouldn't be an error if the tracking ID isn't found, because we may have sent this particular
* queue item with another pickup (after the tracking ID for the other pickup was verified).
*/
$r = q("select outq_posturl from outq where outq_hash = '%s' and outq_posturl = '%s' limit 1",
dbesc($data['secret']),
dbesc($data['callback'])
);
if(! $r) {
$ret['message'] = 'nothing to pick up';
logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
/**
* Everything is good if we made it here, so find all messages that are going to this location
* and send them all.
*/
$r = q("select * from outq where outq_posturl = '%s'",
dbesc($data['callback'])
);
if($r) {
$ret['success'] = true;
$ret['pickup'] = array();
foreach($r as $rr) {
$ret['pickup'][] = array('notify' => json_decode($rr['outq_notify'],true),'message' => json_decode($rr['outq_msg'],true));
$x = q("delete from outq where outq_hash = '%s' limit 1",
dbesc($rr['outq_hash'])
);
}
}
$encrypted = crypto_encapsulate(json_encode($ret),$sitekey);
json_return_and_die($encrypted);
/** pickup: end */
}
/**
* All other message types require us to verify the sender. This is a generic check, so we
* will do it once here and bail if anything goes wrong.
*/
if(array_key_exists('sender',$data)) {
$sender = $data['sender'];
}
/** Check if the sender is already verified here */
$hub = zot_gethub($sender);
if(! $hub) {
/** Have never seen this guid or this guid coming from this location. Check it and register it. */
// (!!) this will validate the sender
$result = zot_register_hub($sender);
if((! $result['success']) || (! ($hub = zot_gethub($sender)))) {
$ret['message'] = 'Hub not available.';
logger('mod_zot: no hub');
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
}
// Update our DB to show when we last communicated successfully with this hub
// This will allow us to prune dead hubs from using up resources
$r = q("update hubloc set hubloc_connected = '%s' where hubloc_id = %d limit 1",
dbesc(datetime_convert()),
intval($hub['hubloc_id'])
);
/**
* This hub has now been proven to be valid.
* Any hub with the same URL and a different sitekey cannot be valid.
* Get rid of them (mark them deleted). There's a good chance they were re-installs.
*
*/
q("update hubloc set hubloc_flags = ( hubloc_flags | %d ) where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '%s' ",
intval(HUBLOC_FLAGS_DELETED),
dbesc($hub['hubloc_url']),
dbesc($hub['hubloc_sitekey'])
);
// TODO: check which hub is primary and take action if mismatched
if(array_key_exists('recipients',$data))
$recipients = $data['recipients'];
if($msgtype === 'auth_check') {
/**
* Requestor visits /magic/?dest=somewhere on their own site with a browser
* magic redirects them to $destsite/post [with auth args....]
* $destsite sends an auth_check packet to originator site
* The auth_check packet is handled here by the originator's site
* - the browser session is still waiting
* inside $destsite/post for everything to verify
* If everything checks out we'll return a token to $destsite
* and then $destsite will verify the token, authenticate the browser
* session and then redirect to the original destination.
* If authentication fails, the redirection to the original destination
* will still take place but without authentication.
*/
logger('mod_zot: auth_check', LOGGER_DEBUG);
if(! $encrypted_packet) {
logger('mod_zot: auth_check packet was not encrypted.');
$ret['message'] .= 'no packet encryption' . EOL;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
$arr = $data['sender'];
$sender_hash = base64url_encode(hash('whirlpool',$arr['guid'] . $arr['guid_sig'], true));
// garbage collect any old unused notifications
q("delete from verify where type = 'auth' and created < UTC_TIMESTAMP() - INTERVAL 10 MINUTE");
$y = q("select xchan_pubkey from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1",
dbesc($sender_hash)
);
// We created a unique hash in mod/magic.php when we invoked remote auth, and stored it in
// the verify table. It is now coming back to us as 'secret' and is signed by a channel at the other end.
