<?php /** @file */
function authenticate_success($user_record, $login_initial = false, $interactive = false,$return = false,$update_lastlog = false) {
$a = get_app();
$_SESSION['addr'] = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
if(x($user_record,'account_id')) {
$a->account = $user_record;
$_SESSION['account_id'] = $user_record['account_id'];
$_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1;
if($login_initial || $update_lastlog) {
q("update account set account_lastlog = '%s' where account_id = %d",
dbesc(datetime_convert()),
intval($_SESSION['account_id'])
);
$a->account['account_lastlog'] = datetime_convert();
call_hooks('logged_in', $a->account);
}
$uid_to_load = (((x($_SESSION,'uid')) && (intval($_SESSION['uid'])))
? intval($_SESSION['uid'])
: intval($a->account['account_default_channel'])
);
if($uid_to_load) {
change_channel($uid_to_load);
}
}
if($login_initial) {
call_hooks('logged_in', $user_record);
// might want to log success here
}
if($return || x($_SESSION,'workflow')) {
unset($_SESSION['workflow']);
return;
}
if(($a->module !== 'home') && x($_SESSION,'login_return_url') && strlen($_SESSION['login_return_url'])) {
$return_url = $_SESSION['login_return_url'];
// don't let members get redirected to a raw ajax page update - this can happen
// if DHCP changes the IP address at an unfortunate time and paranoia is turned on
if(strstr($return_url,'update_'))
$return_url = '';
unset($_SESSION['login_return_url']);
goaway($a->get_baseurl() . '/' . $return_url);
}
/* This account has never created a channel. Send them to new_channel by default */
if($a->module === 'login') {
$r = q("select count(channel_id) as total from channel where channel_account_id = %d and not ( channel_pageflags & %d)>0",
intval($a->account['account_id']),
intval(PAGE_REMOVED)
);
if(($r) && (! $r[0]['total']))
goaway(z_root() . '/new_channel');
}
/* else just return */
}
function change_channel($change_channel) {
$ret = false;
if($change_channel) {
$r = q("select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and channel_account_id = %d and not ( channel_pageflags & %d)>0 limit 1",
intval($change_channel),
intval(get_account_id()),
intval(PAGE_REMOVED)
);
// It's not there. Is this an administrator, and is this the sys channel?
if (is_developer()) {
if (! $r) {
if (is_site_admin()) {
$r = q("select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and ( channel_pageflags & %d) and not (channel_pageflags & %d )>0 limit 1",
intval($change_channel),
intval(PAGE_SYSTEM),
intval(PAGE_REMOVED)
);
}
}
}
if($r) {
$hash = $r[0]['channel_hash'];
$_SESSION['uid'] = intval($r[0]['channel_id']);
get_app()->set_channel($r[0]);
$_SESSION['theme'] = $r[0]['channel_theme'];
$_SESSION['mobile_theme'] = get_pconfig(local_user(),'system', 'mobile_theme');
date_default_timezone_set($r[0]['channel_timezone']);
$ret = $r[0];
}
$x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1",
dbesc($hash)
);
if($x) {
$_SESSION['my_url'] = $x[0]['xchan_url'];
$_SESSION['my_address'] = $r[0]['channel_address'] . '@' . substr(get_app()->get_baseurl(),strpos(get_app()->get_baseurl(),'://')+3);
get_app()->set_observer($x[0]);
get_app()->set_perms(get_all_perms(local_user(),$hash));
}
if(! is_dir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address']))
@os_mkdir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address'], STORAGE_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS,true);
}
return $ret;
}
function permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) {
if(defined('STATUSNET_PRIVACY_COMPATIBILITY'))
return '';
$local_user = local_user();
$remote_user = remote_user();
/**
* Construct permissions
*
* default permissions - anonymous user
*/
$sql = " AND allow_cid = ''
AND allow_gid = ''
AND deny_cid = ''
AND deny_gid = ''
";
/**
* Profile owner - everything is visible
*/
if(($local_user) && ($local_user == $owner_id)) {
$sql = '';
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
* and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
* If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
* done this and passed the groups into this function.
*/
else {
$observer = get_observer_hash();
if($observer) {
$groups = init_groups_visitor($observer);
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
}
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
" AND ( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '') )
)
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
}
return $sql;
}
function item_permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) {
if(defined('STATUSNET_PRIVACY_COMPATIBILITY'))
return '';
$local_user = local_user();
$remote_user = remote_user();
/**
* Construct permissions
*
* default permissions - anonymous user
*/
$sql = " AND item_private=0 ";
/**
* Profile owner - everything is visible
*/
if(($local_user) && ($local_user == $owner_id)) {
$sql = '';
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
* and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
* If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
* done this and passed the groups into this function.
