diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | include/security.php | 248 |
1 files changed, 189 insertions, 59 deletions
diff --git a/include/security.php b/include/security.php index 44cd605dc..b9705a0e4 100644 --- a/include/security.php +++ b/include/security.php @@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ function change_channel($change_channel) { * * @return string additional SQL where statement */ + function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '') { $local_channel = local_channel(); @@ -316,7 +317,7 @@ function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '') { * default permissions - anonymous user */ - if($table) + if ($table) $table .= '.'; $sql = " AND {$table}allow_cid = '' @@ -329,38 +330,63 @@ function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '') { * Profile owner - everything is visible */ - if(($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) { - $sql = ''; + if (($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) { + return EMPTY_STR; } /** - * Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified, - * check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id - * and load the groups the visitor belongs to. - * If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already - * done this and passed the groups into this function. + * Authenticated visitor. */ else { + $observer = ((! is_null($remote_observer)) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash()); - if($observer) { - $groups = init_groups_visitor($observer); - $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match + if ($observer) { + + $sec = get_security_ids($owner_id,$observer); + + // always allow the channel owner, even if authenticated as a visitor + + if ($sec['channel_id']) { + foreach ($sec['channel_id'] as $ch) { + if ($observer === $ch) { + return EMPTY_STR; + } + } + } + + if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) { + $ca = []; + foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) { + $ca[] = '<' . $c . '>'; + } + $cs = implode('|',$ca); + } + else { + $cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match + } - if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) { - foreach($groups as $g) - $gs .= '|<' . $g . '>'; + if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) { + $ga = []; + foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) { + $ga[] = '<' . $g . '>'; + } + $gs = implode('|',$ga); + } + else { + $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match } + $regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP'); $sql = sprintf( - " AND ( NOT ({$table}deny_cid like '%s' OR {$table}deny_gid $regexop '%s') - AND ( {$table}allow_cid like '%s' OR {$table}allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '') ) + " AND ( NOT ({$table}deny_cid regexop '%s' OR {$table}deny_gid $regexop '%s') + AND ( {$table}allow_cid regexop '%s' OR {$table}allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '') ) ) ", - dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')), + dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs), - dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')), + dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs) ); } @@ -377,6 +403,7 @@ function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '') { * * @return string additional SQL where statement */ + function item_permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null) { $local_channel = local_channel(); @@ -398,37 +425,59 @@ function item_permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null) { } /** - * Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified, - * check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id - * and load the groups the visitor belongs to. - * If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already - * done this and passed the groups into this function. + * Authenticated visitor. */ else { - $observer = (($remote_observer) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash()); - if($observer) { + $observer = (($remote_observer) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash()); - $s = scopes_sql($owner_id,$observer); + if($observer) { - $groups = init_groups_visitor($observer); + $scope = scopes_sql($owner_id,$observer); + $sec = get_security_ids($owner_id,$observer); - $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match + // always allow the channel owner, even if authenticated as a visitor + + if($sec['channel_id']) { + foreach($sec['channel_id'] as $ch) { + if($observer === $ch) { + return EMPTY_STR; + } + } + } - if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) { - foreach($groups as $g) - $gs .