$atoken['atoken_id'], 'xchan_hash' => substr($c['channel_hash'],0,16) . '.' . $atoken['atoken_name'], 'xchan_name' => $atoken['atoken_name'], 'xchan_addr' => 'guest:' . $atoken['atoken_name'] . '@' . \App::get_hostname(), 'xchan_network' => 'unknown', 'xchan_url' => z_root() . '/guest/' . substr($c['channel_hash'],0,16) . '.' . $atoken['atoken_name'], 'xchan_hidden' => 1, 'xchan_photo_mimetype' => 'image/png', 'xchan_photo_l' => z_root() . '/' . get_default_profile_photo(300), 'xchan_photo_m' => z_root() . '/' . get_default_profile_photo(80), 'xchan_photo_s' => z_root() . '/' . get_default_profile_photo(48) ]; } return null; } function atoken_delete($atoken_id) { $r = q("select * from atoken where atoken_id = %d", intval($atoken_id) ); if(! $r) return; $c = q("select channel_id, channel_hash from channel where channel_id = %d", intval($r[0]['atoken_uid']) ); if(! $c) return; $atoken_xchan = substr($c[0]['channel_hash'],0,16) . '.' . $r[0]['atoken_name']; q("delete from atoken where atoken_id = %d", intval($atoken_id) ); q("delete from abconfig where chan = %d and xchan = '%s'", intval($c[0]['channel_id']), dbesc($atoken_xchan) ); } /** * @brief * * In order for atoken logins to create content (such as posts) they need a stored xchan. * we'll create one on the first atoken_login; it can't really ever go away but perhaps * @fixme we should set xchan_deleted if it's expired or removed * * @param array $xchan * @return void|boolean */ function atoken_create_xchan($xchan) { $r = q("select xchan_hash from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s'", dbesc($xchan['xchan_hash']) ); if($r) return; $xchan['xchan_guid'] = $xchan['xchan_hash']; $store = []; foreach($xchan as $k => $v) { if(strpos($k,'xchan_') === 0) { $store[$k] = $v; } } $r = xchan_store_lowlevel($store); return true; } function atoken_abook($uid,$xchan_hash) { if(substr($xchan_hash,16,1) != '.') return false; $r = q("select channel_hash from channel where channel_id = %d limit 1", intval($uid) ); if(! $r) return false; $x = q("select * from atoken where atoken_uid = %d and atoken_name = '%s'", intval($uid), dbesc(substr($xchan_hash,17)) ); if($x) { $xchan = atoken_xchan($x[0]); $xchan['abook_blocked'] = 0; $xchan['abook_ignored'] = 0; $xchan['abook_pending'] = 0; return $xchan; } return false; } function pseudo_abook($xchan) { if(! $xchan) return false; // set abook_pseudo to flag that we aren't really connected. $xchan['abook_pseudo'] = 1; $xchan['abook_blocked'] = 0; $xchan['abook_ignored'] = 0; $xchan['abook_pending'] = 0; return $xchan; } /** * @brief Change to another channel with current logged-in account. * * @param int $change_channel The channel_id of the channel you want to change to * * @return bool|array false or channel record of the new channel */ function change_channel($change_channel) { $ret = false; if($change_channel) { $r = q("select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and channel_account_id = %d and channel_removed = 0 limit 1", intval($change_channel), intval(get_account_id()) ); // It's not there. Is this an administrator, and is this the sys channel? if (is_developer()) { if (! $r) { if (is_site_admin()) { $r = q("select channel.*, xchan.* from channel left join xchan on channel.channel_hash = xchan.xchan_hash where channel_id = %d and channel_system = 1 and channel_removed = 0 limit 1", intval($change_channel) ); } } } if($r) { $hash = $r[0]['channel_hash']; $_SESSION['uid'] = intval($r[0]['channel_id']); App::set_channel($r[0]); $_SESSION['theme'] = $r[0]['channel_theme']; $_SESSION['mobile_theme'] = get_pconfig(local_channel(),'system', 'mobile_theme'); $_SESSION['cloud_tiles'] = get_pconfig(local_channel(),'system', 'cloud_tiles'); date_default_timezone_set($r[0]['channel_timezone']); // Update the active timestamp at most once a day if(substr($r[0]['channel_active'],0,10) !== substr(datetime_convert(),0,10)) { $z = q("UPDATE channel SET channel_active = '%s' WHERE channel_id = %d", dbesc(datetime_convert()), intval($r[0]['channel_id']) ); } $ret = $r[0]; } $x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1", dbesc($hash) ); if($x) { $_SESSION['my_url'] = $x[0]['xchan_url']; $_SESSION['my_address'] = channel_reddress($r[0]); App::set_observer($x[0]); App::set_perms(get_all_perms(local_channel(), $hash)); } if(! is_dir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address'])) @os_mkdir('store/' . $r[0]['channel_address'], STORAGE_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS,true); $arr = [ 'channel_id' => $change_channel, 'chanx' => $ret ]; call_hooks('change_channel', $arr); } return $ret; } /** * @brief Creates an additional SQL where statement to check permissions. * * @param int $owner_id * @param bool $remote_observer (optional) use current observer if unset * @param $table (optional) * * @return string additional SQL where statement */ function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '') { $local_channel = local_channel(); /** * Construct permissions * * default permissions - anonymous user */ if ($table) $table .