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authorredmatrix <redmatrix@redmatrix.me>2015-12-06 19:16:38 -0800
committerredmatrix <redmatrix@redmatrix.me>2015-12-06 19:16:38 -0800
commit4ccd9ae6da2f4fbed45af80a11b53c8b4efd9ceb (patch)
treeaec9c03787e0117554f71b4fe86ab26dda71f026 /include
parent3f920da4137ecb91b3aeb2683f2e2b59b4d088cc (diff)
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start of v4
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r--include/message.php1
-rw-r--r--include/zot.php419
2 files changed, 420 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/message.php b/include/message.php
index 6a9e8328a..940fcc275 100644
--- a/include/message.php
+++ b/include/message.php
@@ -506,3 +506,4 @@ function private_messages_fetch_conversation($channel_id, $messageitem_id, $upda
return $messages;
}
+
diff --git a/include/zot.php b/include/zot.php
index d41d5e828..fa6258140 100644
--- a/include/zot.php
+++ b/include/zot.php
@@ -3989,3 +3989,422 @@ function delivery_report_is_storable($dr) {
}
+
+function update_hub_connected($hub,$sitekey = '') {
+
+ if($sitekey) {
+
+ /*
+ * This hub has now been proven to be valid.
+ * Any hub with the same URL and a different sitekey cannot be valid.
+ * Get rid of them (mark them deleted). There's a good chance they were re-installs.
+ */
+
+ q("update hubloc set hubloc_deleted = 1, hubloc_error = 1 where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '%s' ",
+ dbesc($hub['hubloc_url']),
+ dbesc($sitekey)
+ );
+
+ }
+ else {
+ $sitekey = $hub['sitekey'];
+ }
+
+ // $sender['sitekey'] is a new addition to the protcol to distinguish
+ // hublocs coming from re-installed sites. Older sites will not provide
+ // this field and we have to still mark them valid, since we can't tell
+ // if this hubloc has the same sitekey as the packet we received.
+
+
+ // Update our DB to show when we last communicated successfully with this hub
+ // This will allow us to prune dead hubs from using up resources
+
+ $r = q("update hubloc set hubloc_connected = '%s' where hubloc_id = %d and hubloc_sitekey = '%s' ",
+ dbesc(datetime_convert()),
+ intval($hub['hubloc_id']),
+ dbesc($sitekey)
+ );
+
+ // a dead hub came back to life - reset any tombstones we might have
+
+ if(intval($hub['hubloc_error'])) {
+ q("update hubloc set hubloc_error = 0 where hubloc_id = %d and hubloc_sitekey = '%s' ",
+ intval($hub['hubloc_id']),
+ dbesc($sitekey)
+ );
+ if(intval($r[0]['hubloc_orphancheck'])) {
+ q("update hubloc set hubloc_orhpancheck = 0 where hubloc_id = %d and hubloc_sitekey = '%s' ",
+ intval($hub['hubloc_id']),
+ dbesc($sitekey)
+ );
+ }
+ q("update xchan set xchan_orphan = 0 where xchan_orphan = 1 and xchan_hash = '%s'",
+ dbesc($hub['hubloc_hash'])
+ );
+ }
+
+ return $hub['hubloc_url'];
+}
+
+
+function zot_reply_ping() {
+
+ $ret = array('success'=> false);
+
+ // Useful to get a health check on a remote site.
+ // This will let us know if any important communication details
+ // that we may have stored are no longer valid, regardless of xchan details.
+ logger('POST: got ping send pong now back: ' . z_root() , LOGGER_DEBUG );
+
+ $ret['success'] = true;
+ $ret['site'] = array();
+ $ret['site']['url'] = z_root();
+ $ret['site']['url_sig'] = base64url_encode(rsa_sign(z_root(),get_config('system','prvkey')));
+ $ret['site']['sitekey'] = get_config('system','pubkey');
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+}
+
+function zot_reply_pickup($data) {
+
+ $ret = array('success'=> false);
+
+ /*
+ * The 'pickup' message arrives with a tracking ID which is associated with a particular outq_hash
+ * First verify that that the returned signatures verify, then check that we have an outbound queue item
+ * with the correct hash.
+ * If everything verifies, find any/all outbound messages in the queue for this hubloc and send them back
+ */
+
+ if((! $data['secret']) || (! $data['secret_sig'])) {
+ $ret['message'] = 'no verification signature';
+ logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message'], LOGGER_DEBUG);
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+ }
+
+ $r = q("select distinct hubloc_sitekey from hubloc where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_callback = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '' group by hubloc_sitekey ",
+ dbesc($data['url']),
+ dbesc($data['callback'])
+ );
+ if(! $r) {
+ $ret['message'] = 'site not found';
+ logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+ }
+
+ foreach ($r as $hubsite) {
+
+ // verify the url_sig
+ // If the server was re-installed at some point, there could be multiple hubs with the same url and callback.
+ // Only one will have a valid key.
