module ActionDispatch # This middleware calculates the IP address of the remote client that is # making the request. It does this by checking various headers that could # contain the address, and then picking the last-set address that is not # on the list of trusted IPs. This follows the precedent set by e.g. # {the Tomcat server}[https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=50453], # with {reasoning explained at length}[http://blog.gingerlime.com/2012/rails-ip-spoofing-vulnerabilities-and-protection] # by @gingerlime. A more detailed explanation of the algorithm is given # at GetIp#calculate_ip. # # Some Rack servers concatenate repeated headers, like {HTTP RFC 2616}[http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec4.html#sec4.2] # requires. Some Rack servers simply drop preceeding headers, and only report # the value that was {given in the last header}[http://andre.arko.net/2011/12/26/repeated-headers-and-ruby-web-servers]. # If you are behind multiple proxy servers (like Nginx to HAProxy to Unicorn) # then you should test your Rack server to make sure your data is good. # # IF YOU DON'T USE A PROXY, THIS MAKES YOU VULNERABLE TO IP SPOOFING. # This middleware assumes that there is at least one proxy sitting around # and setting headers with the client's remote IP address. If you don't use # a proxy, because you are hosted on e.g. Heroku without SSL, any client can # claim to have any IP address by setting the X-Forwarded-For header. If you # care about that, then you need to explicitly drop or ignore those headers # sometime before this middleware runs. class RemoteIp class IpSpoofAttackError < StandardError; end # The default trusted IPs list simply includes IP addresses that are # guaranteed by the IP specification to be private addresses. Those will # not be the ultimate client IP in production, and so are discarded. See # http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network for details. TRUSTED_PROXIES = %r{ ^127\.0\.0\.1$ | # localhost IPv4 ^::1$ | # localhost IPv6 ^fc00: | # private IPv6 range fc00 ^10\. | # private IPv4 range 10.x.x.x ^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.| # private IPv4 range 172.16.0.0 .. 172.31.255.255 ^192\.168\. # private IPv4 range 192.168.x.x }x attr_reader :check_ip, :proxies # Create a new +RemoteIp+ middleware instance. # # The +check_ip_spoofing+ option is on by default. When on, an exception # is raised if it looks like the client is trying to lie about its own IP # address. It makes sense to turn off this check on sites aimed at non-IP # clients (like WAP devices), or behind proxies that set headers in an # incorrect or confusing way (like AWS ELB). # # The +custom_trusted+ argument can take a regex, which will be used # instead of +TRUSTED_PROXIES+, or a string, which will be used in addition # to +TRUSTED_PROXIES+. Any proxy setup will put the value you want in the # middle (or at the beginning) of the X-Forwarded-For list, with your proxy # servers after it. If your proxies aren't removed, pass them in via the # +custom_trusted+ parameter. That way, the middleware will ignore those # IP addresses, and return the one that you want. def initialize(app, check_ip_spoofing = true, custom_proxies = nil) @app = app @check_ip = check_ip_spoofing @proxies = case custom_proxies when Regexp custom_proxies when nil TRUSTED_PROXIES else Regexp.union(TRUSTED_PROXIES, custom_proxies) end end # Since the IP address may not be needed, we store the object here # without calculating the IP to keep from slowing down the majority of # requests. For those requests that do need to know the IP, the # GetIp#calculate_ip method will calculate the memoized client IP address. def call(env) env["action_dispatch.remote_ip"] = GetIp.new(env, self) @app.call(env) end # The GetIp class exists as a way to defer processing of the request data # into an actual IP address. If the ActionDispatch::Request#remote_ip method # is called, this class will calculate the value and then memoize it. class GetIp # This constant contains a regular expression that validates every known # form of IP v4 and v6 address, with or without abbreviations, adapted # from {this gist}[https://gist.github.com/gazay/1289635]. VALID_IP = %r{ (^(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[0-9]{1,2})(\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[0-9]{1,2})){3}$) | # ip v4 (^( (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){7}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # ip v6 not abbreviated (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){6}:[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # ip v6 with double colon in the end (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){5}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:)?[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # - ip addresses v6 (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){4}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,2}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # - with (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){3}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,3}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # - double colon (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){2}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,4}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # - in the middle (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){6} ((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3} (\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4 (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){1,5}:((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4 (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){1}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,4}((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4 (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,2}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,3}((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4 (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,3}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,2}((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4 (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,4}:([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){1}((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4 (::([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,5}((\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d) |(\d{1,2}))\b)\.){3}(\b((25[0-5])|(1\d{2})|(2[0-4]\d)|(\d{1,2}))\b)) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4 ([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}::([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,5}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # ip v6 with compatible to v4 (::([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){0,6}[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}) | # ip v6 with double colon at the begining (([0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}:){1,7}:) # ip v6 without ending )$) }x def initialize(env, middleware) @env = env @check_ip = middleware.check_ip @proxies = middleware.proxies end # Sort through the various IP address headers, looking for the IP most # likely to be the address of the actual remote client making this # request. # # REMOTE_ADDR will be correct if the request is made directly against the # Ruby process, on e.g. Heroku. When the request is proxied by another # server like HAProxy or Nginx, the IP address that made the original # request will be put in an X-Forwarded-For header. If there are multiple # proxies, that header may contain a list of IPs. Other proxy services # set the Client-Ip header instead, so we check that too. # # As discussed in {this post about Rails IP Spoofing}[http://blog.gingerlime.com/2012/rails-ip-spoofing-vulnerabilities-and-protection/], # while the first IP in the list is likely to be the "originating" IP, # it could also have been set by the client maliciously. # # In order to find the first address that is (probably) accurate, we # take the list of IPs, remove known and trusted proxies, and then take # the last address left, which was presumably set by one of those proxies. def calculate_ip # Set by the Rack web server, this is a single value. remote_addr = ips_from('REMOTE_ADDR').last # Could be a CSV list and/or repeated headers that were concatenated. client_ips = ips_from('HTTP_CLIENT_IP').reverse forwarded_ips = ips_from('HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR').reverse # +Client-Ip+ and +X-Forwarded-For+ should not, generally, both be set. # If they are both set, it means that this request passed through two # proxies with incompatible IP header conventions, and there is no way # for us to determine which header is the right one after the fact. # Since we have no idea, we give up and explode. should_check_ip = @check_ip && client_ips.last if should_check_ip && !forwarded_ips.include?(client_ips.last) # We don't know which came from the proxy, and which from the user raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?! " + "HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{@env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'].inspect} " + "HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{@env['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'].inspect}" end # We assume these things about the IP headers: # # - X-Forwarded-For will be a list of IPs, one per proxy, or blank # - Client-Ip is propagated from the outermost proxy, or is blank # - REMOTE_ADDR will be the IP that made the request to Rack ips = [forwarded_ips, client_ips, remote_addr].flatten.compact # If every single IP option is in the trusted list, just return REMOTE_ADDR filter_proxies(ips).first || remote_addr end # Memoizes the value returned by #calculate_ip and returns it for # ActionDispatch::Request to use. def to_s @ip ||= calculate_ip end protected def ips_from(header) # Split the comma-separated list into an array of strings ips = @env[header] ? @env[header].strip.split(/[,\s]+/) : [] # Only return IPs that are valid according to the regex ips.select{ |ip| ip =~ VALID_IP } end def filter_proxies(ips) ips.reject { |ip| ip =~ @proxies } end end end end