the urlencoded webbie (channel@host.domain) of the channel requesting access * * dest => the desired destination URL (urlencoded) * * sec => a random string which is also stored on $mysite for use during the verification phase. * * version => the zot revision * * delegate => optional urlencoded webbie of a local channel to invoke delegation rights for * * When this packet is received, an "auth-check" zot message is sent to $mysite. * (e.g. if $_GET['auth'] is foobar@podunk.edu, a zot packet is sent to the podunk.edu zot endpoint, which is typically /post) * If no information has been recorded about the requesting identity a zot information packet will be retrieved before * continuing. * * The sender of this packet is an arbitrary/random site channel. The recipients will be a single recipient corresponding * to the guid and guid_sig we have associated with the requesting auth identity * * \code{.json} * { * "type":"auth_check", * "sender":{ * "guid":"kgVFf_...", * "guid_sig":"PT9-TApz...", * "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu", * "url_sig":"T8Bp7j..." * }, * "recipients":{ * { * "guid":"ZHSqb...", * "guid_sig":"JsAAXi..." * } * } * "callback":"\/post", * "version":1, * "secret":"1eaa661", * "secret_sig":"eKV968b1..." * } * \endcode * * auth_check messages MUST use encapsulated encryption. This message is sent to the origination site, which checks the 'secret' to see * if it is the same as the 'sec' which it passed originally. It also checks the secret_sig which is the secret signed by the * destination channel's private key and base64url encoded. If everything checks out, a json packet is returned: * * \code{.json} * { * "success":1, * "confirm":"q0Ysovd1u...", * "service_class":(optional) * "level":(optional) * } * \endcode * * 'confirm' in this case is the base64url encoded RSA signature of the concatenation of 'secret' with the * base64url encoded whirlpool hash of the requestor's guid and guid_sig; signed with the source channel private key. * This prevents a man-in-the-middle from inserting a rogue success packet. Upon receipt and successful * verification of this packet, the destination site will redirect to the original destination URL and indicate a successful remote login. * Service_class can be used by cooperating sites to provide different access rights based on account rights and subscription plans. It is * a string whose contents are not defined by protocol. Example: "basic" or "gold". * * @param[in,out] App &$a */ function post_init(&$a) { if (array_key_exists('auth', $_REQUEST)) { $ret = array('success' => false, 'message' => ''); logger('mod_zot: auth request received.'); $address = $_REQUEST['auth']; $desturl = $_REQUEST['dest']; $sec = $_REQUEST['sec']; $version = $_REQUEST['version']; $delegate = $_REQUEST['delegate']; $test = ((x($_REQUEST, 'test')) ? intval($_REQUEST['test']) : 0); // They are authenticating ultimately to the site and not to a particular channel. // Any channel will do, providing it's currently active. We just need to have an // identity to attach to the packet we send back. So find one. $c = q("select * from channel where not ( channel_pageflags & %d )>0 limit 1", intval(PAGE_REMOVED) ); if (! $c) { // nobody here logger('mod_zot: auth: unable to find a response channel'); if ($test) { $ret['message'] .= 'no local channels found.' . EOL; json_return_and_die($ret); } goaway($desturl); } // Try and find a hubloc for the person attempting to auth $x = q("select * from hubloc left join xchan on xchan_hash = hubloc_hash where hubloc_addr = '%s' order by hubloc_id desc", dbesc($address) ); if (! $x) { // finger them if they can't be found. $ret = zot_finger($address, null); if ($ret['success']) { $j = json_decode($ret['body'], true); if ($j) import_xchan($j); $x = q("select * from hubloc left join xchan on xchan_hash = hubloc_hash where hubloc_addr = '%s' order by hubloc_id desc", dbesc($address) ); } } if(! $x) { logger('mod_zot: auth: unable to finger ' . $address); if($test) { $ret['message'] .