<?php /** @file */
function authenticate_success($user_record, $login_initial = false, $interactive = false,$return = false,$update_lastlog = false) {
$a = get_app();
$_SESSION['addr'] = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
if(x($user_record,'account_id')) {
$a->account = $user_record;
$_SESSION['account_id'] = $user_record['account_id'];
$_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1;
if($login_initial || $update_lastlog) {
q("update account set account_lastlog = '%s' where account_id = %d limit 1",
dbesc(datetime_convert()),
intval($_SESSION['account_id'])
);
$a->account['account_lastlog'] = datetime_convert();
call_hooks('logged_in', $a->account);
}
$uid_to_load = (((x($_SESSION,'uid')) && (intval($_SESSION['uid'])))
? intval($_SESSION['uid'])
: intval($a->account['account_default_channel'])
);
if($uid_to_load) {
change_channel($uid_to_load);
}
}
else {
$_SESSION['uid'] = $user_record['uid'];
$_SESSION['theme'] = $user_record['theme'];
$_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1;
$_SESSION['page_flags'] = $user_record['page-flags'];
$_SESSION['my_url'] = $a->get_baseurl() . '/channel/' . $user_record['nickname'];
$_SESSION['my_address'] = $user_record['nickname'] . '@' . substr($a->get_baseurl(),strpos($a->get_baseurl(),'://')+3);
$a->user = $user_record;
if($interactive) {
if($a->user['login_date'] === '0000-00-00 00:00:00') {
$_SESSION['return_url'] = 'profile_photo/new';
$a->module = 'profile_photo';
info( t("Welcome ") . $a->user['username'] . EOL);
info( t('Please upload a profile photo.') . EOL);
}
else
info( t("Welcome back ") . $a->user['username'] . EOL);
}
$member_since = strtotime($a->user['register_date']);
if(time() < ($member_since + ( 60 * 60 * 24 * 14)))
$_SESSION['new_member'] = true;
else
$_SESSION['new_member'] = false;
if(strlen($a->user['timezone'])) {
date_default_timezone_set($a->user['timezone']);
$a->timezone = $a->user['timezone'];
}
$master_record = $a->user;
if((x($_SESSION,'submanage')) && intval($_SESSION['submanage'])) {
$r = q("select * from user where uid = %d limit 1",
intval($_SESSION['submanage'])
);
if(count($r))
$master_record = $r[0];
}
$r = q("SELECT `uid`,`username`,`nickname` FROM `user` WHERE `password` = '%s' AND `email` = '%s'",
dbesc($master_record['password']),
dbesc($master_record['email'])
);
if($r && count($r))
$a->identities = $r;
else
$a->identities = array();
$r = q("select `user`.`uid`, `user`.`username`, `user`.`nickname`
from manage left join user on manage.mid = user.uid
where `manage`.`uid` = %d",
intval($master_record['uid'])
);
if($r && count($r))
$a->identities = array_merge($a->identities,$r);
if($login_initial)
logger('auth_identities: ' . print_r($a->identities,true), LOGGER_DEBUG);
$r = q("SELECT * FROM `contact` WHERE `uid` = %d AND `self` = 1 LIMIT 1",
intval($_SESSION['uid']));
if(count($r)) {
$a->contact = $r[0];
$a->cid = $r[0]['id'];
$_SESSION['cid'] = $a->cid;
}
header('X-Account-Management-Status: active; name="' . $a->user['username'] . '"; id="' . $a->user['nickname'] .'"');
if($login_initial) {
$l = get_browser_language();
q("UPDATE `user` SET `login_date` = '%s', `language` = '%s' WHERE `uid` = %d LIMIT 1",
dbesc(datetime_convert()),
dbesc($l),
intval($_SESSION['uid'])
);
}
}
if($login_initial)
call_hooks('logged_in', $user_record);
if($return || x($_SESSION,'workflow')) {
unset($_SESSION['workflow']);
return;
}
if(($a->module !== 'home') && x($_SESSION,'login_return_url') && strlen($_SESSION['login_return_url'])) {
$return_url = $_SESSION['login_return_url'];
unset($_SESSION['login_return_url']);
goaway($a->get_baseurl() . '/' . $return_url);
}
}
function change_channel($change_channel) {
$ret = false;
if($change_channel) {
$r = q("select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and channel_account_id = %d and not ( channel_pageflags & %d) limit 1",
intval($change_channel),
intval(get_account_id()),
intval(PAGE_REMOVED)
);
if($r) {
$hash = $r[0]['channel_hash'];
$_SESSION['uid'] = intval($r[0]['channel_id']);
get_app()->set_channel($r[0]);
$_SESSION['theme'] = $r[0]['channel_theme'];
date_default_timezone_set($r[0]['channel_timezone']);
$ret = $r[0];
}
$x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1",
dbesc($hash)
);
if($x) {
$_SESSION['my_url'] = $x[0]['xchan_url'];
$_SESSION['my_address'] = $x[0]['xchan_addr'];
get_app()->set_observer($x[0]);
get_app()->set_perms(get_all_perms(local_user(),$hash));
}
}
return $ret;
}
function permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) {
$local_user = local_user();
$remote_user = remote_user();
/**
* Construct permissions
*
* default permissions - anonymous user
*/
$sql = " AND allow_cid = ''
AND allow_gid = ''
AND deny_cid = ''
AND deny_gid = ''
";
/**
* Profile owner - everything is visible
*/
if(($local_user) && ($local_user == $owner_id)) {
$sql = '';
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
* and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
* If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
* done this and passed the groups into this function.