*/
else {
$observer = get_observer_hash();
if($observer) {
$groups = init_groups_visitor($observer);
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
}
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
" AND ( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '') )
)
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
}
return $sql;
}
function public_permissions_sql($observer_hash) {
$observer = get_app()->get_observer();
$groups = init_groups_visitor($observer_hash);
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
}
$sql = '';
if($observer_hash) {
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
" OR (( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '') )
))
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
return $sql;
}
/*
* Functions used to protect against Cross-Site Request Forgery
* The security token has to base on at least one value that an attacker can't know - here it's the session ID and the private key.
* In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes;
* or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours).
* The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case:
* A security token is used to protekt a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link).
* If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer.
* Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are,
* so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types).
*/
function get_form_security_token($typename = '') {
$a = get_app();
$timestamp = time();
$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename);
return $timestamp . '.' . $sec_hash;
}
function check_form_security_token($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!x($_REQUEST, $formname)) return false;
$hash = $_REQUEST[$formname];
$max_livetime = 10800; // 3 hours
$a = get_app();
$x = explode('.', $hash);
if (time() > (IntVal($x[0]) + $max_livetime)) return false;
$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $x[0] . $typename);
return ($sec_hash == $x[1]);
}
function check_form_security_std_err_msg() {
return t('The form security token was not correct. This probably happened because the form has been opened for too long (>3 hours) before submitting it.') . EOL;
}
function check_form_security_token_redirectOnErr($err_redirect, $typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) {
$a = get_app();
logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . $a->user['guid'] . ' - form element ' . $typename);
logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA);
notice( check_form_security_std_err_msg() );
goaway($a->get_baseurl() . $err_redirect );
}
}
function check_form_security_token_ForbiddenOnErr($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') {
if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) {
$a = get_app();
logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . $a->user['guid'] . ' - form element ' . $typename);
logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA);
header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
killme();
}
}
// Returns an array of group id's this contact is a member of.
// This array will only contain group id's related to the uid of this
// DFRN contact. They are *not* neccessarily unique across the entire site.
if(! function_exists('init_groups_visitor')) {
function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) {
$groups = array();
$r = q("SELECT hash FROM `groups` left join group_member on groups.id = group_member.gid WHERE xchan = '%s' ",
dbesc($contact_id)
);
if(count($r)) {
foreach($r as $rr)
$groups[] = $rr['hash'];
}
return $groups;
}}
// This is used to determine which uid have posts which are visible to the logged in user (from the API) for the
// public_timeline, and we can use this in a community page by making
// $perms = (PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) unless logged in.
// Collect uids of everybody on this site who has opened their posts to everybody on this site (or greater visibility)
// We always include yourself if logged in because you can always see your own posts
// resolving granular permissions for the observer against every person and every post on the site
// will likely be too expensive.
// Returns a string list of comma separated channel_ids suitable for direct inclusion in a SQL query
function stream_perms_api_uids($perms = NULL ) {
$perms = is_null($perms) ? (PERMS_SITE|PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) : $perms;
$ret = array();
if(local_user())
$ret[] = local_user();
$r = q("select channel_id from channel where channel_r_stream > 0 and (channel_r_stream & %d)>0 and not (channel_pageflags & %d)>0",
intval($perms),
intval(PAGE_ADULT|PAGE_CENSORED|PAGE_SYSTEM|PAGE_REMOVED)
);
if($r)
foreach($r as $rr)
if(! in_array($rr['channel_id'],$ret))
$ret[] = $rr['channel_id'];
$str = '';
if($ret)
foreach($ret as $rr) {
if($str)
$str .= ',';
$str .= intval($rr);
}
logger('stream_perms_api_uids: ' . $str, LOGGER_DEBUG);
return $str;
}
function stream_perms_xchans($perms = NULL ) {
$perms = is_null($perms) ? (PERMS_SITE|PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) : $perms;
$ret = array();
if(local_user())
$ret[] = get_observer_hash();
$r = q("select channel_hash from channel where channel_r_stream > 0 and (channel_r_stream & %d)>0 and not (channel_pageflags & %d)>0",
intval($perms),
intval(PAGE_ADULT|PAGE_CENSORED|PAGE_SYSTEM|PAGE_REMOVED)
);
if($r)
foreach($r as $rr)
if(! in_array($rr['channel_hash'],$ret))
$ret[] = $rr['channel_hash'];
$str = '';
if($ret)
foreach($ret as $rr) {
if($str)
$str .= ',';
$str .= "'" . dbesc($rr) . "'";
}
logger('stream_perms_xchans: ' . $str, LOGGER_DEBUG);
return $str;
}