= 'no hubloc found for ' . $address . ' and probing failed.' . EOL; json_return_and_die($ret); } goaway($desturl); } foreach($x as $xx) { logger('mod_zot: auth request received from ' . $xx['hubloc_addr'] ); // check credentials and access // If they are already authenticated and haven't changed credentials, // we can save an expensive network round trip and improve performance. $remote = remote_channel(); $result = null; $remote_service_class = ''; $remote_level = 0; $remote_hub = $xx['hubloc_url']; $DNT = 0; // Also check that they are coming from the same site as they authenticated with originally. $already_authed = ((($remote) && ($xx['hubloc_hash'] == $remote) && ($xx['hubloc_url'] === $_SESSION['remote_hub'])) ? true : false); if($delegate && $delegate !== $_SESSION['delegate_channel']) $already_authed = false; $j = array(); if (! $already_authed) { // Auth packets MUST use ultra top-secret hush-hush mode - e.g. the entire packet is encrypted using the site private key // The actual channel sending the packet ($c[0]) is not important, but this provides a generic zot packet with a sender // which can be verified $p = zot_build_packet($c[0],$type = 'auth_check', array(array('guid' => $xx['hubloc_guid'],'guid_sig' => $xx['hubloc_guid_sig'])), $xx['hubloc_sitekey'], $sec); if ($test) { $ret['message'] .= 'auth check packet created using sitekey ' . $xx['hubloc_sitekey'] . EOL; $ret['message'] .= 'packet contents: ' . $p . EOL; } $result = zot_zot($xx['hubloc_callback'],$p); if (! $result['success']) { logger('mod_zot: auth_check callback failed.'); if ($test) { $ret['message'] .= 'auth check request to your site returned .' . print_r($result, true) . EOL; continue; } continue; } $j = json_decode($result['body'], true); if (! $j) { logger('mod_zot: auth_check json data malformed.'); if($test) { $ret['message'] .= 'json malformed: ' . $result['body'] . EOL; continue; } } } if ($test) { $ret['message'] .= 'auth check request returned .' . print_r($j, true) . EOL; } if ($already_authed || $j['success']) { if ($j['success']) { // legit response, but we do need to check that this wasn't answered by a man-in-middle if (! rsa_verify($sec . $xx['xchan_hash'],base64url_decode($j['confirm']),$xx['xchan_pubkey'])) { logger('mod_zot: auth: final confirmation failed.'); if ($test) { $ret['message'] .= 'final confirmation failed. ' . $sec . print_r($j,true) . print_r($xx,true); continue; } continue; } if (array_key_exists('service_class',$j)) $remote_service_class = $j['service_class']; if (array_key_exists('level',$j)) $remote_level = $j['level']; if (array_key_exists('DNT',$j)) $DNT = $j['DNT']; } // everything is good... maybe if(local_channel()) { // tell them to logout if they're logged in locally as anything but the target remote account // in which case just shut up because they don't need to be doing this at all. if ($a->channel['channel_hash'] != $xx['xchan_hash']) { logger('mod_zot: auth: already authenticated locally as somebody else.'); notice( t('Remote authentication blocked. You are logged into this site locally. Please logout and retry.') . EOL); if ($test) { $ret['message'] .= 'already logged in locally with a conflicting identity.' . EOL; continue; } } continue; } // log them in if ($test) { $ret['success'] = true; $ret['message'] .= 'Authentication Success!' . EOL; json_return_and_die($ret); } $delegation_success = false; if ($delegate) { $r = q("select * from channel left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash where xchan_addr = '%s' limit 1", dbesc($delegate) ); if ($r && intval($r[0]['channel_id'])) { $allowed = perm_is_allowed($r[0]['channel_id'],$xx['xchan_hash'],'delegate'); if ($allowed) { $_SESSION['delegate_channel'] = $r[0]['channel_id']; $_SESSION['delegate'] = $xx['xchan_hash']; $_SESSION['account_id'] = intval($r[0]['channel_account_id']); require_once('include/security.php'); change_channel($r[0]['channel_id']); $delegation_success = true; } } } $_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1; if (! $delegation_success) { $_SESSION['visitor_id'] = $xx['xchan_hash']; $_SESSION['my_url'] = $xx['xchan_url']; $_SESSION['my_address'] = $address; $_SESSION['remote_service_class'] = $remote_service_class; $_SESSION['remote_level'] = $remote_level; $_SESSION['remote_hub'] = $remote_hub; $_SESSION['DNT'] = $DNT; } $arr = array('xchan' => $xx, 'url' => $desturl, 'session' => $_SESSION); call_hooks('magic_auth_success',$arr); $a->set_observer($xx); require_once('include/security.php'); $a->set_groups(init_groups_visitor($_SESSION['visitor_id'])); info(sprintf( t('Welcome %s. Remote authentication successful.'),$xx['xchan_name'])); logger('mod_zot: auth success from ' . $xx['xchan_addr']); q("update hubloc set hubloc_status = (hubloc_status | %d ) where hubloc_id = %d ", intval(HUBLOC_WORKS), intval($xx['hubloc_id']) ); } else { if ($test) { $ret['message'] .