// First verify their signature. We will have obtained a zot-info packet from them as part of the sender
// verification.
if((! $y) || (! rsa_verify($data['secret'],base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$y[0]['xchan_pubkey']))) {
logger('mod_zot: auth_check: sender not found or secret_sig invalid.');
$ret['message'] .= 'sender not found or sig invalid ' . print_r($y,true) . EOL;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
// There should be exactly one recipient, the original auth requestor
$ret['message'] .= 'recipients ' . print_r($recipients,true) . EOL;
if($data['recipients']) {
$arr = $data['recipients'][0];
$recip_hash = base64url_encode(hash('whirlpool',$arr['guid'] . $arr['guid_sig'], true));
$c = q("select channel_id, channel_account_id, channel_prvkey from channel where channel_hash = '%s' limit 1",
dbesc($recip_hash)
);
if(! $c) {
logger('mod_zot: auth_check: recipient channel not found.');
$ret['message'] .= 'recipient not found.' . EOL;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
$confirm = base64url_encode(rsa_sign($data['secret'] . $recip_hash,$c[0]['channel_prvkey']));
// This additionally checks for forged sites since we already stored the expected result in meta
// and we've already verified that this is them via zot_gethub() and that their key signed our token
$z = q("select id from verify where channel = %d and type = 'auth' and token = '%s' and meta = '%s' limit 1",
intval($c[0]['channel_id']),
dbesc($data['secret']),
dbesc($data['sender']['url'])
);
if(! $z) {
logger('mod_zot: auth_check: verification key not found.');
$ret['message'] .= 'verification key not found' . EOL;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
$r = q("delete from verify where id = %d limit 1",
intval($z[0]['id'])
);
$u = q("select account_service_class from account where account_id = %d limit 1",
intval($c[0]['channel_account_id'])
);
logger('mod_zot: auth_check: success', LOGGER_DEBUG);
$ret['success'] = true;
$ret['confirm'] = $confirm;
if($u && $u[0]['account_service_class'])
$ret['service_class'] = $u[0]['account_service_class'];
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
if($msgtype === 'purge') {
if($recipients) {
// basically this means "unfriend"
foreach($recipients as $recip) {
$r = q("select channel.*,xchan.* from channel
left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash
where channel_guid = '%s' and channel_guid_sig = '%s' limit 1",
dbesc($recip['guid']),
dbesc($recip['guid_sig'])
);
if($r) {
$r = q("select abook_id from abook where uid = %d and abook_xchan = '%s' limit 1",
intval($r[0]['channel_id']),
dbesc(base64url_encode(hash('whirlpool',$sender['guid'] . $sender['guid_sig'], true)))
);
if($r) {
contact_remove($r[0]['channel_id'],$r[0]['abook_id']);
}
}
}
}
else {
// Unfriend everybody - basically this means the channel has committed suicide
$arr = $data['sender'];
$sender_hash = base64url_encode(hash('whirlpool',$arr['guid'] . $arr['guid_sig'], true));
require_once('include/Contact.php');
remove_all_xchan_resources($sender_hash);
$ret['success'] = true;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
}
if($msgtype === 'refresh') {
// remote channel info (such as permissions or photo or something)
// has been updated. Grab a fresh copy and sync it.
if($recipients) {
// This would be a permissions update, typically for one connection
foreach($recipients as $recip) {
$r = q("select channel.*,xchan.* from channel
left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash
where channel_guid = '%s' and channel_guid_sig = '%s' limit 1",
dbesc($recip['guid']),
dbesc($recip['guid_sig'])
);
$x = zot_refresh(array(
'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'],
'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'],
'hubloc_url' => $sender['url']
),$r[0]);
}
}
else {
// system wide refresh
$x = zot_refresh(array(
'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'],
'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'],
'hubloc_url' => $sender['url']
),null);
}
$ret['success'] = true;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
if($msgtype === 'notify') {
$async = get_config('system','queued_fetch');
if($async) {
// add to receive queue
// qreceive_add($data);
}
else {
$x = zot_fetch($data);
$ret['delivery_report'] = $x;
}
$ret['success'] = true;
json_return_and_die($ret);
}
// catchall
json_return_and_die($ret);
}