= '.'; $sql = " AND {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '' AND {$table}deny_cid = '' AND {$table}deny_gid = '' "; /** * Profile owner - everything is visible */ if (($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) { return EMPTY_STR; } /** * Authenticated visitor. */ else { $observer = ((! is_null($remote_observer)) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash()); if ($observer) { $sec = get_security_ids($owner_id,$observer); // always allow the channel owner, even if authenticated as a visitor if ($sec['channel_id']) { foreach ($sec['channel_id'] as $ch) { if ($observer === $ch) { return EMPTY_STR; } } } if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) { $ca = []; foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) { $ca[] = '<' . $c . '>'; } $cs = implode('|',$ca); } else { $cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) { $ga = []; foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) { $ga[] = '<' . $g . '>'; } $gs = implode('|',$ga); } else { $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } $regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP'); $sql = sprintf( " AND ( NOT ({$table}deny_cid regexop '%s' OR {$table}deny_gid $regexop '%s') AND ( {$table}allow_cid regexop '%s' OR {$table}allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '') ) ) ", dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs), dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs) ); } } return $sql; } /** * @brief Creates an additional SQL where statement to check permissions for an item. * * @param int $owner_id * @param bool $remote_observer (optional) use current observer if unset * * @return string additional SQL where statement */ function item_permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null) { $local_channel = local_channel(); /** * Construct permissions * * default permissions - anonymous user */ $sql = " AND item_private = 0 "; /** * Profile owner - everything is visible */ if(($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) { $sql = ''; } /** * Authenticated visitor. */ else { $observer = (($remote_observer) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash()); if($observer) { $scope = scopes_sql($owner_id,$observer); $sec = get_security_ids($owner_id,$observer); // always allow the channel owner, even if authenticated as a visitor if($sec['channel_id']) { foreach($sec['channel_id'] as $ch) { if($observer === $ch) { return EMPTY_STR; } } } if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) { $ca = []; foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) { $ca[] = '<' . $c . '>'; } $cs = implode('|',$ca); } else { $cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) { $ga = []; foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) { $ga[] = '<' . $g . '>'; } $gs = implode('|',$ga); } else { $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } $regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP'); $sql = sprintf( " AND (( NOT (deny_cid regexop '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s') AND ( allow_cid regexop '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0 )) ) OR ( item_private = 1 $scope )) ", dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs), dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs) ); } } return $sql; } /** * Remote visitors also need to be checked against the public_scope parameter if item_private is set. * This function checks the various permutations of that field for any which apply to this observer. * */ function scopes_sql($uid,$observer) { $str = " and ( public_policy = 'authenticated' "; if(! is_foreigner($observer)) $str .= " or public_policy = 'network: red' "; if(local_channel()) $str .= " or public_policy = 'site: " . App::get_hostname() . "' "; $ab = q("select * from abook where abook_xchan = '%s' and abook_channel = %d limit 1", dbesc($observer), intval($uid) ); if(! $ab) return $str . " ) "; if($ab[0]['abook_pending']) $str .