+
+ $forgery = true;
+ $secret_fail = true;
+
+ $sitekey = $hubsite['hubloc_sitekey'];
+
+ logger('mod_zot: Checking sitekey: ' . $sitekey, LOGGER_DATA);
+
+ if(rsa_verify($data['callback'],base64url_decode($data['callback_sig']),$sitekey)) {
+ $forgery = false;
+ }
+ if(rsa_verify($data['secret'],base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$sitekey)) {
+ $secret_fail = false;
+ }
+ if((! $forgery) && (! $secret_fail))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if($forgery) {
+ $ret['message'] = 'possible site forgery';
+ logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+ }
+
+ if($secret_fail) {
+ $ret['message'] = 'secret validation failed';
+ logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we made it to here, the signatures verify, but we still don't know if the tracking ID is valid.
+ * It wouldn't be an error if the tracking ID isn't found, because we may have sent this particular
+ * queue item with another pickup (after the tracking ID for the other pickup was verified).
+ */
+
+ $r = q("select outq_posturl from outq where outq_hash = '%s' and outq_posturl = '%s' limit 1",
+ dbesc($data['secret']),
+ dbesc($data['callback'])
+ );
+ if(! $r) {
+ $ret['message'] = 'nothing to pick up';
+ logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Everything is good if we made it here, so find all messages that are going to this location
+ * and send them all.
+ */
+
+ $r = q("select * from outq where outq_posturl = '%s'",
+ dbesc($data['callback'])
+ );
+ if($r) {
+ logger('mod_zot: successful pickup message received from ' . $data['callback'] . ' ' . count($r) . ' message(s) picked up', LOGGER_DEBUG);
+
+ $ret['success'] = true;
+ $ret['pickup'] = array();
+ foreach($r as $rr) {
+ if($rr['outq_msg']) {
+ $x = json_decode($rr['outq_msg'],true);
+
+ if(! $x)
+ continue;
+
+ if(array_key_exists('message_list',$x)) {
+ foreach($x['message_list'] as $xx) {
+ $ret['pickup'][] = array('notify' => json_decode($rr['outq_notify'],true),'message' => $xx);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ $ret['pickup'][] = array('notify' => json_decode($rr['outq_notify'],true),'message' => $x);
+ $x = q("delete from outq where outq_hash = '%s'",
+ dbesc($rr['outq_hash'])
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ $encrypted = crypto_encapsulate(json_encode($ret),$sitekey);
+ json_return_and_die($encrypted);
+
+ /* pickup: end */
+}
+
+
+
+function zot_reply_auth_check($data,$encrypted_packet) {
+
+ $ret = array('success' => false);
+
+ /*
+ * Requestor visits /magic/?dest=somewhere on their own site with a browser
+ * magic redirects them to $destsite/post [with auth args....]
+ * $destsite sends an auth_check packet to originator site
+ * The auth_check packet is handled here by the originator's site
+ * - the browser session is still waiting
+ * inside $destsite/post for everything to verify
+ * If everything checks out we'll return a token to $destsite
+ * and then $destsite will verify the token, authenticate the browser
+ * session and then redirect to the original destination.
+ * If authentication fails, the redirection to the original destination
+ * will still take place but without authentication.
+ */
+ logger('mod_zot: auth_check', LOGGER_DEBUG);
+
+ if (! $encrypted_packet) {
+ logger('mod_zot: auth_check packet was not encrypted.');
+ $ret['message'] .= 'no packet encryption' . EOL;
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+ }
+
+ $arr = $data['sender'];
+ $sender_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'],$arr['guid_sig']);
+
+ // garbage collect any old unused notifications
+
+ // This was and should be 10 minutes but my hosting provider has time lag between the DB and
+ // the web server. We should probably convert this to webserver time rather than DB time so
+ // that the different clocks won't affect it and allow us to keep the time short.
+
+ q("delete from verify where type = 'auth' and created < %s - INTERVAL %s",
+ db_utcnow(), db_quoteinterval('30 MINUTE')
+ );
+
+ $y = q("select xchan_pubkey from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1",
+ dbesc($sender_hash)
+ );
+
+ // We created a unique hash in mod/magic.php when we invoked remote auth, and stored it in
+ // the verify table. It is now coming back to us as 'secret' and is signed by a channel at the other end.
+ // First verify their signature. We will have obtained a zot-info packet from them as part of the sender
+ // verification.