= '|<' . $g . '>'; + if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) { + $ca = []; + foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) { + $ca[] = '<' . $c . '>'; + } + $cs = implode('|',$ca); + } + else { + $cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match + } + + if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) { + $ga = []; + foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) { + $ga[] = '<' . $g . '>'; + } + $gs = implode('|',$ga); } + else { + $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match + } + $regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP'); $sql = sprintf( - " AND (( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s') - AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0 )) - ) OR ( item_private = 1 $s )) + " AND (( NOT (deny_cid regexop '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s') + AND ( allow_cid regexop '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0 )) + ) OR ( item_private = 1 $scope )) ", - dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')), + dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs), - dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')), + dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs) ); } @@ -465,40 +514,57 @@ function scopes_sql($uid,$observer) { } - - - - - /** * @param string $observer_hash * * @return string additional SQL where statement */ + function public_permissions_sql($observer_hash) { - $groups = init_groups_visitor($observer_hash); + $owner_id = 0; - $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match + if ($observer_hash) { + + $sec = get_security_ids($owner_id,$observer_hash); + + if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) { + $ca = []; + foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) { + $ca[] = '<' . $c . '>'; + } + $cs = implode('|',$ca); + } + else { + $cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match + } + + if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) { + $ga = []; + foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) { + $ga[] = '<' . $g . '>'; + } + $gs = implode('|',$ga); + } + else { + $gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match + } - if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) { - foreach($groups as $g) - $gs .= '|<' . $g . '>'; - } - $sql = ''; - if($observer_hash) { $regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP'); $sql = sprintf( - " OR (( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s') - AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0 ) ) - )) + " AND ( NOT (deny_cid regexop '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s') + AND ( allow_cid regexop '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0) ) + ) ", - dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')), + dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs), - dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')), + dbesc($cs), dbesc($gs) ); } + else { + $sql = EMPTY_STR; + } return $sql; } @@ -510,7 +576,7 @@ function public_permissions_sql($observer_hash) { * In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes; * or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours). * The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case: - * A security token is used to protekt a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link). + * A security token is used to protect a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link). * If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer. * Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are, * so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types). @@ -587,8 +653,8 @@ function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) { // private profiles are treated as a virtual group $r = q("SELECT abook_profile from abook where abook_xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) and abook_profile != '' "); - if($r) { - foreach($r as $rv) { + if ($r) { + foreach ($r as $rv) { $groups[] = 'vp.' . $rv['abook_profile']; } } @@ -596,8 +662,8 @@ function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) { // physical groups this identity is a member of $r = q("SELECT hash FROM pgrp left join pgrp_member on pgrp.id = pgrp_member.gid WHERE xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) "); - if($r) { - foreach($r as $rr) + if ($r) { + foreach ($r as $rr) $groups[] = $rr['hash']; } return $groups; @@ -605,6 +671,70 @@ function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) { + +function get_security_ids($channel_id, $ob_hash) { + + $ret = [ + 'channel_id' => [], + 'allow_cid' => [], + 'allow_gid' => [] + ]; + + if($channel_id) { + $ch = q("select channel_hash, portable_id from channel where channel_id = %d", + intval($channel_id) + ); + if($ch) { + $ret['channel_id'][] = $ch[0]['channel_hash']; + $ret['channel_id'][] = $ch[0]['portable_id']; + } + } + + $groups = []; + + $x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s'", + dbesc($ob_hash) + ); + + if ($x) { + + // include xchans for all zot-like networks + + $xchans = q("select xchan_hash from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' OR ( xchan_guid = '%s' AND xchan_pubkey = '%s' ) ", + dbesc($ob_hash), + dbesc($x[0]['xchan_guid']), + dbesc($x[0]['xchan_pubkey']) + ); + + if ($xchans) { + $ret['allow_cid'] = ids_to_array($xchans,'xchan_hash'); + $hashes = ids_to_querystr($xchans,'xchan_hash',true); + + // private profiles are treated as a virtual group + + $r = q("SELECT abook_profile from abook where abook_xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) and abook_profile != '' "); + if($r) { + foreach ($r as $rv) { + $groups[] = 'vp.' . $rv['abook_profile']; + } + } + + // physical groups this identity is a member of + + $r = q("SELECT hash FROM pgrp left join pgrp_member on pgrp.id = pgrp_member.gid WHERE xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) "); + if($r) { + foreach ($r as $rv) { + $groups[] = $rv['hash']; + } + } + $ret['allow_gid'] = $groups; + } + } + + return $ret; +} + + // This is used to determine which uid have posts which are visible to the logged in user (from the API) for the // public_timeline, and we can use this in a community page by making // $perms = (PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) unless logged in. |