= 'auth failure. ' . print_r($_REQUEST,true) . print_r($j,true) . EOL; continue; } logger('mod_zot: magic-auth failure - not authenticated: ' . $xx['xchan_addr']); q("update hubloc set hubloc_status = (hubloc_status | %d ) where hubloc_id = %d ", intval(HUBLOC_RECEIVE_ERROR), intval($xx['hubloc_id']) ); } if ($test) { $ret['message'] .= 'auth failure fallthrough ' . print_r($_REQUEST,true) . print_r($j,true) . EOL; continue; } } /** * @FIXME we really want to save the return_url in the session before we * visit rmagic. This does however prevent a recursion if you visit * rmagic directly, as it would otherwise send you back here again. * But z_root() probably isn't where you really want to go. */ if(strstr($desturl,z_root() . '/rmagic')) goaway(z_root()); if ($test) { json_return_and_die($ret); } goaway($desturl); } } /** * @brief zot communications and messaging. * * Sender HTTP posts to this endpoint ($site/post typically) with 'data' parameter set to json zot message packet. * This packet is optionally encrypted, which we will discover if the json has an 'iv' element. * $contents => array( 'alg' => 'aes256cbc', 'iv' => initialisation vector, 'key' => decryption key, 'data' => encrypted data); * $contents->iv and $contents->key are random strings encrypted with this site's RSA public key and then base64url encoded. * Currently only 'aes256cbc' is used, but this is extensible should that algorithm prove inadequate. * * Once decrypted, one will find the normal json_encoded zot message packet. * * Defined packet types are: notify, purge, refresh, force_refresh, auth_check, ping, and pickup * * Standard packet: (used by notify, purge, refresh, force_refresh, and auth_check) * \code{.json} * { * "type": "notify", * "sender":{ * "guid":"kgVFf_1...", * "guid_sig":"PT9-TApzp...", * "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu", * "url_sig":"T8Bp7j5...", * }, * "recipients": { optional recipient array }, * "callback":"\/post", * "version":1, * "secret":"1eaa...", * "secret_sig": "df89025470fac8..." * } * \endcode * * Signature fields are all signed with the sender channel private key and base64url encoded. * Recipients are arrays of guid and guid_sig, which were previously signed with the recipients private * key and base64url encoded and later obtained via channel discovery. Absence of recipients indicates * a public message or visible to all potential listeners on this site. * * "pickup" packet: * The pickup packet is sent in response to a notify packet from another site * \code{.json} * { * "type":"pickup", * "url":"http:\/\/example.com", * "callback":"http:\/\/example.com\/post", * "callback_sig":"teE1_fLI...", * "secret":"1eaa...", * "secret_sig":"O7nB4_..." * } * \endcode * * In the pickup packet, the sig fields correspond to the respective data * element signed with this site's system private key and then base64url encoded. * The "secret" is the same as the original secret from the notify packet. * * If verification is successful, a json structure is returned containing a * success indicator and an array of type 'pickup'. * Each pickup element contains the original notify request and a message field * whose contents are dependent on the message type. * * This JSON array is AES encapsulated using the site public key of the site * that sent the initial zot pickup packet. * Using the above example, this would be example.com. * * \code{.json} * { * "success":1, * "pickup":{ * "notify":{ * "type":"notify", * "sender":{ * "guid":"kgVFf_...", * "guid_sig":"PT9-TApz...", * "url":"http:\/\/z.podunk.edu", * "url_sig":"T8Bp7j5D..." * }, * "callback":"\/post", * "version":1, * "secret":"1eaa661..." * }, * "message":{ * "type":"activity", * "message_id":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu", * "message_top":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu", * "message_parent":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu", * "created":"2012-11-20 04:04:16", * "edited":"2012-11-20 