= " or public_policy = 'any connections' "; $str .= " or public_policy = 'contacts' ) "; return $str; } /** * @param string $observer_hash * * @return string additional SQL where statement */ function public_permissions_sql($observer_hash) { $owner_id = 0; if ($observer_hash) { $sec = get_security_ids($owner_id,$observer_hash); if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) { $ca = []; foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) { $ca[] = '<' . $c . '>'; } $cs = implode('|',$ca); } else { $cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) { $ga = []; foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) { $ga[] = '<' . $g . '>'; } $gs = implode('|',$ga); } else { $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } $regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP'); $sql = sprintf( " AND ( NOT (deny_cid regexop '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s') AND ( allow_cid regexop '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0) ) ) ", dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs), dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs) ); } else { $sql = EMPTY_STR; } return $sql; } /* * Functions used to protect against Cross-Site Request Forgery * The security token has to base on at least one value that an attacker can't know - here it's the session ID and the private key. * In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes; * or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours). * The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case: * A security token is used to protect a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link). * If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer. * Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are, * so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types). */ function get_form_security_token($typename = '') { $timestamp = time(); $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', App::$observer['xchan_guid'] . ((local_channel()) ? App::$channel['channel_prvkey'] : '') . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename); return $timestamp . '.' . $sec_hash; } function check_form_security_token($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { if (!x($_REQUEST, $formname)) return false; $hash = $_REQUEST[$formname]; $max_livetime = 10800; // 3 hours $x = explode('.', $hash); if (time() > (IntVal($x[0]) + $max_livetime)) return false; $sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', App::$observer['xchan_guid'] . ((local_channel()) ? App::$channel['channel_prvkey'] : '') . session_id() . $x[0] . $typename); return ($sec_hash == $x[1]); } function check_form_security_std_err_msg() { return t('The form security token was not correct. This probably happened because the form has been opened for too long (>3 hours) before submitting it.') . EOL; } function check_form_security_token_redirectOnErr($err_redirect, $typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) { logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . App::$observer['xchan_name'] . ' - form element ' . $typename); logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA); notice( check_form_security_std_err_msg() ); goaway(z_root() . $err_redirect ); } } function check_form_security_token_ForbiddenOnErr($typename = '', $formname = 'form_security_token') { if (!check_form_security_token($typename, $formname)) { logger('check_form_security_token failed: user ' . App::$observer['xchan_name'] . ' - form element ' . $typename); logger('check_form_security_token failed: _REQUEST data: ' . print_r($_REQUEST, true), LOGGER_DATA); header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden'); killme(); } } // Returns an array of group hash id's on this entire site (across all channels) that this connection is a member of. // var $contact_id = xchan_hash of connection function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) { $groups = []; $x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s'", dbesc($contact_id) ); if (! $x) { return $groups; } // include xchans for all zot-like networks $xchans = q("select xchan_hash from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' OR ( xchan_guid = '%s' AND xchan_pubkey = '%s' ) ", dbesc($contact_id), dbesc($x[0]['xchan_guid']), dbesc($x[0]['xchan_pubkey']) ); if($xchans) { $hashes = ids_to_querystr($xchans,'xchan_hash',true); } // private profiles are treated as a virtual group $r = q("SELECT abook_profile from abook where