+
+ if ((! $y) || (! rsa_verify($data['secret'], base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$y[0]['xchan_pubkey']))) {
+ logger('mod_zot: auth_check: sender not found or secret_sig invalid.');
+ $ret['message'] .= 'sender not found or sig invalid ' . print_r($y,true) . EOL;
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+ }
+
+ // There should be exactly one recipient, the original auth requestor
+
+ $ret['message'] .= 'recipients ' . print_r($recipients,true) . EOL;
+
+ if ($data['recipients']) {
+
+ $arr = $data['recipients'][0];
+ $recip_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'], $arr['guid_sig']);
+ $c = q("select channel_id, channel_account_id, channel_prvkey from channel where channel_hash = '%s' limit 1",
+ dbesc($recip_hash)
+ );
+ if (! $c) {
+ logger('mod_zot: auth_check: recipient channel not found.');
+ $ret['message'] .= 'recipient not found.' . EOL;
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+ }
+
+ $confirm = base64url_encode(rsa_sign($data['secret'] . $recip_hash,$c[0]['channel_prvkey']));
+
+ // This additionally checks for forged sites since we already stored the expected result in meta
+ // and we've already verified that this is them via zot_gethub() and that their key signed our token
+
+ $z = q("select id from verify where channel = %d and type = 'auth' and token = '%s' and meta = '%s' limit 1",
+ intval($c[0]['channel_id']),
+ dbesc($data['secret']),
+ dbesc($data['sender']['url'])
+ );
+ if (! $z) {
+ logger('mod_zot: auth_check: verification key not found.');
+ $ret['message'] .= 'verification key not found' . EOL;
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+ }
+ $r = q("delete from verify where id = %d",
+ intval($z[0]['id'])
+ );
+
+ $u = q("select account_service_class from account where account_id = %d limit 1",
+ intval($c[0]['channel_account_id'])
+ );
+
+ logger('mod_zot: auth_check: success', LOGGER_DEBUG);
+ $ret['success'] = true;
+ $ret['confirm'] = $confirm;
+ if ($u && $u[0]['account_service_class'])
+ $ret['service_class'] = $u[0]['account_service_class'];
+
+ // Set "do not track" flag if this site or this channel's profile is restricted
+ // in some way
+
+ if (intval(get_config('system','block_public')))
+ $ret['DNT'] = true;
+ if (! perm_is_allowed($c[0]['channel_id'],'','view_profile'))
+ $ret['DNT'] = true;
+ if (get_pconfig($c[0]['channel_id'],'system','do_not_track'))
+ $ret['DNT'] = true;
+ if (get_pconfig($c[0]['channel_id'],'system','hide_online_status'))
+ $ret['DNT'] = true;
+
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+ }
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+}
+
+
+function zot_reply_purge($sender,$recipients) {
+
+ $ret = array('success' => false);
+
+ if ($recipients) {
+ // basically this means "unfriend"
+ foreach ($recipients as $recip) {
+ $r = q("select channel.*,xchan.* from channel
+ left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash
+ where channel_guid = '%s' and channel_guid_sig = '%s' limit 1",
+ dbesc($recip['guid']),
+ dbesc($recip['guid_sig'])
+ );
+ if ($r) {
+ $r = q("select abook_id from abook where uid = %d and abook_xchan = '%s' limit 1",
+ intval($r[0]['channel_id']),
+ dbesc(make_xchan_hash($sender['guid'],$sender['guid_sig']))
+ );
+ if ($r) {
+ contact_remove($r[0]['channel_id'],$r[0]['abook_id']);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ $ret['success'] = true;
+ }
+ else {
+ // Unfriend everybody - basically this means the channel has committed suicide
+ $arr = $sender;
+ $sender_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'],$arr['guid_sig']);
+
+ require_once('include/Contact.php');
+ remove_all_xchan_resources($sender_hash);
+
+ $ret['success'] = true;
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+ }
+
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+}
+
+
+function zot_reply_refresh($sender,$recipients) {
+
+ $ret = array('success' => false);
+
+ // remote channel info (such as permissions or photo or something)
+ // has been updated. Grab a fresh copy and sync it.
+ // The difference between refresh and force_refresh is that
+ // force_refresh unconditionally creates a directory update record,
+ // even if no changes were detected upon processing.
+
+ if($recipients) {
+
+ // This would be a permissions update, typically for one connection
+
+ foreach ($recipients as $recip) {
+ $r = q("select channel.*,xchan.* from channel
+ left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash
+ where channel_guid = '%s' and channel_guid_sig = '%s' limit 1",
+ dbesc($recip['guid']),
+ dbesc($recip['guid_sig'])
+ );
+
+ $x = zot_refresh(array(
+ 'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'],
+ 'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'],
+ 'hubloc_url' => $sender['url']
+ ), $r[0], (($msgtype === 'force_refresh') ? true : false));
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ // system wide refresh
+
+ $x = zot_refresh(array(
+ 'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'],
+ 'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'],
+ 'hubloc_url' => $sender['url']
+ ), null, (($msgtype === 'force_refresh') ? true : false));
+ }
+
+ $ret['success'] = true;
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+
+}
+
+
+function zot_reply_notify($data) {
+
+ $ret = array('success' => false);
+
+ logger('notify received from ' . $connecting_url);
+
+ $async = get_config('system','queued_fetch');
+
+ if($async) {
+ // add to receive queue
+ // qreceive_add($data);
+ }
+ else {
+ $x = zot_fetch($data);
+ $ret['delivery_report'] = $x;
+ }
+
+ $ret['success'] = true;
+ json_return_and_die($ret);
+
+} \ No newline at end of file