04:04:16", * "title":"", * "body":"Hi Nickordo", * "app":"", * "verb":"post", * "object_type":"", * "target_type":"", * "permalink":"", * "location":"", * "longlat":"", * "owner":{ * "name":"Indigo", * "address":"indigo@podunk.edu", * "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu", * "photo":{ * "mimetype":"image\/jpeg", * "src":"http:\/\/podunk.edu\/photo\/profile\/m\/5" * }, * "guid":"kgVFf_...", * "guid_sig":"PT9-TAp...", * }, * "author":{ * "name":"Indigo", * "address":"indigo@podunk.edu", * "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu", * "photo":{ * "mimetype":"image\/jpeg", * "src":"http:\/\/podunk.edu\/photo\/profile\/m\/5" * }, * "guid":"kgVFf_...", * "guid_sig":"PT9-TAp..." * } * } * } * } * \endcode * * Currently defined message types are 'activity', 'mail', 'profile', 'location' * and 'channel_sync', which each have different content schemas. * * Ping packet: * A ping packet does not require any parameters except the type. It may or may * not be encrypted. * * \code{.json} * { * "type": "ping" * } * \endcode * * On receipt of a ping packet a ping response will be returned: * * \code{.json} * { * "success" : 1, * "site" { * "url": "http:\/\/podunk.edu", * "url_sig": "T8Bp7j5...", * "sitekey": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- * MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQE..." * } * } * \endcode * * The ping packet can be used to verify that a site has not been re-installed, and to * initiate corrective action if it has. The url_sig is signed with the site private key * and base64url encoded - and this should verify with the enclosed sitekey. Failure to * verify indicates the site is corrupt or otherwise unable to communicate using zot. * This return packet is not otherwise verified, so should be compared with other * results obtained from this site which were verified prior to taking action. For instance * if you have one verified result with this signature and key, and other records for this * url which have different signatures and keys, it indicates that the site was re-installed * and corrective action may commence (remove or mark invalid any entries with different * signatures). * If you have no records which match this url_sig and key - no corrective action should * be taken as this packet may have been returned by an imposter. * * @param[in,out] App &$a */ function post_post(&$a) { $encrypted_packet = false; $ret = array('success' => false); $data = json_decode($_REQUEST['data'],true); /* * Many message packets will arrive encrypted. The existence of an 'iv' * element tells us we need to unencapsulate the AES-256-CBC content using * the site private key. */ if($data && array_key_exists('iv',$data)) { $encrypted_packet = true; $data = crypto_unencapsulate($data,get_config('system','prvkey')); logger('mod_zot: decrypt1: ' . $data, LOGGER_DATA); $data = json_decode($data,true); } if(! $data) { // possible Bleichenbacher's attack, just treat it as a // message we have no handler for. It should fail a bit // further along with "no hub". Our public key is public // knowledge. There's no reason why anybody should get the // encryption wrong unless they're fishing or hacking. If // they're developing and made a goof, this can be discovered // in the logs of the destination site. If they're fishing or // hacking, the bottom line is we can't verify their hub. // That's all we're going to tell them. $data = array('type' => 'bogus'); } $msgtype = ((array_key_exists('type',$data)) ? $data['type'] : ''); if($msgtype === 'ping') { // Useful to get a health check on a remote site. // This will let us know if any important communication details // that we may have stored are no longer valid, regardless of xchan details. logger('POST: got ping send pong now back: ' . z_root() , LOGGER_DEBUG ); $ret['success'] = true; $ret['site'] = array(); $ret['site']['url'] = z_root(); $ret['site']['url_sig'] = base64url_encode(rsa_sign(z_root(),get_config('system','prvkey'))); $ret['site']['sitekey'] = get_config('system','pubkey'); json_return_and_die($ret); } if($msgtype === 'pickup') { /* * The 'pickup' message arrives with a tracking ID which is associated with a particular outq_hash * First verify that that the returned signatures verify, then check that we