*/
else {
$observer = get_app()->get_observer();
$groups = init_groups_visitor($remote_user);
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
}
$sql = sprintf(
" AND ( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid REGEXP '%s')
AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '') )
)
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $remote_user . '>%')),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $remote_user . '>%')),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
return $sql;
}
function item_permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) {
$local_user = local_user();
$remote_user = remote_user();
/**
* Construct permissions
*
* default permissions - anonymous user
*/
$sql = " AND not item_private ";
/**
* Profile owner - everything is visible
*/
if(($local_user) && ($local_user == $owner_id)) {
$sql = '';
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
* and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
* If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
* done this and passed the groups into this function.
*/
else {
$observer = get_app()->get_observer();
$groups = init_groups_visitor($remote_user);
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
}
$sql = sprintf(
" AND ( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid REGEXP '%s')
AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '') )
)
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $remote_user . '>%')),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $remote_user . '>%')),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
return $sql;
}
function public_permissions_sql($observer_hash) {
$observer = get_app()->get_observer();
$groups = init_groups_visitor($observer_hash);
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
}
$sql = sprintf(
" OR (( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid REGEXP '%s')
AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '') )
))
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')),
dbesc($gs)
);
return $sql;
}
/*
* Functions used to protect against Cross-Site Request Forgery
* The security token has to base on at least one value that an attacker can't know - here it's the session ID and the private key.
* In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes;
* or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours).
* The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case:
* A security token is used to protekt a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link).
* If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer.
* Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are,
* so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types).
*/
function get_form_security_token($typename = '') {
$a = get_app();
$timestamp = time();
$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename);
return $timestamp . '.' . $sec_hash;
}
function check_form_security_token($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!x($_REQUEST, $formname)) return false;
$hash = $_REQUEST[$formname];
$max_livetime = 10800; // 3 hours
$a = get_app();
$x = explode('.', $hash);
if (time() > (IntVal($x[0]) + $max_livetime)) return false;
$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $x[0] . $typename);
return ($sec_hash == $x[1]);
}
function check_form_security_std_err_msg() {
return t('The form security token was not correct. This probably happened because the form has been opened for too long (>3 hours) before submitting it.') . EOL;
}
function check_form_security_token_redirectOnErr($err_redirect, $typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) {
$a = get_app();
logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . $a->user['guid'] . ' - form element ' . $typename);
logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA);
notice( check_form_security_std_err_msg() );
goaway($a->get_baseurl() . $err_redirect );
}
}
function check_form_security_token_ForbiddenOnErr($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) {
$a = get_app();
logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . $a->user['guid'] . ' - form element ' . $typename);
logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA);
header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
killme();
}
}
// Returns an array of group id's this contact is a member of.
// This array will only contain group id's related to the uid of this
// DFRN contact. They are *not* neccessarily unique across the entire site.
if(! function_exists('init_groups_visitor')) {
function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) {
$groups = array();
$r = q("SELECT gid FROM group_member WHERE xchan = '%s' ",
dbesc($contact_id)
);
if(count($r)) {
foreach($r as $rr)
$groups[] = $rr['gid'];
}
return $groups;
}}
// This is used to determine which uid have posts which are visible to the logged in user (from the API) for the
// public_timeline, and we can use this in a community page by making $perms_min = PERMS_NETWORK unless logged in.
// Collect uids of everybody on this site who has opened their posts to everybody on this site (or greater visibility)
// We always include yourself if logged in because you can always see your own posts
// resolving granular permissions for the observer against every person and every post on the site
// will likely be too expensive.
// Returns a string list of comma separated channel_ids suitable for direct inclusion in a SQL query
function stream_perms_api_uids($perms_min = PERMS_SITE) {
$ret = array();
if(local_user())
$ret[] = local_user();
$r = q("select channel_id from channel where channel_r_stream <= %d",
intval($perms_min)
);
if($r)
foreach($r as $rr)
if(! in_array($rr['channel_id'],$ret))
$ret[] = $rr['channel_id'];
$str = '';
if($ret)
foreach($ret as $rr) {
if($str)
$str .= ',';
$str .= intval($rr);
}
return $str;
}