abook_xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) and abook_profile != '' "); if ($r) { foreach ($r as $rv) { $groups[] = 'vp.' . $rv['abook_profile']; } } // physical groups this identity is a member of $r = q("SELECT hash FROM pgrp left join pgrp_member on pgrp.id = pgrp_member.gid WHERE xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) "); if ($r) { foreach ($r as $rr) $groups[] = $rr['hash']; } return $groups; } function get_security_ids($channel_id, $ob_hash) { $ret = [ 'channel_id' => [], 'allow_cid' => [], 'allow_gid' => [] ]; if($channel_id) { $ch = q("select channel_hash, portable_id from channel where channel_id = %d", intval($channel_id) ); if($ch) { $ret['channel_id'][] = $ch[0]['channel_hash']; $ret['channel_id'][] = $ch[0]['portable_id']; } } $groups = []; $x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s'", dbesc($ob_hash) ); if ($x) { // include xchans for all zot-like networks $xchans = q("select xchan_hash from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' OR ( xchan_guid = '%s' AND xchan_pubkey = '%s' ) ", dbesc($ob_hash), dbesc($x[0]['xchan_guid']), dbesc($x[0]['xchan_pubkey']) ); if ($xchans) { $ret['allow_cid'] = ids_to_array($xchans,'xchan_hash'); $hashes = ids_to_querystr($xchans,'xchan_hash',true); // private profiles are treated as a virtual group $r = q("SELECT abook_profile from abook where abook_xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) and abook_profile != '' "); if($r) { foreach ($r as $rv) { $groups[] = 'vp.' . $rv['abook_profile']; } } // physical groups this identity is a member of $r = q("SELECT hash FROM pgrp left join pgrp_member on pgrp.id = pgrp_member.gid WHERE xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) "); if($r) { foreach ($r as $rv) { $groups[] = $rv['hash']; } } $ret['allow_gid'] = $groups; } } return $ret; } // This is used to determine which uid have posts which are visible to the logged in user (from the API) for the // public_timeline, and we can use this in a community page by making // $perms = (PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) unless logged in. // Collect uids of everybody on this site who has opened their posts to everybody on this site (or greater visibility) // We always include yourself if logged in because you can always see your own posts // resolving granular permissions for the observer against every person and every post on the site // will likely be too expensive. // Returns a string list of comma separated channel_ids suitable for direct inclusion in a SQL query function stream_perms_api_uids($perms = NULL, $limit = 0, $rand = 0 ) { $perms = is_null($perms) ? (PERMS_SITE|PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) : $perms; $ret = array(); $limit_sql = (($limit) ? " LIMIT " . intval($limit) . " " : ''); $random_sql = (($rand) ? " ORDER BY " . db_getfunc('RAND') . " " : ''); if(local_channel()) $ret[] = local_channel(); $x = q("select uid, v from pconfig where cat = 'perm_limits' and k = 'view_stream' "); if($x) { $y = []; foreach($x as $xv) { if(intval($xv['v']) & $perms) { $y[] = $xv; } } if($y) { $ids = ids_to_querystr($y,'uid'); $r = q("select channel_id from channel where channel_id in ( $ids ) and ( channel_pageflags & %d ) = 0 and channel_system = 0 and channel_removed = 0 $random_sql $limit_sql ", intval(PAGE_ADULT|PAGE_CENSORED) ); if($r) { foreach($r as $rr) if(! in_array($rr['channel_id'], $ret)) $ret[] = $rr['channel_id']; } } } $str = ''; if($ret) { foreach($ret as $rr) { if($str) $str .= ','; $str .= intval($rr); } } else $str = "''"; logger('stream_perms_api_uids: ' . $str, LOGGER_DEBUG); return $str; } function stream_perms_xchans($perms = NULL ) { $perms = is_null($perms) ? (PERMS_SITE|PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) : $perms; $ret = array(); if(local_channel()) $ret[] = get_observer_hash(); $x = q("select uid, v from pconfig where cat = 'perm_limits' and k = 'view_stream' "); if($x) { $y = []; foreach($x as $xv) { if(intval($xv['v']) & $perms) { $y[] = $xv; } } if($y) { $ids = ids_to_querystr($y,'uid'); $r = q("select channel_hash from channel where channel_id in ( $ids ) and ( channel_pageflags & %d ) = 0 and channel_system = 0 and channel_removed = 0 ", intval(PAGE_ADULT|PAGE_CENSORED) ); if($r) { foreach($r as $rr) if(! in_array($rr['channel_hash'], $ret)) $ret[] = $rr['channel_hash']; } } } $str = ''; if($ret) { foreach($ret as $rr) { if($str) $str .= ','; $str .= "'" . dbesc($rr) . "'"; } } else $str = "''"; logger('stream_perms_xchans: ' . $str, LOGGER_DEBUG); return $str; }