have an outbound queue item * with the correct hash. * If everything verifies, find any/all outbound messages in the queue for this hubloc and send them back */ if((! $data['secret']) || (! $data['secret_sig'])) { $ret['message'] = 'no verification signature'; logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message'], LOGGER_DEBUG); json_return_and_die($ret); } $r = q("select distinct hubloc_sitekey from hubloc where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_callback = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '' group by hubloc_sitekey ", dbesc($data['url']), dbesc($data['callback']) ); if(! $r) { $ret['message'] = 'site not found'; logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']); json_return_and_die($ret); } foreach ($r as $hubsite) { // verify the url_sig // If the server was re-installed at some point, there could be multiple hubs with the same url and callback. // Only one will have a valid key. $forgery = true; $secret_fail = true; $sitekey = $hubsite['hubloc_sitekey']; logger('mod_zot: Checking sitekey: ' . $sitekey, LOGGER_DATA); if(rsa_verify($data['callback'],base64url_decode($data['callback_sig']),$sitekey)) { $forgery = false; } if(rsa_verify($data['secret'],base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$sitekey)) { $secret_fail = false; } if((! $forgery) && (! $secret_fail)) break; } if($forgery) { $ret['message'] = 'possible site forgery'; logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']); json_return_and_die($ret); } if($secret_fail) { $ret['message'] = 'secret validation failed'; logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']); json_return_and_die($ret); } /* * If we made it to here, the signatures verify, but we still don't know if the tracking ID is valid. * It wouldn't be an error if the tracking ID isn't found, because we may have sent this particular * queue item with another pickup (after the tracking ID for the other pickup was verified). */ $r = q("select outq_posturl from outq where outq_hash = '%s' and outq_posturl = '%s' limit 1", dbesc($data['secret']), dbesc($data['callback']) ); if(! $r) { $ret['message'] = 'nothing to pick up'; logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']); json_return_and_die($ret); } /* * Everything is good if we made it here, so find all messages that are going to this location * and send them all. */ $r = q("select * from outq where outq_posturl = '%s'", dbesc($data['callback']) ); if($r) { logger('mod_zot: successful pickup message received from ' . $data['callback'] . ' ' . count($r) . ' message(s) picked up', LOGGER_DEBUG); $ret['success'] = true; $ret['pickup'] = array(); foreach($r as $rr) { if($rr['outq_msg']) { $x = json_decode($rr['outq_msg'],true); if(! $x) continue; if(array_key_exists('message_list',$x)) { foreach($x['message_list'] as $xx) { $ret['pickup'][] = array('notify' => json_decode($rr['outq_notify'],true),'message' => $xx); } } else $ret['pickup'][] = array('notify' => json_decode($rr['outq_notify'],true),'message' => $x); $x = q("delete from outq where outq_hash = '%s'", dbesc($rr['outq_hash']) ); } } } $encrypted = crypto_encapsulate(json_encode($ret),$sitekey); json_return_and_die($encrypted); /* pickup: end */ } /* * All other message types require us to verify the sender. This is a generic check, so we * will do it once here and bail if anything goes wrong. */ if (array_key_exists('sender',$data)) { $sender = $data['sender']; } /* Check if the sender is already verified here */ $hubs = zot_gethub($sender,true); if (! $hubs) { /* Have never seen this guid or this guid coming from this location. Check it and register it. */ // (!!) this will validate the sender $result = zot_register_hub($sender); if ((! $result['success']) || (! ($hubs = zot_gethub($sender,true)))) { $ret['message'] = 'Hub not available.'; logger('mod_zot: no hub'); json_return_and_die($ret); } } foreach($hubs as $hub) { $sitekey = $hub['hubloc_sitekey']; if(array_key_exists('sitekey',$sender) && $sender['sitekey']) { /* * This hub has now been proven to be valid. * Any hub with the same URL and a different sitekey cannot be valid. * Get rid of them (mark them deleted). There's a good chance they were re-installs. */ q("update hubloc set hubloc_flags = ( hubloc_flags | %d ) where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '%s' ", intval(HUBLOC_FLAGS_DELETED), dbesc($hub['hubloc_url']), dbesc($sender['sitekey']) ); $sitekey = $sender['sitekey']; } // $sender['sitekey'] is a new addition to the protcol to distinguish // hublocs coming from re-installed sites. Older sites will not provide // this field and we have to still mark them valid, since we can't tell // if this hubloc has the same sitekey as the packet we received. // Update our DB to show when we last communicated successfully with this hub // This will allow us to prune dead hubs from using up resources $r = q("update hubloc set hubloc_connected = '%s' where hubloc_id = %d and hubloc_sitekey = '%s' ", dbesc(datetime_convert()), intval($hub['hubloc_id']), dbesc($sitekey) ); // a dead hub came back to life - reset any tombstones we might have if ($hub['hubloc_status'] & HUBLOC_OFFLINE) { q("update hubloc set hubloc_status = (hubloc_status & ~%d) where hubloc_id = %d and hubloc_sitekey = '%s' ", intval(HUBLOC_OFFLINE), intval($hub['hubloc_id']), dbesc($sitekey) ); if ($r[0]['hubloc_flags'] & HUBLOC_FLAGS_ORPHANCHECK) { q("update hubloc set hubloc_flags = (hubloc_flags & ~%d) where hubloc_id = %d and hubloc_sitekey = '%s' ", intval(HUBLOC_FLAGS_ORPHANCHECK), intval($hub['hubloc_id']), dbesc($sitekey) ); } q("update xchan set xchan_flags = (xchan_flags & ~%d) where (xchan_flags & %d)>0 and xchan_hash = '%s'", intval(XCHAN_FLAGS_ORPHAN), intval(XCHAN_FLAGS_ORPHAN), dbesc($hub['hubloc_hash']) ); } $connecting_url = $hub['hubloc_url']; } /** @TODO check which hub is primary and take action if mismatched */ if (array_key_exists('recipients', $data)) $recipients = $data['recipients']; if ($msgtype === 'auth_check') { /* * Requestor visits /magic/?dest=somewhere on their own site with a browser * magic redirects them to $destsite/post [with auth args....] * $destsite sends an auth_check packet to originator site * The auth_check packet is handled here by the originator's site * - the browser session is still waiting * inside $destsite/post for everything to verify * If everything checks out we'll return a token to $destsite * and then $destsite will verify the token, authenticate the browser * session and then redirect to the original destination. * If authentication fails, the redirection to the original destination * will still take place but without authentication. */ logger('mod_zot: auth_check', LOGGER_DEBUG); if (! $encrypted_packet) { logger('mod_zot: auth_check packet was not encrypted.'); $ret['message'] .= 'no packet encryption' . EOL; json_return_and_die($ret); } $arr = $data['sender']; $sender_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'],$arr['guid_sig']); // garbage collect any old unused notifications // This was and should be 10 minutes but my hosting provider has time lag between the DB and // the web server. We should probably convert this to webserver time rather than DB time so // that the different clocks won't affect it and allow us to keep the time short. q("delete from verify where type = 'auth' and created < %s - INTERVAL %s", db_utcnow(), db_quoteinterval('30 MINUTE') ); $y = q("select xchan_pubkey from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1", dbesc($sender_hash) ); // We created a unique hash in mod/magic.php when we invoked remote auth, and stored it in // the verify table. It is now coming back to us as 'secret' and is signed by a channel at the other end. // First verify their signature. We will have obtained a zot-info packet from them as part of the sender // verification. if ((! $y) || (! rsa_verify($data['secret'], base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$y[0]['xchan_pubkey']))) { logger('mod_zot: auth_check: sender not found or secret_sig invalid.'); $ret['message'] .= 'sender not found or sig invalid ' . print_r($y,true) . EOL; json_return_and_die($ret); } // There should be exactly one recipient, the original auth requestor $ret['message'] .= 'recipients ' . print_r($recipients,true) . EOL; if ($data['recipients']) { $arr = $data['recipients'][0]; $recip_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'], $arr['guid_sig']); $c = q("select channel_id, channel_account_id, channel_prvkey from channel where channel_hash = '%s' limit 1", dbesc($recip_hash) ); if (! $c) { logger('mod_zot: auth_check: recipient channel not found.'); $ret['message'] .