account = $user_record; $_SESSION['account_id'] = $user_record['account_id']; $_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1; if($login_initial || $update_lastlog) { q("update account set account_lastlog = '%s' where account_id = %d limit 1", dbesc(datetime_convert()), intval($_SESSION['account_id']) ); $a->account['account_lastlog'] = datetime_convert(); call_hooks('logged_in', $a->account); } $uid_to_load = (((x($_SESSION,'uid')) && (intval($_SESSION['uid']))) ? intval($_SESSION['uid']) : intval($a->account['account_default_channel']) ); if($uid_to_load) { change_channel($uid_to_load); } } if($login_initial) call_hooks('logged_in', $user_record); if($return || x($_SESSION,'workflow')) { unset($_SESSION['workflow']); return; } if(($a->module !== 'home') && x($_SESSION,'login_return_url') && strlen($_SESSION['login_return_url'])) { $return_url = $_SESSION['login_return_url']; unset($_SESSION['login_return_url']); goaway($a->get_baseurl() . '/' . $return_url); } } function change_channel($change_channel) { $ret = false; if($change_channel) { $r = q("select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and channel_account_id = %d and not ( channel_pageflags & %d) limit 1", intval($change_channel), intval(get_account_id()), intval(PAGE_REMOVED) ); if($r) { $hash = $r[0]['channel_hash']; $_SESSION['uid'] = intval($r[0]['channel_id']); get_app()->set_channel($r[0]); $_SESSION['theme'] = $r[0]['channel_theme']; $_SESSION['mobile_theme'] = get_pconfig(local_user(),'system', 'mobile_theme'); date_default_timezone_set($r[0]['channel_timezone']); $ret = $r[0]; } $x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1", dbesc($hash) ); if($x) { $_SESSION['my_url'] = $x[0]['xchan_url']; $_SESSION['my_address'] = $x[0]['channel_address'] . '@' . substr(get_app()->get_baseurl(),strpos(get_app()->get_baseurl(),'://')+3); get_app()->set_observer($x[0]); get_app()->set_perms(get_all_perms(local_user(),$hash)); } if(! is_dir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address'])) @mkdir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address'], STORAGE_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS,true); } return $ret; } function permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) { $local_user = local_user(); $remote_user = remote_user(); /** * Construct permissions * * default permissions - anonymous user */ $sql = " AND allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND deny_cid = '' AND deny_gid = '' "; /** * Profile owner - everything is visible */ if(($local_user) && ($local_user == $owner_id)) { $sql = ''; } /** * Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified, * check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id * and load the groups the visitor belongs to. * If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already * done this and passed the groups into this function. */ else { $observer = get_observer_hash(); if($observer) { $groups = init_groups_visitor($observer); $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) { foreach($groups as $g) $gs .= '|<' . $g . '>'; } $sql = sprintf( " AND ( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid REGEXP '%s') AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '') ) ) ", dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')), dbesc($gs), dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')), dbesc($gs) ); } } return $sql; } function item_permissions_sql($owner_id,$remote_verified = false,$groups = null) { $local_user = local_user(); $remote_user = remote_user(); /** * Construct permissions * * default permissions - anonymous user */ $sql = " AND not item_private "; /** * Profile owner - everything is visible */ if(($local_user) && ($local_user == $owner_id)) { $sql = ''; } /** * Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified, * check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id * and load the groups the visitor belongs to. * If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already * done this and passed the groups into this function. */ else { $observer = get_observer_hash(); if($observer) { $groups = init_groups_visitor($observer); $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) { foreach($groups as $g) $gs .= '|<' . $g . '>'; } $sql = sprintf( " AND ( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid REGEXP '%s') AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '') ) ) ", dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')), dbesc($gs), dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')), dbesc($gs) ); } } return $sql; } function public_permissions_sql($observer_hash) { $observer = get_app()->get_observer(); $groups = init_groups_visitor($observer_hash); $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) { foreach($groups as $g) $gs .= '|<' . $g . '>'; } $sql = ''; if($observer_hash) { $sql = sprintf( " OR (( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid REGEXP '%s') AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid REGEXP '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '') ) )) ", dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')), dbesc($gs), dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')), dbesc($gs) ); } return $sql; } /* * Functions used to protect against Cross-Site Request Forgery * The security token has to base on at least one value that an attacker can't know - here it's the session ID and the private key. * In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes; * or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours). * The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case: * A security token is used to protekt a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link). * If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer. * Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are, * so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types). */ function get_form_security_token($typename = '') { $a = get_app(); $timestamp = time(); $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename); return $timestamp . '.' . $sec_hash; } function check_form_security_token($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { if (!x($_REQUEST, $formname)) return false; $hash = $_REQUEST[$formname]; $max_livetime = 10800; // 3 hours $a = get_app(); $x = explode('.', $hash); if (time() > (IntVal($x[0]) + $max_livetime)) return false; $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $x[0] . $typename); return ($sec_hash == $x[1]); } function check_form_security_std_err_msg() { return t('The form security token was not correct. This probably happened because the form has been opened for too long (>3 hours) before submitting it.') . EOL; } function check_form_security_token_redirectOnErr($err_redirect, $typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) { $a = get_app(); logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . $a->user['guid'] . ' - form element ' . $typename); logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA); notice( check_form_security_std_err_msg() ); goaway($a->get_baseurl() . $err_redirect ); } } function check_form_security_token_ForbiddenOnErr($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) { $a = get_app(); logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . $a->user['guid'] . ' - form element ' . $typename); logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA); header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden'); killme(); } } // Returns an array of group id's this contact is a member of. // This array will only contain group id's related to the uid of this // DFRN contact. They are *not* neccessarily unique across the entire site. if(! function_exists('init_groups_visitor')) { function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) { $groups = array(); $r = q("SELECT hash FROM `groups` left join group_member on groups.id = group_member.gid WHERE xchan = '%s' ", dbesc($contact_id) ); if(count($r)) { foreach($r as $rr) $groups[] = $rr['hash']; } return $groups; }} // This is used to determine which uid have posts which are visible to the logged in user (from the API) for the // public_timeline, and we can use this in a community page by making $perms_min = PERMS_NETWORK unless logged in. // Collect uids of everybody on this site who has opened their posts to everybody on this site (or greater visibility) // We always include yourself if logged in because you can always see your own posts // resolving granular permissions for the observer against every person and every post on the site // will likely be too expensive. // Returns a string list of comma separated channel_ids suitable for direct inclusion in a SQL query function stream_perms_api_uids($perms_min = PERMS_SITE) { $ret = array(); if(local_user()) $ret[] = local_user(); $r = q("select channel_id from channel where channel_r_stream > 0 and channel_r_stream <= %d", intval($perms_min) ); if($r) foreach($r as $rr) if(! in_array($rr['channel_id'],$ret)) $ret[] = $rr['channel_id']; $str = ''; if($ret) foreach($ret as $rr) { if($str) $str .= ','; $str .= intval($rr); } logger('stream_perms_api_uids: ' . $str); return $str; } function stream_perms_xchans($perms_min = PERMS_SITE) { $ret = array(); if(local_user()) $ret[] = get_observer_hash(); $r = q("select channel_hash from channel where channel_r_stream > 0 and channel_r_stream <= %d", intval($perms_min) ); if($r) foreach($r as $rr) if(! in_array($rr['channel_hash'],$ret)) $ret[] = $rr['channel_hash']; $str = ''; if($ret) foreach($ret as $rr) { if($str) $str .= ','; $str .= "'" . dbesc($rr) . "'"; } logger('stream_perms_xchans: ' . $str); return $str; }