= 'recipient not found.' . EOL; json_return_and_die($ret); } $confirm = base64url_encode(rsa_sign($data['secret'] . $recip_hash,$c[0]['channel_prvkey'])); // This additionally checks for forged sites since we already stored the expected result in meta // and we've already verified that this is them via zot_gethub() and that their key signed our token $z = q("select id from verify where channel = %d and type = 'auth' and token = '%s' and meta = '%s' limit 1", intval($c[0]['channel_id']), dbesc($data['secret']), dbesc($data['sender']['url']) ); if (! $z) { logger('mod_zot: auth_check: verification key not found.'); $ret['message'] .= 'verification key not found' . EOL; json_return_and_die($ret); } $r = q("delete from verify where id = %d", intval($z[0]['id']) ); $u = q("select account_service_class from account where account_id = %d limit 1", intval($c[0]['channel_account_id']) ); logger('mod_zot: auth_check: success', LOGGER_DEBUG); $ret['success'] = true; $ret['confirm'] = $confirm; if ($u && $u[0]['account_service_class']) $ret['service_class'] = $u[0]['account_service_class']; // Set "do not track" flag if this site or this channel's profile is restricted // in some way if (intval(get_config('system','block_public'))) $ret['DNT'] = true; if (! perm_is_allowed($c[0]['channel_id'],'','view_profile')) $ret['DNT'] = true; if (get_pconfig($c[0]['channel_id'],'system','do_not_track')) $ret['DNT'] = true; if (get_pconfig($c[0]['channel_id'],'system','hide_online_status')) $ret['DNT'] = true; json_return_and_die($ret); } json_return_and_die($ret); } if ($msgtype === 'request') { // request a particular post/conversation by message_id $x = zot_process_message_request($data); json_return_and_die($x); } if ($msgtype === 'purge') { if ($recipients) { // basically this means "unfriend" foreach ($recipients as $recip) { $r = q("select channel.*,xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash where channel_guid = '%s' and channel_guid_sig = '%s' limit 1", dbesc($recip['guid']), dbesc($recip['guid_sig']) ); if ($r) { $r = q("select abook_id from abook where uid = %d and abook_xchan = '%s' limit 1", intval($r[0]['channel_id']), dbesc(make_xchan_hash($sender['guid'],$sender['guid_sig'])) ); if ($r) { contact_remove($r[0]['channel_id'],$r[0]['abook_id']); } } } } else { // Unfriend everybody - basically this means the channel has committed suicide $arr = $data['sender']; $sender_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'],$arr['guid_sig']); require_once('include/Contact.php'); remove_all_xchan_resources($sender_hash); $ret['success'] = true; json_return_and_die($ret); } } if (($msgtype === 'refresh') || ($msgtype === 'force_refresh')) { // remote channel info (such as permissions or photo or something) // has been updated. Grab a fresh copy and sync it. // The difference between refresh and force_refresh is that // force_refresh unconditionally creates a directory update record, // even if no changes were detected upon processing. if ($recipients) { // This would be a permissions update, typically for one connection foreach ($recipients as $recip) { $r = q("select channel.*,xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash where channel_guid = '%s' and channel_guid_sig = '%s' limit 1", dbesc($recip['guid']), dbesc($recip['guid_sig']) ); $x = zot_refresh(array( 'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'], 'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'], 'hubloc_url' => $sender['url'] ), $r[0], (($msgtype === 'force_refresh') ? true : false)); } } else { // system wide refresh $x = zot_refresh(array( 'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'], 'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'], 'hubloc_url' => $sender['url'] ), null, (($msgtype === 'force_refresh') ? true : false)); } $ret['success'] = true; json_return_and_die($ret); } if ($msgtype === 'notify') { logger('notify received from ' . $connecting_url); $async = get_config('system','queued_fetch'); if ($async) { // add to receive queue // qreceive_add($data); } else { $x = zot_fetch($data); $ret['delivery_report'] = $x; } $ret['success'] = true; json_return_and_die($ret); } // catchall json_return_and_die($ret); }